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NOTES AND COMMENTS
participate in major extracurricular activities unless he maintains a B
average in his Law School work.
LAw SCHOOL NEEDS
The present Library collection is hardly more than an ordinary working unit. It is not yet adequate for research and investigation of University calibre. To the end that these minimum facilities may be adequately expanded, an endowment is required which, in addition to state
appropriations for maintenance, will yield $2,500 a year for new books.
The Library is now confronted with a serious shortage of available
space for expansion. When the Law Building was constructed, twelve
years ago, arrangements were made for the housing of 25,000 volumes.
We are now 7,000 volumes in excess of our capacity. We face ihe
immediate necessity of converting a room in the basement, not connected
with the present Library, into library service with special supervision.
In the very near future we must plan for an addition to the building to
house not only the expanding Library but to furnish also much needed
seminar rooms and office space for research workers.
The amount of public work which the School is called upon to do is
constantly growing. More research assistance is imperative. And
scholarships and fellowships are vitally necessary if, in competition with
other University Law Schools, we are to have in our student body the
ablest students from the best Southern colleges.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bankruptcy-Distribution of Property Held by the Entirety
upon Bankruptcy of One or Both Spouses.
Husband and wife were adjudicated bankrupts on the same day,
and each listed all his property as held by the entireties. Nine days
prior to the adjudication, a creditor who held a joint obligation against
both spouses secured a joint judgment against them. Subsequently the
bankruptcy proceedings of both husband and wife were consolidated
by order of the court, but two days before consolidation the judgment
creditor petitioned for execution against all the property of both bankrupts. Held, the estate by the entirety passed to the trustee since by
consolidation he represented both husband and wife, and the joint judgment was a preference which should not prevail against the trustee.'
'In re Utz, 7 F. Supp. 612 (D. Md. 1934).
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It is generally held that the creditors of an individual spouse cannot
reach the estate by the entirety 2 for the reason that each spouse owns
the whole and to allow the debts of either to be satisfied out of the
estate would in effect be permitting one person's property to be taken
for the debts of another.3 A joint judgment against both spouses, however, can reach the estate, since they mutually own the property, and it
should be liable for their joint obligations. 4 The Bankruptcy Act gives
to the trustee the right of- a judgment creditor holding an execution
returned unsatisfied.6 Thus a trustee in bankruptcy representing the
husband and wife stands in the position of a creditor who holds a
joint judgment unsatisfied against both spouses, and such trustee should
be vested 'with the property held by the entirety. A judgment against
an individua obtained within four months before he becomes a bankrupt (and while he is insolvent) constitutes a preference and such judgment cannot prevail against the trustee settling the bankrupt's estate.0
The same rule should apply where a joint judgment against both
spouses, constituting a lien on the estate by the entirety, has been secured within four months before the legal entity of husband and wife
is adjudicated bankrupt. The result of the instant case to the effect
'A judgment against one spouse is not even a lien on the estate. Hood v.

Mercer, 150 N. C. 699, 64 S. E. 897 (1909). Such judgment will not prevent

husband and wife, acting jointly, from passing good title to the estate. WinchesterSimmons Co. v. Cutler, 199. N. C. 709, 155 S. E. 611 (1930).
'A. Hufel's Son v. Getty, 200 Fed. 939 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1924); Southern Distributing Co. v. Carraway, 189 N. C. 420, 127 S. E. 427 (1925) ; Note (1925) 35
A. L. R. 147. But see: Zubler v. Porter, 98 N. J. L. 444, 120 Atl. 194 (1923)
(A purchaser of the interest of one spouse at an execution sale procured the land
as a tenant in common with the other spouse subject to the right of survivorship
of either spouse. The Court declared that in New Jersey an estate by the entirety was the same as a tenancy in common with the right of survivorship attached); Marcum v. Marcum, 177 Ky. 186, 197 S. W. 655 (1917) (A purchaser
of the interest of one at an execution sale received only that part of the estate as
was proportionate to the portion of the purchase price paid by that particular
spouse).
At common law the husband was entitled to the whole usufruct of the
estate, and some courts held that this interest could be taken for his debts, Hall
v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670 (1877); Bennett v. Cheld, 19 Wis. 362 (1865). The
Married Women's Acts, however, in many jurisdictions took away the husband's
common-law; right to the usufruct, and this is given as an additional reason for
,not allowing the estate or the income to be taken for the husband's debs. Otto
F. Stiffet's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S. W. 67 (1918);
Notes (1925) 35 A. L. R. 147, (1925) 9 MINr. L. REV. 673, (1931) 29 Mxcn. L.
REv. 778. In North Carolina the husband retains his common-law right to all
the usufruct, but this income cannot be taken for his debts. Davis v. Bass, 188
N. C. 200, 124 S. E. 566 (1924).
' Sharpe v. Baker, 51 Ind. App. 547, 96 N. E. 627 (1911) ; Sanford v. Bertau,
204 Mich. 244, 169 N. W. 880 (1918) ; Martin v. Lewis, 187 N. C. 473, 122 S. E.
180 (1924); Note (1925) 35 A. L. R. 155.
11 U. S. C. A. §75 (a) 2 (1927) ; Imperial Assurance Co. v. Livingston, 49 F.
(2d) 745 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
11 U. S. C. A. §96 (b) (1927); Benjihnin v. Chandler, 143 Fed. 217 (M. D.
Pa. 1905) ; Moore v. John H. Smith and Sons, 205 Fed. 431 (W. D. N. Y. 1913).
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that the trustee in his dual capacity was vested with the property held
by the entirety, and that a joint judgment obtained within four months
7
constituted a preference is logically correct.
A joint creditor is faced with a different problem when only one
spouse (say the husband) goes bankrupt. Where the joint creditor has
not secured a judgment before the husband's discharge in bankruptcy,
it is generally held that he cannot get a joint judgment after the discharge since the husband's debts have been stricken out and only the
wife remains liable on the obligation. 8 The joint creditor is then unable to reach the estate by the entirety since the obligation he holds is
against only one spouse, 9 and the only way he may protect himself
against such loss is to go promptly into the federal court before the
husband's discharge and ask that the discharge be withheld until he,
the joint creditor, can secure in the state court a joint judgment which
will be a lien on the estate by the entirety.1 ° Such judgment may be
satisfied out of the estate by the entirety after the husband's discharge."1
The courts raise no question as to a preference in this situation.12 This
seems correct since the trustee in bankruptcy has no access to the estate
by the entirety.
The result of the principal case gives rise to the practical problem
of distribution among creditors of an estate by the entirety in bankruptcy proceedings. In the solution of this problem an apt analogy
might be drawn between an estate by the entirety and property held by
a partnership. 13 Where a partnership and the individual partners are
bankrupt at the same time, the funds of the partnership go first to pay
the debts of the partnership, and if there is any surplus, it is divided
7Only one case has been found dealing with this problem. In that case
husband and wife were declared bankrupt on same day and X was made trustee
for each individually, but no consolidation took place. Held, that X was not vested
with property held iby the entireties. Dickey v. Thompson, 323 Mo. 107, 18 S. W.
(2d) 388 (1929) commented on (1929) 43 HARV.L. REv. 312.
'Wharton v. Citizen's Bank, 223 Mo. App. 236, 15 S. W. (2d) 860 (1929);
'Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 1235.
'Supra note 3.
" Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Wharton v.
Citizen's Bank, 223 Mo. App. 236, 15 S. W. (2d) 860 (1929). Contra: Edwards
v. Pethick, 250 Mich. 315, 230 N. W. 186 (1930).
'u See Frey v. McGaw, 127 Md. 23, 95 At1.
960 (1915)
(A judgment was
secured before husband went bankrupt and was satisfied after his discharge,
but it was not necessary for the creditor to go into court and ask that the discharge be withheld as he had procured the judgment before bankruptcy proceedings were begun).
Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931). But see Ades
v. Chaplin, 132 Md. 66, 193 Ad. 94 (1918) (Joint judgment secured within four
months before husband was adjudicated a bankrupt was set aside as a preference.
This seems wrong since the trustee could not reach the estate by the entirety).
" An estate by the entirety and property held by partnership have been said to
present analogous situations in bankruptcy. Dickey v. Thompson, 323 Mo. 107,
18 S. W. (2d) 388 (1929).
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between the estates of the partners. 14 By analogy the estate by the
entirety should go first to pay the joint creditors. In some jurisdictions
where the estate by the entirety is not recognized in personalty received
from sale of realty held by entireties, 15 it is suggested that the surplus
should be divided' 6 between the estates of the spouses for payment of
the individual debts. The surplus, however, in other jurisdictions
would still be held by the entireties. 17 In these jurisdictions the trustee
of the estate of the individual spouse would not be vested with any part
of the surplus since a judgment creditor of the individual spouse could
not reach it,8 and the trustee has no more right than such creditor.' 9
The suggested distribution would protect joint creditors who make
loans believing they will be satisfied out of the estate by the entirety
and would allow the surplus to be used, when the law permits, in payment of the debts of the individual spouses.
ROBERT BOOTH.

Bankruptcy-Jurisdiction of Court Under 1933 Amendments.
A decision which will prove to be of unusual interest' to the profession, and of far-reaching importance, 2 is that of the Circuit Court of
Appeals in In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company.3
The railway company filed its petition in the Northern District of
Illinois for reorganization under the new Section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act.4 More than four months prior to the filing of the petition, the railway company had borrowed an aggregate of more than $17,000,000 from
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, two New York banks, two Illi11 U. S. C. A. §23 (f) (1927) ; Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 Fed. 73 (C. C
A. 8th, 1915) ; Titus v. Mawell, 281 Fed. 433 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922).
'Note (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv. 256.
"Division might be made
(1) by giving each estate a proportional part of
the surplus according to the portion each spouse paid of the purchase price; or
(2) by allotting one half of the surplus to each estate. The effect of this would
be to consider as a gift to one spouse by the other any amount in excess of one
half of the purchase price which the latter paid. See Arnold v. Lang, 11 F. (2d)
630 (E. D. Mo. 1926).
n Note (1935) 13 N. C. L. Rxv.
'Hill Top Savings and Trust Co. v. Worley, 16 Pa. Dist. 250 (1906).
Cullom v. Kearns, 8 F. (2d) 437 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925).
Certiorari has been granted by the Supreme Court of the United States.
'See note 5 infra.
372 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
4 11 U. S. C. A. §205 (1934 Supp.). For a general discussion of this Section,
see Garrison, Reorganization of Railroads under the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 1
U. oF CHIac. L. Rxv. 71; Hanna, Recent Additions to the Bankruptcy Act (1933)
1 GEO. WASH. L. Rzv. 448; Richter. Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act
(1933) 8 NoTRE DAmE LAWY. 460; Rodgers and Groom, Reorganization of
Railroad Corporations under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 COL.
L. REv. 571; Weiner, Reorganization under Sectioi4 77: A Comment (1933) 33
COL. L. Rxv. 834; Wilson, Railroad Reorganization under Section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 665.
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nois banks, and a Missouri bank. As collateral for these loans, $54,000,000 in securities, consisting largely of otherwise unissued bonds of the
railway company itself and of its subsidiaries, were pledged under an
agreement which gave the creditors a power of sale, conditioned upon
the happening of certain contingencies relating to the debtor's financial
status. Upon petition of the railway company, the District Court issued
an order enjoining these creditors from exercising the power of sale,
or from otherwise converting or disposing of the pledged collateral.
All of the creditors had filed special appearances to contest the Court's
jurisdiction over them and over the pledged securities.
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals (per Evans, J.) affirmed
the order, relying solely, as to the jurisdictional question, upon that portion of paragraph (a) of Section 77 which reads: ". . . If the petition
is so approved, the court in which such order approving the petition
is entered shall, during the pendency of the proceedings under this section and for the purposes thereof, have exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor and its property wherever located... ."5 This language, according to the opinion, "extended the court's jurisdiction over the debtor's
property so as to include the entire United States." That being so, the
pledged collateral was held to be "property" within the meaning of the
Section,6 and the jurisdictional issue was disposed of by saying, "In
short, the jurisdiction of the court, so far as the property was concerned,
included the territory wherein all of appellees' bonds were located." 7
'Italics ours. The importance of this decision is increased by the fact that
the quoted language of §77 is also to be found substantially in §§74 (for the
relief of agricultural debtors) (11 U. S. C. A. §203n) and 77B (on corporate reorganizations) (11 U. S. C. A. §207a).
'No attempt is made in this note to deal with that aspect of the problem.
However, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Galveston City R. Co., 87 Fed. 813, 815 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1898), where Court said: "They are evidence of debt, not assets of the
appellee." Compare Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Railway Steel Spring Co., 258
Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919).
"TheCourt then proceeded to hold that the District Court not only had the
power to enjoin the sale of pledged securities, but might do so in a summary
proceeding, relying again upon §77 and giving it a "liberal construction.., consonant with the purposes of this remedial legislation."
These two problems are not within the scope of this note. However, the
decision, on both points, seems to be against the weight of judicial opinion prior
to the enactment of §77.
On the first point, see, in general, accord: Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v.
Railway Steel Spring Co., 258 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919). Contra: Jerome v.
McCarter, 94 U.S. 734, 24 L. ed. 136 (1876); Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U.S.
28, 27 Sup. Ct. 681, 51 L. ed. 945 (1907) ; In re Hudson River Nay. Corp., 57 F.
(2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; In re Browne, 104 Fed. 762 (E. D. Pa. 1900). Also
REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1934) §§923, 2510; 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
(13th. ed. 1923) 1550-53; Note (1924) 28 A. L. R. 409; Hatch, A Fort of Depression Finance-CorporationsPledging Their Own Bonds (1934) 47 HARy.
L. REV. 1093.
On the second point, see, in general, In re Silver, 2 F. Supp. 628 (S.D. Fla.
1933) ; REImNGTON, BANKRUPTCY (4th, ed. 1934) §2350; I CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
(13th, ed. 1923) 771-89.
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The decision is in striking contrast with one of the same Court
8
(Evans, J. again writing the opinion), decided only two years before.
In that case, two of the Insull holding companies, both of which were
Illinois corporations, had pledged the stocks of certain other Illinois
corporations with New York banks to secure loans from the latter. Both
holding companies went into receivership, and, on petition of the receivers, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois enjoined
the creditor banks from exercising the power of sale given in the pledge
agreement, and from otherwise converting or disposing of the pledged
securities. The banks appeared specially, and moved to vacate the restraining orders on the ground that the Court was without jurisdiction
over either the banks or the pledged property. On appeal, the Circuit
Court of Appeals ordered the injunctions vacated, holding that the
Court had no jurisdiction over the parties, and that "the absence of
possession, or any right to possession by the receivers, and the location
of the pledged securities with the pledgees in New York" were "decisive of the question." In the course of his opinions 9 in the Fentress
case, judge Evans remarked that "the jurisdiction of a court in bankruptcy in such matters is as extensive as that of a court of equity which
appoints a receiver."
Was the jurisdiction of the court sitting in bankruptcy any 'more extensive than when sitting in an equity receivership, prior to the amendment? The Court's reliance upon the quoted language of the amendment in disposing of the jurisdictional question would indicate that it
was not. Section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act 0 expressly limited the jurisdiction of the court to the territorial limits of the district, and the process of a bankruptcy court could not validly issue outside those boundaries.'. However, upon the filing of the petition, the property of the
bankrupt, wherever situated in the United States, was brought in custodia legis,'2 and the court in which the petition was filed obtained
"plenary jurisdiction in bankruptcy, coextensive with the United States,
I Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress, 61 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932).
p. 333.
"011 U. S. C. A. §11 (1927).
"Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U. S. 102, 30 Sup. Ct. 372, 54 L. ed. 402 (1910)
seinble; Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300, 32 Sup. Ct.
96, 56 L. ed. 208 (1911) semble; Staunton v. Wooden, 179 Fed. 61 (C.C.A.9th,
1910); In re Farrell, 201 Fed. 338 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912) ; Carter v. Whisler, 275
Fed. 743 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) ; It re Waukesha Water Co., 116 Fed. 1009 (E. D.
Wis. 1902) ; In re Alphin & Lake Cotton Co., 131 Fed. 824 (E.D. Ark. 1904) ;
In re Isaac Harris Co., 173 Fed. 735 (E.D. N.Y. 1909) ; In re Rathfon Bros.,
200 Feb. 108 (W.D. Mich. 1912) ; It re Boston-Cerrillos Mines Corp., 206 Fed.
794 (D. N.M. 1913); In re Geller, 216 Fed. 558 (D. N.J. 1914); REmINGTON,
BANKRUPTCY (4th, ed. 1934) §34; 1 COLLIe, BANKRUPTCY (13th, ed. 1923) §2g.
"Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 U. S. 263, 34 Sup. Ct. 851, 58 L. ed. 1305 (1914);
Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co. v. Wills, 240 U.S. 642, 36 Sup. Ct. 466, 60 L. ed.
841 (1916) ; In re Dempster, 172 Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909).
9
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to order and control the disposition of the bankrupt's estate" and "to
determine all liens thereon and all interests affecting it."'1 This jurisdiction did not attach, however, when the bankruptcy court had neither
actual nor constructive possession of the property.1 4 Thus, an explanation may be found for the fact that in the Fentresscase, the decision
on the jurisdictional question rested jointly upon the absence of possession, or right to possession, in the receivers, and the situs of the
pledged collateral outside the territorial limits of the district, while, in
the principal case, no mention is made of the Court's possession or right
to possession,' 5 but the pledged property is held to be within the newly
enlarged territorialjurisdiction of the Court; and that enlargement of
territorialjurisdiction is found in the amendment giving the court "exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever located."
Was that portion of Section 77 intended to enlarge the territorial
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, so as to make it coextensive with
the United States, in proceedings under the amendment? The Court
believed that the amendment "was intended to and did wisely exclude
ancillary receivership proceedings in bankruptcy cases wherein railroad
corporations were the bankrupts." The belief in that purpose points
strongly to the interpretation which the Court adopted.' 6 However,
there are at least three considerations that militate against the conclusion
of the Court.
In the first place, the word "jurisdiction" has been subjected to such
indiscriminate use and has been permitted to assume so many connotations' 7 that its use in the amendment furnishes no very valuable clue
"Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 U.S. 263, 34 Sup. Ct. 851, 58 L. ed. 1305 (1914) ;
In re Granite City Bank, 137 Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) ; Orinoco Iron Co. v.
Metzel, 230 Fed. 40 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916) ; see Staunton v. Wooden, 179 Fed. 61
63 (C. C. A. 9th, 1910).
14
In re Hudson River Nay. Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; In re
Silver, 2 F. Supp, 628 (S.D. Fla. 1933) ; see In re Peacock, 178 Fed. 851, 856
(C.C. E.D. N.C. 1910) ; In re Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 291 Fed. 390, 396 (E.D.
Tenn. 1922) ; In re Smith, 3 F. (2d) 40, 42 (S.D. Tex. 1924) ; 1 CoLLIER, BANKRuPTcY (13th, ed. 1923) 781-82.

The right to possession could have been no greater in one case than in the
other. In re Hudson River Nav. Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). See
.i;re Landquist, 70 F. (2d) 929, 936 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934), where the Court said:
"So far as we know it has always been held that a bankruptcy court has no
jurisdiction whatever over pledged security which has been transferred in good
faith by a debtor to his creditor more than four months prior to the filing of
the bankruptcy petition."
" In this connection, see REPORT PAMPHLET No. 1. THE AssOCIATIoN OF THE
BAR OF THE CrT= OF NEW YORK (1926-7). ANNUAL REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EQUITY REcErvRsirPs, pp. 19-31, in which an extension of the doctrine of

§56 of the Judicial Code (11 U. S. C. A. §117) was advocated. See also, 56 A.
B. A. REP. 406-9 (1931) ; and Swaine, Corporate Reorganizatio-AnAmendmtent
to the Bankruptcy Act-A Symposium (1933) 19 VA. L. Rv. 317.
"TAs was said by Professor Lloyd, in referring to the use of the word "lien,"
"It is proof of the poverty of the legal imagination that in so many instances
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to the Congressional intent. This is strikingly impressed upon one who
reads the decisions of the bankruptcy courts and attempts to assign
some meaning to the word wherever used. On at least one occasion, the
Circuit Court of Appeals referred to the powers of the bankruptcy court,
long prior to the enactment of the Section 77, in language practically
identical with that of the amendment upon which the Court relied in the
principal case' 8-and at a time when the territorialjurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts was expressly limited, and the limitation recognized 139 Is language to be given one meaning when used by the courts,
and another when used by Congress in a piece of rush legislation?
Secondly, paragraph (n) of Section 77 provides, in part, that "in
proceedings under this section and consistent with the provisions thereof,
the jwrisdiction20 and powers of the court ... shall be the same as if
a voluntary petition for adjudication had been filed. .. ." Is it clear
that, if this paragraph is read with paragraph (a), Congress referred
to territorial jurisdiction in paragraph (a), and to something else in
paragraph (n) ?
Thirdly, insofar as there is any value in speculating on the question of Congressional intent, it might be added that the relative obscurity
of the provision relied upon by the Court leads one to the conclusion
that no very revolutionary change was intended thereby. If Congress
had intended to enlarge the territorial jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts
in certain cases from the limits of the district to include the entire United
States, is it not reasonable to presume that such an intention would have
been phrased more unmistakably and placed a bit more conspicuously in
the amendment?
It is submitted that, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
Court's decision on this point is at least dubious, 2 1"' the Court, perhaps,
terms definitely applied to particular purposes are forcibly appropriated to other

uses." (Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of the Lien Theory (1922) 32 YAixu
L. J. 233, 245).
s In In re Granite City Bank, 137 Fed. 818, 822 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905, the Court
said: "Under the scheme of the bankrupt act, the District Court of the domicile
of the bankrupt takes exclusive jurisdiction of the bankrupt and his property,
wherever situated, to administer it and distribute the proceeds pari passu among
the creditors." (Italics ours.)
Other illustrations of such language are to be found in In re Dempster, 172
Fed. 353, 355 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909) ; Staunton v. Wooden, 179 Fed. 61, 63 (C. C. A.
9th, 1910) ; and a particularly interesting example in Orinoco Iron Co. v. Metzel,
230 Fed. 40, 46 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916).

"Note 11 supra.

- Italics ours.

z It is not to be understood that this note takes a position critical of the policy
which apparently impelled the Court to the general result reached in the case
and prompted it to hurdle the jurisdictional problem in order to reach that result.
The note, rather, raises the quesion whether or not the language of the amendment (upon which the Court was forced to, and did, rely) justified the hurdle
which the Court made.
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assuming the equitable viewpoint in "regarding as done that which ought
to be done."
D. W.

MARKHAM.

Banks and Banking-Insolvency-Recovery of Funds Held by
Insolvent Bank as Trustee Ex Maleficio.
The trust department of the C. Bank had approximately two hundred small trust accounts, whose uninvested funds had been included in
a general deposit maintained by it in the commercial department. To
facilitate investment the trust department consolidated these small accounts into what it termed a "Mortgage Pool Account," with itself as
trustee, and each estate was credited with a participation certificate to
the extent of its contribution. A consolidated account totaling $155,940
was thereby built up out of which the bank purchased from its own departments, affiliated investment companies, and elsewhere securities aggregating $151,867.34, leaving a cash credit in the pool account of $4,072.66. Subsequently the bank dosed its doors, and the plaintiffs were
appointed to succeed it as trustees for the "Mortgage Pool Account."
In this action it was alleged and to some extent proved that the securities sold to the pool account then had a market value of $60,746.93 less
than the sums actually paid therefor. On this basis plaintiffs sought
to impress the bank's cash in the hands of the Commissioner of Banks
'with a constructive trust in favor of the estates represented by them.
Held, that the judgment of nonsuit be affirmed.It is well settled that a fiduciary may be declared a trustee cx waleficio of any profits which he may have acquired through his dealings
with the funds committed to his care,2 and, since creditors are not bona
fide purchasers, the rule is applicable to the receiver 3 of an insolvent
trustee. Such a proceeding, however, is not, as is so often stated, one
to establish a preference, but, rather, an action brought to restore to the
cestui that which equity considers his own.4 Success will depend upon
the proof of two facts: (a) that the alleged trustee, whether express or
ex delicto, has at the outset acquired something of value the beneficial
ownership of which remains, either by express or implied provisions
of the parties, or in the contemplation of law, in another; and (b) that
'Cocke v. Hood, 207 N. C. 14, 175 S. E. 841 (1934).
23 PoMEROY, EQuIrY JURIsPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1918) §§1052, 1058; Notes (1931)

44 HAv. L. Rv. 1281; (1927) 43 L. Q. REv. 438.
*The same principles would, of course, be applicable to an assignee for
benefit of creditors or trustee in bankruptcy.
IPowesheik County v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 220 N. W. 63, 209 Iowa 467,
228 N. W. 32 (1928) ; cf. Capital Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, .172 U. S. .425,
19 Sup. Ct. 202, 43 L. ed. 502 (1898) (Such an action against the receiver of
a national bank raises no federal question.)
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the original trustee has so retained this property that in some form it
has passed with his estate into the hands of the receiver.5 These principles, though easily stated, are so general in their scope that their delimitation by various rules of application has been found necessary.
At common law it was required that the cestui trace and identify his
specific property, or its product, in the hands of the trustee.0 Thus,
if the res was money, and this money had been mingled with that of the
trustee, the cestui was reduced to the status of a mere creditor, since his
money had no "ear mark" and could no longer be traced. With the advent of modern commercial practices -this rule, though simple to apply, as often as not proved conducive to gross injustice, and it was discarded by the famous English case of In Re Hallett's Estate,7 decided
in 1879. It was there held that, where the trustee has mingled trust
money with his own, the trust was not thereby terminated, but that the
cestui wa entitled to the proportion of the fund which his money had
contributed, 8 and moreover, that, should the trustee withdraw his money
from this fund, it would be presumed that he intended first to withdraw
his own money before dissipating the trust. 9 Thus the cestid was entitled to recover the amount of the trust, not to exceed the lowest amount
which the fund had contained between the time of the commingling and
the commencement of the action. 10 This case has been accorded the
almost unanimous approval of the American courts.' 1 However, there
INote
(1928)Dale13 &MINN.
REv.Div.
39. 772 (1879); Mills v. Post,
'Ex Parte
Co., 11L. Ch.
76 Mo. 426
(1882); Thompson's Appeal, 22 Pa. 16 (1853).

"13 Ch. Div. 696 (1879).
1It would seem that the cestii is given a choice between two remedies: (a) an
equitable lien not to exceed the lowest point which the fund has reached between
the wrongful commingling and the receivership, or (b) under the constructive
trust theory, he may be considered as 'beneficial part-owner of the fund, his interest to be proportionate to the contribution which his property has made thereto.

Williston, The Right to Follow Trust Property when Confused with Other

Property (1888) 2 HIv. L. REv. 28; Ames, Following MisappropriatedProperty
into Its Product (1906) 19 HARV. L. REv. 511; Scott, The Right to Follow Money
Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money (1913) 27 HAv. L. REv. 125.

IIt was ruled at one time that the "first money in first money out" doctrine
was applicable in this situation. Pennell v. Duffell, 4 De G., M. & G. 372 (Ch.
1853).

"It is to be remembered, however, that the presumption is one, not of law, but
of fact, and consequently may be rebutted. Thus, where the trustee has withdrawn
more than his own credit, the presumption is rebutted to the extent of his inroads
upon the trust fund. Likewise, there are other circumstances which have been
held to. successfully rebut the presumption. Where the first withdrawals from the
commingled fund were preserved and subsequent withdrawals dissipated, it was
held that the trust attached to the proceeds of the first withdrawals. Brennan v.
Tillinghast, 201 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913). Also a showing that the trust
money was obtained by the bank through the willful and criminal acts of its agents
has been held sufficient -to rebut the presumption. It re First State Bank, 152

Iowa 724, 133 N. W. 354 (1911).

a'Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. ed.

693 (1881);

BOGERT, TRUSTS

(1921) pp. 521-535; Note (1929) 16 VA. L. REv. 392.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
are some courts which have extended the ruling to a rather illogical conclusion, namely, that the trust will attach to the entire estate so long as
it may be shown that the estate was, at the outset, augmented by the
commingling, and that the trust fund 'has not been dissipated, in this
latter regard the cestui being aided by the presumption mentioned
above. 12 But the majority have more conservatively required that the
trust money be traced into some particular fund or asset before equity
will lend its aid.' 3
The North Carolina law on the subject is not entirely clear. In the
earlier cases our Court definitely espoused the old "ear mark" precept,
14
However,
and the commingling of trust funds dissipated the trust.
for a
deposit
a
or
deposit,
special
a
it was subsequently decided that
15
of
distribution
the
specific purpose, was entitled to a "preference" in
0
the assets of an insolvent bank." It would seem that, since the reason
for this holding was that these types of deposits were impressed with a
trust, the same rule would apply where the bank received the money in
pursuance of a strict trusteeship, but that apparently -has not been the situation. Reasonable distinctions in this regard are not readily discern"Meyers v. Board of Education of City of Clay Center, 51 Kan. 87, 32 Pac.
658 (1893); Eastman v. Farmers' State Bank, 175 Minn. 336, 221 N. W. 236
(1928) ; State v. Page Bank, 322 Mb. 29, 14 S. W. (2d) 597 (1929).
Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U. S. 707, 34 Sup. Ct. 466, 58 L. ed. 806 (1913) ;
Board of Com'rs of Crawford County v. Strawn, 157 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907) ;
Myers v. Matusek, 98 Fla. 1126, 125 So. 360 (1929) ; Leach v. Iowa State Say.
Bank, 204 Iowa 497, 215 N. W. 728 (1927) ; In re State Bank of Portland, 110
Ore. 61, 222 Pac. 740 (1924) ; cf. Peurifoy v. Boswell, 162 S. C. 107, 160 S. E.
156 (1931). Townsend, Tracing Technique hp Bank Preference Cases (1933) 7
U. oF CiN. L. REv. 201.
"First Nat. Bank v. Davis, 114 N. C. 344, 19 S. E. 280 (1894) ; Commercial &
Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Davis, 115 N. C. 226, 20 S. E. 370 (1894) ; Corporation Commission v. Bank, 137 N. C. 697, 50 S. E. 308 (1905) ; Virginia-Carolina Chemical
Co. v. Rogers, 172 N. C. 154, 9(0 S. E. 129 (1916) ; cf. Commercial Nat. Bank v.
Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, 13 Sup. Ct. 533, 37 L. ed. 363 (1892) ; Whitley v. Foy,
59 N. C. 34, 78 Am. Dec. 236 (1860).

Accord: J. Allen Smith &Co. v. Montgomery, 209 Ala. 100, 95 So. 291 (1923);
Acuntius v. Steneck Trust Co., 111 N. J. Eq. 81, 161 AtI. 349 (1932).

"A special deposit is created when money, or other property, is placed with

the bank for safe keeping merely, and not with the intention that it is to be min-

gled with the other money in the bank. Thus a type of bailment exists. While a
deposit for a specific purpose is, as the name implies, one made under an agreement that it is to be put to some designated use, as the payment of interest on some
obligation of the depositor, the purchase of certain securities, etc. See Notes
(1923) 12 CALIF. L. REv. 214; (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 603.
"0Corporation Commission v. Merchants' Bank & Trust Co., 194 N. C. 125,
138 S. E. 530 (1927) ; Parker v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 202 N. C. 230, 162
S. E. 564 (1932) commented upon (1932) 10 N. C. L. REV. 381, (1932) 38 W. VA.
L. Q. 365; Heckstall v. Citizens Bank, 202 N. C. 350, 163 S. E. 107 (1932) ; Flack
v. Hood, 204 N. C. 337, 168 S. E. 520 (1933) ; Smith v. Hood, 204 N. C. 343, 168
S. E. 527 (1933) ; Asheville Safe Deposit Co. v. Hood, 204 N. C. 346, 168 S. E.
524 (1933) ; Real Estate Trust Co. v. Hood, 204 N. C. 778, 168 S. E. 530 (1933) ;
Lawrence v. Hood, 205 N. C. 268, 170 S. E. 926 (1933) ; Brunswick County v.
North Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 206 N. C. 127, 173 S. E. 327 (1934).
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ible, yet the cases in which recovery has been allowed have usually, but
not always, 17 dealt with special deposits or deposits for a specific purpose,I s while those in which recovery has been denied have been held to
involve unidentifiable trust funds. 19
The inconsistencies of the North Carolina cases are clearly indicated
by a contrast with the instant case. In the Lauerhass Case,20 decided
last year, suit was brought by the holder of participation certificates in
this same "Mortgage Pool Account." The bank, after administration,
had been acting in the capacity of trustee of an estate which the plaintiff
had inherited from his mother, and among the securities purchased by
the bank in such capacity were notes, bought from itself, and two participation certificates. The bank's combined profits from these transactions,
amounting to some $11,000, were declared a preferred claim. As the
opinion is per curiam, it is difficult to ascertain the theory of the holding, but it was declared to be upon the authority of Flack v. Hood,21
which is one of the specific deposit cases.
In the instant case, however, this theory is declared inapplicable on
the grounds that the transaction was no more than a mere shifting of
credits which did not augment the assets of the bank. Though there is
some authority to the contrary,22 North Carolina is in line with the
United States Supreme Court, and a majority of states elsewhere, in
holding that a check upon a deposit in the trustee bank itself is merely
a shifting of credits, and, therefore, even when presented to the bank for
the purpose of creating a trust or special deposit, will not give rise to
a preferential claim upon the bank's insolvency.2 Since the securities in
the present case were paid for largely by checks drawn by the trust
department upon deposits in the commercial department, these authoriPeoples Nat. Bank v. Waggoner, 185 N. C. 297 117 S. E. 6 (1923).
See cases cited in note 16, upra.

Roebuck v. National Surety Co., 200 N. C. 196, 156 S. E. 531 (1930) ; First &

Citizens Nat. Bank v. Corporation Commission, 201 N. C. 381, 160 S. E. 360

(1931); Hicks v. Corporation Commission, 201 N. C. 819, 161 S. E. 545 (1931);
In re Gardner Banking & Trust Co., 204 N. C. 791, 168 S. E. 813 (1933); cf.
Underwood v. Hood, 205 N. C. 399, 171 S. E. 364 (1933).

Lauerhass v. Hood, 205 N. C. 190, 170 S. E. 655 (1933).
204 N. C. 337, 168 S. E. 520 (1933).

'This is upon the theory that the transaction is tantamount to the depositor's
withdrawing his money from the bank and handing it back in the form of a trust
or special deposit. Thus, if the depositor does not have a balance sufficient to cover
the check, the assets of the bank will not be augmented. Matzen v. Johnson, 127
Kan. 139, 272 Pac.'164 (1928).
' Blakey v. Brinson, 286 U. S. 254, 52 Sup. Ct. 516, 76 L. ed. 1089 (1932) ; Willians v. Hood, 204 N. C. 140, 167 S. E. 574 (1933) ; In re Bank of Pender, 204 N.
C. 143, 167 S. E. 561 (1933); Dupree v. Harrell, 205 N. C. 595, 172 S. E. 214
(1933) ; cf. Zachery v. Hood, 205 N. C. 194, 170 S. E. 641 (1933) (Attachment of
husband's deposit in wife's action for subsistence, and judgment that it be paid to
plaintiff from time to time under court order, changed deposit from general to
special).
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ties might be controlling were it not for the fact that the money here
alleged to be held under a trust was already the subject of an express
trust before these checks were issued. It would seem that if the original trust money "had a string tied to it or an invisible legal fence about
it, setting it apart from the general funds of the bank," 24 it would take
something more than a mere shifting of credits and exchange of checks
between commercial and trust departments to sever the string or destroy
the fence. The problem is not whether the bank got the money, but
whether it got rid of it.25
JOEL

B. ADAms.

Conflict of Laws-Insurance-Validity of $tatutes Localizing
Insurance Contracts.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co.'
thwarted an attempt of the State of Mississippi to draw within the
dominion of its local laws, by statutory enactment, 2 "all contracts of
insurance on property, lives, or interests in" Mississippi. The device
employed was a legislative declaration that all such contracts "shall be
deemed to be made therein."
North Carolina is one of the few jurisdictions which have attempted
in this way to "eliminate" the conflict of law between states,3 and the
First Nat. Bank v. Hood, 204 N. C. 351, 353, 168 S. E. 528, 529 (1933).
In the case of Cocke v. Hood, 205 N. C. 832, 170 S. E. 637 (1933), the
court experienced no difficulty in giving these same trustees a preferential claim
for the $4,072.66 uninvested cash balance to the credit of the "Mortgage Pool Account." This was a byproduct of the same bookkeeping transaction. But cf.
Edisto Nat. Bank v. Bryant, 72 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) (Funds on
deposit before bank appointed co-executor held not to create trust in hands of
receiver upon bank's subsequent insolvency).
154 Sup. Ct. 634 (U. S.1934).
2Miss. CoDE ANN. (1930) §5131.
3N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §6287. For cases in which this section
has been applied or referred to, but not discussed, see Fountain & Herrington v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 55 Fed. (2d) 120 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932) ; Horton v. Insurance
Co., 122 N. C. 498, 29 S.E. 944, (1898) ; Blackwell v. Life Ass'n., 141 N. C. 117,
53 S.E. 833 (1906) ; Williams v. Life Ass'n., 145 N. C. 128, 58 S.E. 802 (1907) ;
Williams v. Order of Heptasophs, 172 N. C. 787, 90 S.E. 888 (1916) ; Wilson v.
Order of Heptasophs, 174 N. C. 628, 94 S.E. 443 (1917).
The above section also contains a provision that "all contracts of insurance
the applications for which are taken within the state shall be deemed to have
been made within this state and are subject to the laws thereof." This language
will be found substantially duplicated in ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §8375. While
this provision is not specifically dealt with in the text discussion, it is believed
that the reasoning of the discussion adequately covers it.
Massachusetts at one time had a provision substantially like that of Mississippi. (Acts 1894 c. 522, §3). It was construed in Stone v. Old Colony St.
Ry. Co., 212 Mass. 459, 99 N. E. 218 (1912) as not intended td'regulate or prohibit contracts of insurance made outside Massachusetts. The present Massachu-
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decision raises the very practical question as to how far such attempts,
as made, can be held effective without violating the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and whether any such attempts which
do not conform to the Supreme Court's rules of conflict of laws can
be successful.
It is to be noted that this problem is quite distinct from that concerning the power of the states in respect to the conditions which they
may impose upon foreign insurance companies seeking to do business
within their borders, 4 or that as to what constitutes doing business
within a state. 5 Neither is this type of statute inherently within that
class of unconstitutional enactments which attempt directly, or in effect,
to forbid or penalize the making of contracts outside the state, to be
performed outside the state, upon property or lives within the state. 0
Rather is our problem concerned with the question-to what extent
can a state retain control over contracts of insurance, wherever made
and wherever to be performed, covering property, lives, or interests
located within its borders, by legislating that such contracts shall be
governed by its domestic laws ?T
The Mississippi statute was a recognition of the existing general
rule of conflict of laws laid down by the courts that the validity and
construction of a contract of insurance are to be determined by the
(domestic) law of the place where the contract is made ;8 and Mississetts statute, (MAss. LAws ANN. (Michie, 1933) c. 175, §3) is construed in 2
Op. A. G. 471 as follows: "If this section means more than that the legality
and construction of a contract made outside the state shall be governed by
Massachusetts law, and attempts to take away a man's right to contract outside the state, it is unconstitutional."
T.x. REv. Civ. CoDE. (Vernon, 1925) art. 5054 provides that "any contract
of insurance payable to any citizen or inhabitant of this state by any insurance
company or corporation doing business within this state shall be held to be a contract made and entered into under and by virtue of the laws of this state relating
to insurance," etc. Although designed to be a condition upon doing business in
Texas, it was held in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389, 45 Sup. Ct.
129, 69 L. ed. 342 (1924) that it could not be "constitutionally" applied to a Tennessee contract.
These are the only statutes of thd type under consideration which the writer
has found without an exhaustive search.
'Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648 15 Sup. Cf. 207, 39 L. ed. 297 (1895)
(Leading Case).
See, for example, on this problem, Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business
(1925) 25 COL. L. Rxv. 1018; Note (1927) 5 N. C. L. R. 159.
'Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 580, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. ed. 832 (1897)
(Leading Case); Note (1919) 1 A. L. R. 1665.
'Other aspects of the principal case are discussed in (1934) 34 COL. L. Ra,.
951, and (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 863.
For a discussion of an important related problem, see Ross, Has the Conflict of
Laws Become a Branch of Conirtitntional Law (1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 161.
1 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE (2nd. ed. 1927-8 & Supp. 1932) 849; Notes
(1902) 63 L. R. A. 833; (1909) 19 Ann. Cas. 30.
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sippi was declared to be the place of making in those cases where the
insured interest was located therein, regardless of other facts in the
case.
Now, assuming that the Supreme Court is committed to the "place
of making" rule 9 (which it unquestionably applied in the principal
case), to what extent will it permit a state legislature to determine the
place of making? Here, the plaintiff, a Mississippi corporation, applied through its office in Memphis, Tenn., to the Memphis agency of
the defendant, a Connecticut insurance company, for a fidelity bond, to
cover pecuniary loss sustained by the plaintiff through the fraud, dishonesty, or willful misapplications by employees (to be designated) "in
any position, anywhere." The bond was delivered to the plaintiff's
Memphis office through the defendant's agency in that city. The defalcations for which the plaintiff sought indemnity occurred in Mississippi. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that, when the employee
removed to Mississippi and there defaulted, the interest insured was
in Mississippi and the contract became a Mississippi contract under the
statute, "even though it contained all the elements necessary to make it
a Tennessee contract"; hence a fifteen-months limitation clause in the
bond, although valid by Tennessee law, was held unenforceable by application of Mississippi law. In reversing the Mississippi court's decision,
the Supreme Court of the United States remarked that a state "may
not, on grounds of policy, ignore a right which has lawfully vested
elsewhere, if, as here, the interest of the forum has but slight connection with the substance of the contract obligations." Further, "a legislative policy which attempts to draw to the state of the forum control
over the obligations of contracts elsewhere validly consummated and to
convert them for all purposes into contracts of the forum, regardless of
the relative importance of the interests of the forum as contrasted with
those created at the place of the contract, conflicts with the guaranties
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Thus, it seems clear that the Court
will not permit a legislature to announce that a contract is made in
one state when such an announcement appeals to the Court as being
contrary to fact, but will at least require that the state have more than
"a slight connection with the substance of the contract obligations."
OThe Supreme Court has, at one time or another, enunciated all three of
the accepted, rules as to the law governing contracts, viz., the "place of making"
rule, the "place of performance" rule, and the "intention" rule. On latter two,
see, for example, Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, 1 Sup. Ct. 102, 27 L. ed.
104 (1882); Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S.397, 9
Sup. Ct. 469, 32 L. ed. 788 (1889) ; London Assurance v. Companhia De Moagens
Do Barreiro, 167 U. S.149, 17 Sup. Ct. 785, 42 L. ed. 113 (1897); Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S.551, 24 Sup. Ct. 538, 48 L. ed. 788 (1904).
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It is interesting to note that the place of making a contract is not
always so easily determined as the existence of a general rule applying
that test would seem to imply. In the first place, when courts refer
to the place of making a contract, they must be taken to mean "contract"
in the sense of the factual agreenfent, as distinguished from the use of
the word to denote the legal consequences which may attach to that
factual agreement, else their statements that the "validity of a contract
is determined by the law of the place of making" would be rendered
meaningless, the very definition' o of the word, as used in the latter
sense, assuming validity. If, then, the place of making refers to the
factual agreement, where is a contract made when the offeror is in one
state and the offeree in another? Obviously, the question must be
answered arbitrarily, not logically, as the courts have done; but, by the
very reason for an arbitrary solution, courts have come to widely divergent conclusions." It is submitted that, except in those cases where
all the acts and manifestations necessary to make up a factual agreement clearly took place within one state, the legislative rule that a
contract of insurance should be deemed made in the state in which the
insured interest is located establishes a no more arbitrary "connection"
between that state and the "substance of the contract obligations" than
some which the courts have laid down. However that may be, it seems
obvious from the language of the decision in the principal case that the
judicial rules are to predominate, and that any legislative rule which
destroys or affects the interests which are deemed to 'have vested at the
place of, and at the time of, making (under the judicial rules) will be
held to deprive parties of due process of law.
To return to our original inquiry, then, it seems clear, at the outset,
that the device of enacting that a contract shall be deemed to have
been "made" in a given jurisdiction is a futile one, for, as pointed out
above, unless the statute embodies, and conforms to, the judicial rule,
the latter rule will predominate; and such a statute could serve little
purpose, unless to guide an oscillating state judiciary which found itself
torn between the divergent lines of authority on such problems.
It seems equally clear that, unless such statutes were made uniform
throughout the country, they would be of no great benefit anyway. If,
for example, a contract of insurance should come within the statute of
one state and thus be subject to its laws, and, for different reasons,
come also within the statute of another state and be subject to its laws,
a RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §1.
'

See collection of cases in Notes (1902) 63 L. R. A. 833; (1909) 23 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 968; (1914) 52 L. R. A. (N. S.), 275; (1909) 19 Ann. Cas. 30.
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the problem has been rendered no less complex -by the enactment of the
two statutes.
The language of the decision already quoted would seem to suggest
one loophole, that is, that if the "relative importance of the interests
of the forum as contrasted with those created at the place of the contract" were sufficient outstanding, the Court would more readily permit
the assertion of dominionf over the contract. But when we note that,
in the principal case, one party was a citizen of Mississippi, the insured
interest was located therein,12 and payment (performance) was to be
made therein, there seems to be little object in legislating over the few
cases which would present any state with a stronger claim than Mississippi had here against the state in which the contract was made. Of
course, there might not always be such a clear case as here for determining the place of making, but, as already brought out, the Court
displays no inclination to relinquish the determination of that point
according to its own rules.
Again, the Court recognizes that "cases may occur in which enforcement of a contract as made outside a state may be so repugnant to its
vital interests as to justify enforcement in a different manner," and
concedes that "ordinarily a state may prohibit performance within its
borders even of a contract validly made elsewhere, if the performance
would violate its laws." In other words, a state's public policy is even
more sacred than the enforcement of the vested rights of the parties
to a contract made outside its borders. 13 But, while that basis might
justify a state in not enforcing certain contracts elsewhere made, it
would not prevent the enforcement of those contracts elsewhere according to the laws of the jurisdiction in which they were made-(again,
as determined by judicial rules), and thus offers no-or, at best, only
a flimsy-solution to the problem in hand.
Nor does resort to the various judicial rules on conflict of laws' 4
seem to offer any assistance. The discussion thus far has illustrated
" It appears that the defaulting employee was in Mississippi at the time of his
defalcations, but presumably not at the time the contract was made. The Court
disregards this point.
The question naturally follows as to the construction which would be placed
upon such statutes, were they to be held valid. If construed to mean contracts
of insurance covering property, lives, or interests within the state at the time
the contract was made, the apparent purpose behind the statute-to assert the
state's police power over contracts of insurance covering interests located within
the state-would be defeated as to movable interests coming into the state already
insured. If construed to mean contracts of insurance covering property, lives,
or interests within the state at the time the alleged caUse of action arose, khen
the law governing the contract would change (at least potentially) each time
a movable insured interest crossed a state line, with the resultant instability.
aA generally asserted principle.

See, for example, COOLEY, BRIEFS ON IN-

suBANcg (2nd. ed. 1927-28) 855, and authorities there cited.
"Note 9 supra.
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the difficulty, even if it is assumed that the Court is committed to one
rule. The "place of performance" rule offers an even more attenuated
"connection with the substance of the contract obligations" in view of
the Court's summary dismissal of the proposition that payment-the
usual performance of insurance contracts-was to take place in Mississippi. And, while courts have sometimes respected the manifested intention of the parties as to what law should govern their contract, any
statutory enactment requiring them to stipulate that the laws of the
jurisdiction in which the insured interest was located should govern
would undoubtedly come within the prohibitions of Allgeyer v.
Louiskm. 15

D. W. MARXHAM,
Constitutional Law-Interstate Transportation of
Intoxicating Liquors.
A recent Georgia case involving the confiscation of an interstate
shipment of beer emphasizes the renewed importance of the problem of
interstate liquor traffic.1 It 'was early established that a state in the
exercise of its police power could close saloons and prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, 2 but a state could not prohibit
carriers from bringing liquors into the state without interfering with
interstate commerce.3 Thereupon the open saloons gave way to the
shops of local agents which, under the protection of the Commerce
Clause, were able to operate without state interference so long as sales
were made in the original package. 4 Congress then passed the Wilson
Act, 5 which the prohibitionists thought would put an end to the seeming evasions of the state laws. This act was held valid,0 but it was
interpreted quite literally, in Rhodes v. Iowa,7 to mean that the state
laws could take effect upon liquor shipped into the state only after arrival and delivery to the consignee. Thus while the consignee might
be prohibited from selling it, he was free to have it shipped in for his
165 U. S. 580, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. ed. 832 (1897), cited note 6, supra.
A statute so worded as to clearly indicate that it was an assertion of the
state's power over persons and property within its borders might present a

stronger case for validity. However, the localization of an insurable interest
within a certain state does not, logically, require the localization of contracts
concerning that interest within the same state.
IRyman v. Legg, 176 S. E. 403 (Ga. 1934).
2
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. ed. 205 (1887).
'Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 31 L. ed.
700 (1888).
'Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. ed. 128 (1890).
026 STAT. 313 (1890), 27 U. S. C. A. §121 (1934 Supp.).
'In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. ed. 572 (1891).
'170 U. S. 412, 18 Sup. Ct. 664, 42 L. ed. 1088 (1898).
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personal consumption. This condition existed until 1913 when Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act,8 which divested intoxicating
liquors of their interstate character and thereby enabled and permitted
the dry state of destination to exercise control the moment the shipment crossed its borders. In spite of the word "prohibited" this act
contained no penal provision and its violation was not a federal offense. 9
Four years later Congress took a rather drastic step in adopting the
Reed Amendment,1 0 which made it a federal offense to advertise liquors
in dry states and "to order, purchase, or cause" intoxicating liquors
(except for scientific, etc., purposes) to be transported in interstate
commerce into a state the laws of which prohibit their manufacture or
sale for beverage purposes. In 1919, upon the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, 11 the "manufacture, sale, or transportation" of intoxicating liquors designed for beverage purposes was forbidden, and
Congress and the several states were given concurrent power to enforce national prohibition by appropriate means. The federal Beer
Act' 2 enacted in March, 1933, removed the prohibition of the Volstead
Act as to 3.2 per centum beer, wines, etc., and incorporated sections
similar to the Webb-Kenyon Act13 and the Reed Amendment 14 to
prevent the shipment of same into states the laws of which forbid the
manufacture or sale of such beverages. In the absence of these sections, light wines and beers could probably have -been shipped into the
bone-dry states under protection of the Commerce Clause upon the
theory they were not intoxicating liquors. The last major event was
the ratification in December, 1933, of the Twenty-first Amendment, 15
which (1) repealed the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act,'1
and (2) prohibited the "transportation, or importation into any State,
Territory, or Possession of the United States for use or deliyery therein
of intoxicating liquors in violation of the laws thereof."
The scope of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts was held not to be
limited by the National Prohibition Act or the Eighteenth Amendment. 17 Since these acts are not inconsistent with the Twenty-first
837 STAT. 699 (1913), 27 U. S. C. A. §122 (1934 Supp.). Held constitutional,
James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct.
180,0 61 L. ed. 326 (1917).
Dowling and Hubbard, Divesting at Article of its Interstate Character
(1920), 5 MiNm. L. REv. 100, 253.
2039 STAT. 1069 (1917), 18 U. S. C. A. §341, 27 U. S. C. A. §123 (1933 Supp.).
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STA. 17 (1933), 27 U. S. C. A. §64 a-p (1934 Supp.).

=48 STAT. 19, 27 U. S. C. A. §64i (1933).
1448 STAT. 19, 27
"U. S. CoNsT.

U. S. C. A. §64k (1933).

"'United States v. Chambers, 54 Sup. Ct. 434 (U. S. 1934).
2M cCormick & Co., Inc. v. Brown, 286 U. S. 582, 52 Sup. Ct. 522, 76 L.
ed. 1017 (1932).
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Amendment, it is assumed they are now in force to the same extent.
The Reed Amendment was so revised in 1934 as to eliminate the prohibition of advertising intoxicating liquors in dry states by means of
the mails.' 8 The federal restrictions apply to those states in which
prohibition extends over the entire territory, not merely to parts under
local option;19 but in one instance they were invoked to prohibit the
interstate shipment into a single dry county in Texas upon the theory
that the local unit was dry by state law although the rest of the state
remained wet. 2 0
The word "commerce" as used in the constitutional sense "is a term
of the largest import" 2 ' and is not restricted to a commercial or business transaction; in fact a person walking across an interstate bridge
is engaged in interstate commerce. 22 Therefore the federal control
over the transportation or importation in interstate commerce of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes "into" dry states is not limited to
common carriers ;23 it extends to prohibit the transportation by a person who carries the same from one state into another in his own private
24
vehicle, not for the purposes of trade, but for his own personal use.
The intention as to ultimate destination of the goods fixes the character
of transportation, whether intrastate, interstate, or foreign. 28 It is
generally held that there is no offense until the liquor has been transported "into" the dry state.26 The repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment removed the restriction upon the shipments "through" dry states
as a mere incident of the transportation to another state. Under the
protection of the Commerce Clause intoxicating liquors may be shipped
"through" dry states,2 7 and may be carried by persons on a train pass-

148 S'AT. 316, 27 U. S. C. A. §123 (1934 Supp.).

" Laughter v. U. S., 259 Fed. 94 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919) ; United States v. Collins,
263 Fed. 657 (C. C4 A. 5th, 1919) ; West Jersey & S. Ry. v. City of Millville,
91 N. J. Law 572, 103 Adt. 245 (1918).
'

McAdams v. Wells Fargo & Co. Express, 249 Fed. 175 (E. D. La. 1918).

'Welton
v. State of Mo., 91 U. S. 275, 280, 23 L. ed. 347, 350 (1875).
' 1Covington &c. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087,
38 L. ed. 962 (1894).

'James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37

Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. ed. 326 (1917).

United States v. Simpson, 252 U. S. 465, 40 Sup. Ct. 364, 64 L. ed. 665 (1919).

'United States v. Picou, 71 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).

- United States v. Collins, 263 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919) ; Moran v. U. S.,
264 Fed. 768 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920). Contra: Ex Parte Westbrook, 250 Fed. 636
(S. D. Fla. 1918) (defendants attempted to carry liquor from wet Florida to
dry Georgia; conviction under Reed Amendment for causing intoxicating liquors

to be transported in interstate commerce although they had driven only 2 miles
in Florida).

' United States v. Gudger, 249 U. S. 373, 39 Sup. Ct. 323, 63 L. ed. 653
(1919) ; Martin v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 715; 100 S. E. 836 (1919).
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ing through the state, 28 or even in a truck or automobile29 in the absence of evidence to show that the parties intended to use or dispose of
same within the state. This right is not lost or impaired by the transfer
in the dry state of some portion of the liquor to another vehicle provided it is intended in good faith that the whole of it shall be carried
directly into another state, the intent and good faith being a question
for the jury.30 To prevent the abuse of importation under the claim
of a "through" shipment, the courts of the states through which the
shipments pass may determine upon the evidence in the individual case
whether the transportation is bona fide "through" the state.3 ' If a
"through" shipment remains in a dry state an undue length of time for
a reason not incidental to the shipping conditions accompanying the
transportation, it loses the protection of interstate commerce and becomes
subject to local laws. 3 2 The Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that
if it is unlawful to sell intoxicating liquors in the state of destination,
then the liquor is not a legitimate article of interstate commerce and is
therefore amenable to the laws of the state to which it is brought or
through which it passes.3 3 If this case is followed, North Carolina may
prosecute one who transports liquor through the state from wet Virginia
to presently dry South Carolina.
The Reed Amendment as construed in United States v. Hill 4 goes
beyond the previous federal acts, which were designed to aid the states
in enforcing their own laws. If a state permits importation or receipt of
liquor for personal use or otherwise, but prohibits the manufacture or
sale, the Reed Amendment makes it a federal offense to import any liquor
for any purposes save those condoned by the amendment: scientific,
I United States v. Gudger, 249 U. S. 373, 39 Sup. Ct. 323, 63 L. ed. 653
(1919) ; Martin v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 715, 100 S. E. 836 (1919).
'Durst v. U. S., 266 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920) ; Moragne v. State, 201
Ala. 388, 78 So. 450 (1918).
o Durst v. U. S. 266 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920).
"Theatrical Club v. State, 199 Ala. 562, 74 So. 696 (1917); Moragne v.

State, 20i Ala. 388, 78 So. 450 (1918) ; Marler v. Vandiviere, 178 Ga. 115, 172

S. E. 33 (1933).

1 Theatrical Club v. State, 199 Ala. 562, 74 So. 969 (1917).
' Haumschilt v. State, 142 Tenn. 520, 221 S. W. 196 (1920).
248 U. S. 420, 39 Sup. Ct. 143, 63 L. ed. 337 (1919) (Defendant bought whisky, intending to take it to W. Va. for his personal use as a beverage, and for that
purpose carried it on his person on a trip by common carrier into the latter state,
the laws of which specifically permitted such importation but forbade manufacture
or sale for beverage purposes; defendant was convicted for violating the Reed
Amendment irrespective of the state law). (McReynolds, J., dissented as follows:

"The Reed Amendment as now construed is a congressional fiat imposing more
complete prohibition wherever the state has assumed to prevent manufacture
or sale... If Congress may deny liquor to those who live in a state simply because
its manufacture is prohibited there, why may not this be done for any suggested
reason-e. g. because the roads are bad, or men are hanged for murder, or coals
are dug? Where is the limit?")

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

medicinal, etc. Thus the state law is superseded. Upon a further
strict construction of this act,3 5 it might be held that if North Carolina,
for instance, should so modify its prohibition laws as to permit the
importation and sale of beverages which might qualify in law as intoxicating liquors (e.g., beer of greater than 3.2 per centum alcohol),
the importation of same would be prohibited by the Reed Amendment
unless the manufacture as well as sale thereof were made lawful. It
is noteworthy that the Twenty-first Amendment in contrast merely
prohibits the transportation or importation into the state for use or
delivery therein of intoxicating liquors "in violation of the laws thereof." Since there is now a strong constitutional guarantee of protection
against the transportation into dry states contrary to the laws of those
states, the Reed Amendment might well be repealed. In the event of such
repeal, the dry states would again be able to have a modified form of
prohibition (e.g., permitting the bringing in, and possession of, small
quantities for personal use) without subjecting their citizens to punishment for a federal offense contrary to the spirit of the Twenty-first
Amendment.
THOMAs H. LEATH.

Constitutional Law-Validity of Municipal Ordinance Excluding
Personal Sureties in Requirement of Bond for Operation
of Taxicabs.
As a condition precedent to the operation of public service automobiles on the streets of Charlotte, North Carolina, an ordinance required the deposit with the treasurer of the city of either liability
insurance with a responsible company authorized to do business in the
state, or cash or securities in lieu thereof.' In a recent case the jury
found that the defendant had met all state and municipal requirements
for the operation of taxicabs, except compliance with the ordinance.!
The trial court's verdict of not guilty of any offense was affirmed by
the supreme court on the ground that since the ordinance made no provision for bonds with personal sureties, it was unconstitutional, in that
869 (W. D. La. 1919).
'An ordinance to regulate the operation of cabs, taxicabs, and for-hire cars,
' United States v. Collins, 254 Fed.

adopted by the city of Charlotte, October 27, 1933 :-"Section one: No. person,
firm, or corporation shall operate. . . cabs, taxicabs, or for-hire cars.. . upon the
streets of Charlotte... unless (A) said operators shall have filed with the treasurer of the city of Charlotte... policies of liability insurance with a responsible
company authorized to do business in North Carolina, indemnifying licensees...
(in stated sums)... in any action wherein said driver may be held liable. (B)
In lieu, of such insurance, . . .operators may- deposit like amounts... in cash or
securities.' Section two prescribes penalties.
2State v. Sasseen, 206 N. C. 644, 175 S. E. 142 (1934).
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it tended to create "separate emoluments" and "monopolies" by turning
the surety business to companies. 3 The court agreed with the contention of the defendant that the ordinance conflicted with a statute which
showed the legislative intent to allow personal sureties, but it declined
to use that ground as a basis for the decision.4
From other jurisdictions there is practically no authority in accord
with the instant decision; 5 and the only North Carolina case cited by
the court in support of its holding is clearly distinguishable. 6 In the
principal case the court takes the position that the municipal ordinance,
since it excludes individual sureties, is unconstitutional because it accords special privileges to surety companies by giving them business
denied personal sureties. 7 But in the case cited to sustain this view, a
statute applicable only to Buncombe County8 is held unconstitutional because building contractors were required to file bonds, executed by
'The court said the ordinance violated the following: N. C. CONST. Art 1,
§7 ("No men or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments
or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services") ; id.
§31 ("Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state
and ought not to be allowed") ; id. §29 ("A frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty").
'The defendant claimed the ordinance contravened N. C. Laws 1931, c. 116
("An act to promote safe driving on the highways and to force the collection of
judgments against irresponsible drivers of motor vehicles." The act makes no
distinction between operators of private and of public service vehicles. It provides that failure of any operator of an automobile to pay tort judgments
within thirty days after rendition authorizes suspension of drivers license until
said judgments are satisfied, or until said operator gives proof of ability to
respond in damages as to future accidents, said proof of ability to respond as to
future accidents to consist of the deposit of a bond with surety company or with
"two individual sureties.") Though the court agrees with the defendant, it says,
"We are not now called upon to decide whether the ordinance in question antagonizes the state law, and whether the state law covers the entire field."
I Infra notes 13, 14, and 15. The few cases in which parts of like ordinances
have been held invalid for any reason are clearly distinguishable: Jitney Bus Ass'n
v. City of Wilkes Barre, 256 Pa. 462, 100 Atl. 954 (1917) (wherein the ordinance
was held unreasonable in so far as it required continuing liability of obligors
after payment of the full sum set out in the bond, and provided only for corporate
sureties although there was proof that they could not be secured without tremendous difficulty) ; State v. Dillon, 82 Fla. 276, 89 So. 558 (1921) (where ordinance
was held unconstitutional because of the continuing liability objection). However, in People v. Martin, 203 App. Div. 423, 197 N. Y. S.28 (1922), an ordinance
requiring continuing liability in the bond was upheld.
' Plott v. Ferguson, 202 N. C. 446, 163 S.E. 688 (1932). Only this case is
cited to support the contention of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance, on
which ground alone the decision rests. The court refers to two other decisions on
this point, but only as dicta: Fleming v. Asheville, 203 N. C. 810, 167 S.E. 77
(1933) ; s. c. 205 N. C. 765, 172 S.E. 362 (1934).
'See supra, note 3.
8 N. C. Laws 1927, c. 613 (Providing that in Buncombe County, if private
builders required bonds from contractors, said bonds must contain a provision
saving the builder harmless, must be executed with corporate sureties, and must
include provisions required by N. C. Laws 1927, c. 151 relative to bonds covering
municipal building by towns and cities.) (N. C. Laws 1927, c. 151 provides that
the surety on the bond contracts not only to indemnify the creditor against loss,
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surety companies, which in Buncombe County imposed obligations on
such surety companies and granted privileges to the citizens of that
county, not required of surety companies nor accorded citizens of the
ninety-nine other counties of the state.0
The general rule that in the exercise of the police power, cities and
states can impose reasonable regulations upon the operation of vehicles
for hire is based on the principle that a person -has no inherent right to
use the public streets for private business.10 Equally well founded is
the rule that in case of conflict between statute and ordinance relative
to the same subject, the statute of course will prevail ;"1 but municipal
requirements are not necessarily in conflict with those of the state merely
because the former are more stringent than the latter. 12 One of the
conditions precedent to the operation of public service vehicles which is
everywhere admitted to be reasonable is the requirement of a bond to
cover damages caused by negligence.' 3 And not only does the power
to require bond include the power to stipulate that it be issued by a
bonding company as surety, but also such requirement by ordinance or
statute is not unconstitutional because it fails to provide for any other
kind of surety.' 4 Nor will the fact that the operators of vehicles for
but also to guarantee payment for labor and materials furnished under the building contract).
'Supra,note (8). N. C. Laws 1927, c. 151 was held invalid because in effect
it provided that corporate sureties in Buncombe County, irrespective of the contract of indemnity, must, in private construction work, not only hold the creditor'
harmless, but also see laborers and materialmen paid. This placed a burden on
corporate sureties in Buncombe not borne by the same kind of sureties in other
counties, hence violating both due process, by impairment of freedom of contract, and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Federal constitution.
It also gave laborers and materialmen in Buncombe separate emoluments and
privileges not enjoyed by the citizens of other counties, hence violating the N. C.
CoxsT. Art 1, §7.

"'Huston v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 455, 156 N. W. 883 (1916) ; Harris
v. Atlantic City, 73 N. J.L. 251, 62 Atl. 995 (1906) (regulating wheel chairs for
hire on the streets) ; Dallas Taxicab Co. v. City of Dallas, 68 S. W. (2nd)' 359,
(Tex. 1934); 1 PoND, PuBLIC UTmlTiEs (4th. ed. 1932) §87.
'Ellington Co. v. City of Macon, 177 Ga. 541, 170 S.E. 813 (1933) ; Denny
v. Brady, 201 Ind. 59, 163 N. E. 489 (1928) ; North Star Line v. City of Grand
Rapids, 259 Mich. 654, 244 N. W. 192 (1932). However, there is a strong presumption that the city ordinance is consistent with the state law; hence to invalidate
the ordinance, conflict with a statute must be clear and unmistakable.
U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Guenther, 281 U. S. 34, 50 Sup. Ct. 165, 74 L. ed. 683
(1929) ; Red Star Motors Ass'n v. Detroit, 244 Mich. 503, 221 N. W. 629 (1928).
Dallas Taxicab Co. v. City of Dallas, 68 S.W. (2nd) 359, (Tex. 1934).
1 State ex rel Dillon, 82 Fla. 276, 89 So. 558 (1921) ; Transylvania Cas. Ins.
Co. v. City of Atlanta, 35 Ga. App. 681, 134 S.E. 632 (1926).
" Lutz v. New Orleans, 235 Fed. 978 (E. D. La. 1916) ; Hester v. R. R Com.,
172 Ark. 90, 287 S.W. 763 (1926) ; Ex Parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150 Pac.
348 (1915) ; Sprout v. City of South Bend, 198 Ind. 563, 153 N. E. 504 (1926) ;
Fletcher v. Bordelon, 56 S.W. (2nd) 313 (Tex. 1933) ; State v. Seattle Taxi Co.,
90 Wash. 416, 156 Pac. 837 (1916) (These decisions are all flatly contra to the
instant case); 2 Bmaay, A TOMOBILmES (6th. ed. 1929) §1966; 1 BLASHnELD,
CycLoIEr. OF AUTOMOBLE LAW (1st. ed. 1927) 157.
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hire are unable to provide such bond invalidate the statute or
ordinance. 15
The argument of the court that the exclusion of individual sureties
makes the ordinance unconstitutional is entirely untenable because no
particular groups of people nor specific companies are chosen to enjoy
the surety business under grants of "separate emoluments" or "monopolies," but the ordinance simply makes reasonable classifications for the
protection of the public.' 6 Furthermore, important North Carolina
statutes, requiring bonds issued by companies or corporations as sureties, and making no provisions for individual sureties, have never been
held unconstitutional by the supreme court.' 7 Although there is just
as much reason for condemning these statutes as for holding void the
ordinance in the principal case, yet, in view of the weight of authority
on the subject, it is believed the supreme court will construe the statutes
to be valid.' 8
The contention that the ordinance conflicts with the statute, though
not used as a basis for the instant decision, is also unsound, both be-

cause the subject matter is not identical, and because even if it were,
the mere fact that the ordinance is more stringent than the statute,
would not alone make the former invalid.' 9
Also for practical considerations the present holding is to be re21New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 139 La. 113, 71 So. 248 (1915); Puget Sound
v. Grassmeyer, 102 Wash. 482, 173 Pac. 504 (1918).
"Hester v. Arkansas R. R Comn, 172 Ark. 90, 287 S. W. 763 (1926); ex

Parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150 Pac. 348 (1915), cited supra note 14, (wherein
the court, in upholding an ordinance that excluded personal sureties from bonds,
said 'We know of no constitutional right that one has to give any particular
kind of surety"). In the instant case, since the ordinance allows any and all
persons who are willing to meet the requirements set for becoming surety
companies to enjoy the surety business, there is nothing exclusive about the ordinance.
7
N . C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §218 (c) (Requiring the commissioner of
banks to file bond executed by surety company as surety thereon) ; id.§221 (m)
(the same as to bank employees) ; id. §225 (j) (the same as to employees of industrial banks) ; id. §323 (a) (same relative to bonds from officials of the state).
See: Guaranty Co. v. Hood, Comr. of Banks, 206 N. C. 639, 175 S. E. 135, (1934)
(wherein the constitutionality of N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1334 (70),
requiring bonds with surety companies to the exclusion of personal sureties seems
to be taken for granted).
=Snpra notes 14 and 15; Dallas Taxicab Co. v. City of Dallas, 68 S. W. (2nd)
359 (Tex. 1934).
" Cases cited by the court to sustain its argument do present instances of clear
conflicts: State v. Taylor, 88 N. C. 692 (1883) (Wherein a statute which removed
from the jurisdiction of the city cognizance of the crime of selling liquor on
Sunday, was held to be contravened by an ordinance giving the city jurisdiction
of that crime) ; State v. Stallings, 189 N. C. 104, 126 S. E. 187 (1925) (holding an
ordinance void because it required drivers to stop at intersections, irrespective of
traffic conditions, in the face of a statute which allowed drivers to cross at ten
miles per hour). But in the instant case there is no conflict, because the ordinance merely regulates public service automobiles as such, concerning which
subject the statute makes no attempt to deal. See notes 1 and 4, Yupra.
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gretted, because (a) in the interests of the public it is desirable that
public service vehicles be more strictly regulated than private vehicles ;20 (b) under the general law applicable to all automobile drivers
alike, it is possible for injured parties to be entirely unable to collect
amounts awarded by any judgments for "first offenses" rendered
against operators of for-hire vehicles ;21 (c) in view of the corporate
surety's greater responsibility, and of the power of the creditor to sue
such surety directly, the desireability of corporate over individual sureties is recognized in business and law.22
JoE L. CARLToN.
Contracts Induced by Fraud-Election of Remedies in Noth
Carolina.
A plaintiff who has been induced to enter a contract through fraud
of the defendant is faced with the perplexing problem of making a choice
of remedies. From the point of view of selection of rights he may affirm
the contract or may rescind. If he chooses the former, his remedy is
an action on the contract or an action for deceit. But if he chooses the
latter, his remedy is to seek a restoration of the status quo, by bringing
a bill for rescission or suing at law on the basis of a complete rescission.1
Thus, the plaintiff is faced with a choice between two inconsistent positions in regard to his substantive rights. In practical effect this usually
means an election between the two remedies already mentioned. To this
situation is applied the much discussed doctrine of election of remedies with the result that the choice of one among inconsistent remedies
bars recourse to others.2 It has been pointed out 8 that the historical
evolution of this doctrine has proceeded in at least three stages: first,
a period in which the doctrine was applied for the recognized purpose
of preventing a double satisfaction; second, a period in which the doctrine was cast in terms of formal logic and its real purpose overlooked
in the following of logical consistencies; and third, a period in which, it
being recognized that logical consistency as an end in itself often led
'See: Eastern Ohio Transportation Corp. v. Village of Bridgeport, 44 Ohio

App. 433, 185 N. E. 891 (1932) ; Notes 10 and 14 supra.
'Comment,

(1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 384; see note 4, .supra.

Lutz v. New Orleans, 235 Fed. 978 (E. D. La. 1916) ; NATIONAL BAN urarCY
AcT, §50, Bonds of trustees and referees: 30 STAr. 558 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §78
(1927).
'Day v. Broyles, 222 Ala. 508, 133 So. 269 (1931) ; Fields v. Brown, 160 N. C.
295, 76 S. E. 8 (1912) (If rescission does not restore the status quo, damages may
be a cumulative and not an inconsistent remedy).
'United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct. 100, 67 L. ed.
261 (1922); Gutterman v. Gally, 131 Cal. App. 647, 21 Pac. (2d) 1000 (1933);
Deinard and Deinard, Election of Remedies (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. 341; Hines,
Election of Remedies, A Criticism (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 707.
'Note (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 593.
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to exceedingly undesirable results,4 the courts sought escape in exceptions and qualifications. 5
The exact status of the doctrine in North Cirolina is not entirely
clear, but apparently it is still in the second stage of the development
outlined above, still flourishing in all the strength of a strictly logical
application. Perhaps the most striking example of this is the case of
Stewart v. Salisbury Realty Co.6 In that case the defrauded vendee of
a land contract, upon discovering the fraud, attempted to rescind by
tendering a deed, which was refused by the vendor. Subsequently the
vendee brought an action for deceit. The court, per Brown, J., held that
a mere tender of rescission bars a later action for deceit. In reaching
this extreme result the court went even further than was absolutely
necessary for logical consistency.1 Other manifestations of the strict
doctrine in North Carolina are: (1) the bringing of an action on the theory that title has passed will bar a subsequent action on a theory that
title has not passed ;8 and (2) a plaintiff may not in one complaint join
an action for rescission with an action for breach of contract.9 Of
course, even under a strict application of the doctrine, for the assertion
of one remedy to constitute a bar to another remedy, the two remedies
must be inconsistent.' 0 Thus, a defrauded vendor's action for the purchase price does not bar his later action for deceit, as both proceed upon
an affirmance of the contract."1
'A defrauded plaintiff, having prosecuted his bill for rescission to an unsucessful close, was thereafter denied the right to sue for deceit. The result is that
the guilty party goes unscathed with the fruits of his fraud. United States v.
Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct. 100, 67 L. ed. 261 (1922).
'Abbadessa v. Puglisi, 101 Conn. 1, 124 Atl. 838 (1924); Schenck v. State
Line Telephone Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 592 (1924) (mistaken pursuit of a
non-existent remedy is not an irrevocable election).
I Stewart v. Salisbury Realty and Insurance Co., 159 N. C. 230, 74 S. E.
736 (1913).
' Rescission is bilateral; therefore, an attempted rescission by one party
not accepted by the other is not inconsistent with continued existence of the
contract and so should not bar a later action for deceit. But affirmance is unilateral;
therefore, a prior action for deceit is a bar to a subsequent action for rescission.
Cohoon v. Fisher, 146 Ind. 583, 45 N. E. 787 (1897) ; Gorman-Head Auto Co. v.
Barrett, 78 Okla. 34, 188 Pac. 1083 (1920); Hines, Election of Remedies, A
Criticism (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 707, 712. But some liberal courts hold a prior
action for deceit a conditional affirmance only, contingent on a recovery of damages. Smith v. Bricker, 86 Iowa 285, 53 N. W. 250 (1892); Schenck v. State
Line Telephone Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 592 (1924).
'Davis v. Butters Lumber Co., 132 N. C. 233, 43 S. E. 650 (1903) ; Lanier v.
Roper Lumber Co., 177 N. C. 200, 98 S. E. 593 (1919).
'Lykes v. Grove, 201 N. C. 254, 159 S. E. 360 (1931) (although no action
for deceit involved here, the problem is the same since one action proceeds on an
affirmance and the other on a disaffirmance of the contract). Contra: Glover v.
Radford., 120 Mich. 528, 79 N. W. 803 (1899).
Fleming v. Congleton, 177 N. C. 186, 98 S. E. 449 (1919) ; Irvin v. Harris,
182 N. C. 647, 109 S. E. 867 (1921).
" Standand Sewing Machine Co. v. Owings, 14( N. C. 503, 53 S. E. 345
(1906) (satisfaction of first judgment unsuccessful because of defendant's supervening bankruptcy) ; Bare v. Thacker, 190 N. C. 499, 130 S. E. 164 (1925).
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On the other hand there are at least two North Carolina cases which
differ radically from the result reached by a strict application of the
doctrine. While it is true that in neither of these cases did the court
expressly consider thQ doctrine, the problem was present on the facts
and necessarily involved in the holding. In the case of Pettijohnv.Williams,12 the court, per Pearson, J., allowed a bill for rescission even
after judgment had been recovered in the action for deceit, double recovery being prevented by an injunction against further proceedings in the
law action pending the proceedings for rescission. Also, in Troxler v.
Building Co. 13 the court was little worried by the technical inconsistency
of the plaintiff's double-barreled request in the same complaint for damages for deceit and for rescission, even sending appropriate issues on
both counts to the jury, though, of course, a recovery would finally be
permitted on but one.
It is a commentary on the value of a strict application of the doctrine that the ultimate results obtained by these last two cases, in which
it was not applied, seem far preferable to the results of those cases in
which it was strictly applied. Furthermore, the problem which the
doctrine was originally invoked to meet, i.e., prevention of a double
satisfaction, was adequately met in these cases. Therefore, unless there
has been a decision adverse to the plaintiff in the first action on the question of fraud, thus constituting res adjudicata,'4 or unless the bringing
of the first action has led to such a material change of position on the
part of the defendant as to constitute an estoppel,15 it would seem the
doctrine has little to recommend itself except mere compliance with
formal logic.
F. M. PARKER.
Evidence-Hearsay-Admissibility of Declarations of
Present Bodily Feelings.
Plaintiff filed a claim before the North Carolina Industrial Commission for compensation, contending that the death of her husband
resulted from an accident arising out of his employment by defendant
"Pettijohn v. Williams, 55 N. C. 302 (1855) (Although speaking of an
"election of remedies," the court is here considering an election between legal
and equitable remedies rather than an election between affirmance and disaffirmance
of a voidable transaction).
" Troxler v. Building Co., 137 N. C. 51, 49 S. E. 58 (1904). This case seems
to be contrary to the more recent case of Lykes v. Grove., 201 N. C. 254, 159 S. E.
360 (1931), cited note 9, supra.
" Gutheil v. Goodrich, 160 Ind. 92, 66 N. E. 446 (1903). In some jurisdictions
a prior suit to rescind is a final election only when it is res judicata on the
merits of the subsequent action in deceit. Kramer v. Association of Almond
Growers, 111 Cal. App. 595, 295 Pac. 873 (1931); Dooley v. Crabtree, 134 Iowa 465,
109 N. W. 889 (1907).
"Comment (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 665.
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drug store. Deceased, after carrying two heavy boxes into the store,
complained of a pain around his heart. Over plaintiff's objection,
defendant was allowed to have a physician testify that shortly after
the accident deceased told physician that he first felt the pain while
returning from the post office previous to the accident. Judgment for the
defendant was affirmed on appeal. The declaration was held competent as one of "bodily feelings" and therefore not within the hearsay
rule.'
Generally declarations of present existing bodily feelings are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule on the theory that their
spontaneity makes them trustworthy. 2 Some jurisdictions qualify this
exception by holding declarations even of present pain inadmissible
unless made to a physician. 3 In nearly all jurisdictions the declaration,
to fall within this exception, must be one of present existing pain.
Those which allow declarations of past pain do so in cases where the
declarant was under the influence of some exciting stimulus so strong
as to minimize the possibility of reflective falsehood. 4 This exception
for excited utterances, often comprehended under the omnibus term
"res gestae," is independent of the one under consideration and beyond
the scope of the present discussion.
In North Carolina such declarations must relate to present bodily
feelings. If this requirement is met, they are admissible whether made
to a physician or not.5 This includes cases involving declarations made
even to members of the declarant's family. 6 It cannot be clearly ascertained from the facts in many of the North Carolina cases whether the
declarations were of present or past bodily feelings. However, it is
explicitly stated in the opinions that the exception in question saves
'Moore
v. Summers Drug Co., 206 N. C. 711, 175 S. E. 96 (1934).
2
Biles v.
Holmes, 33 N. C. 16 (1850) ; Perkins v. Concord R. R. Co., 44 N. H.
223 (1862) ; Thomas v. Herrall, 18 Ore. 546, 23 Pac. 497 (1890) ; 3 WIGmORE, EviDEN E (2d ed. 1923) §1718 et seq.; 1 GR ENLgAJ, Evmimca (13th ed. 1876) §102.
'Reed v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 574 (1871) ; Roche v. Brooklyn City
& N. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 294, 11 N. E. 630 (1887) (The court said "But evidence
of simple declarations of a party, made sometime after the injury, and not to a
physician for the purpose of being attended to professionally, and simply making
the statement that he or she is then suffering pain . . . is liable- to gross exaggeration and is evidence of a most dangerous tendency").
'Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Moseley, 75 U. S. 397, 19 L. ed. 437 (1869) ; 3
W GmoRE, EviDENcE (2d ed. 1923) §1745; Morgan, Suggested Classification of
Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 229.
'Biles v. Holmes, 33 N. C. 16, 20 (1850) (The court said, "The declaration of
a patient to his physician is strong evidence of the state of his health and only
differs from his declaration to a third party because it is less probable that he
will feign or state falsehoods to one by whom he hopes to be relieved; but this
consideration only affects the degree of credit due to such declarations and does
not affect their admissibility.") Lush v. McDaniel, 35 N. C. 485 (1852) ; Howard
v. Wright, 173 N. C. 339, 91 S. E. 1032 (1917) ; Bryant v. Burs-Hammond Construction Co., 197 N. C. 639, 150 S. E. 122 (1929).
' State v. Harris, 63 N. C. 6 (1868).
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from the hearsay rule only declarations of present bodily feelings.
Indeed some of them expressly exclude declarations of past pain."
Hence it would seem that the North Carolina cases clearly permit
declarations of present pain and exclude such evidence of past bodily
feelings.
The ruling of the instant case advances beyond precedent by receiving a declaration of past pain. It is conceivable that our court intends
only a slight modification of preexisting doctrine to the effect that
declarations of past pain may be received where they are made to a
physician for purposes of treatment. It is possible that the court intends a total abandonment of its former limitations by receiving declarations of past bodily feelings made to anyone. The language of the
court suggests a third interpretation, namely: that where the time between the pain and the declaration thereof is of short duration (probably an half hour or less in this case), it is still to be considered a
declaration of present pain. This interpretation is frustrated by the
obvious inconsistency of calling past pain present pain. In any event,
the court has not applied the well established rule borne out by a long
9
line of North Carolina cases.
It is submitted, however, that the court in the principal case properly admitted the declaration, notwithstanding the consequent perplexity of the law on the subject. The declaration, although of past pain,
was made to a physician for purposes of treatment and as such is a
satisfactory testimonial of its own trustworthiness. Such a declaration
meets the two requirements underlying recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule-that the declaration be necessary and trustworthy. 10 It
may thus be hoped that the instant ruling lays the foundation for a new
exception to the hearsay .rule for statements made by patient to
physician.
E. D. KUYKENDALL, JR.

Evidence-Testimon, of Interested Survivor in Accident
Litigation.
While a married couple were riding together, the car skidded from
a curve and turned over, the husband being killed and the wife injured.
The wife sued her husband's estate for injuries caused by his negligence. C. S. 1795 provides that in an action against the administrator
'Bell v. Morrisett, 511 N. C. 178 (1858) ; Henderson v. Crouse, 52 N. C. 623
(1860); State v. Harris, 63 N. C. 0 (1868).
I Martin v. Hanes, 189 N. C. 644, 127 S. E. 688 (1925).
'Wallace v. McIntosh, 49 N. C. 434 (1857) ; State v. Harris, 63 N. C. 6 (1868)
Howard v. Wright, 173 N. C. 339, 91 S. E. 1032 (1917); Martin v. Hanes, 189
N. C. 644, 127 S. E. 688 (1925).
113 Wimooa, EvmzxcE (2d ed. 1923) §1718 et seq.
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of a deceased person an interested party shall not be examined as a
witness "concerning a personal transaction or communication between
the witness and the deceased." Held, the wife is incompetent to testify
concerning the accident, since C. S. 1795 applies to actions in tort as
well as to actions in contract, and since the accident constituted a "personal transaction" within the meaning of the statute.,
All except some nine of the states have statutes similar to our C. S.
1795.2 By many of these the witness is incompetent to testify concerning a "personal transaction." Those states which have passed on the
subject hold this statute applicable to actions in tort as well as to actions in contract.3 However, one state has recently amended its statute
so as to make it inapplicable "in actions for personal injury, death or
damage to property by negligence or tortious act. ' 4 But there is no
such unanimity as to just what constitutes a "personal transaction" in
such cases. In offering a definition, some of the cases require that there
be mutual participation by the witness and the deceased. 5 Other cases,
perhaps a majority, have no requirement of bilateral behavior, but declare that a "transaction" is something done in the decedent's presence
to which if alive he could testify of his own knowledge. 6 Still a third
IBoyd v. Williams, 207 N. C.30, 175 S. E. 832 (1934).
'In Conn., Mass., and R. I., the interested survivor is entirely competent.
In N. M., Or., and Va., he may testify but no judgment may be based on his
uncorroborated testimony. In Ariz. he may testify "if required by the court."
And in N. H. he may testify "when it clearly appears to the court that injustice
may be done without the testimony of the party." MORGAkr, LAW OF EVmENCE
(1927) 29. In Montana, by REv. CODE (1921) §10535, subd. 3, he may testify
in the court's discretion where exclusion will result in injustice.'
'Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Davidson, 225 Ala. 171, 142 So. 63 (1932)
(personal injury) ; Ogden v. Keck, 253 Ill. App. 444 (1929) (wrongful death) ;
Hollowach v. Priest, 113 Me. 510, 95 Atl. 146 (1915) (wrongful death) ;Rock
v. Gannon Grocery Co., 246 Mich. 545, 224 N. W. 752 (1929); Dougherty v.
Garrick, 184 Minn. 436, 239 N. W. 153 (1931); Leavea v. Southern Ry. Co.,
266 Mo. 151, 181 S. W. 7, (1915) (partially overruled in Freeman v. Berberich,
332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393 (1933), holding statute not applicable to actions
ex delicto for personal injuries, except as to actual parties to cause of action
and on trial) ; Priest v. Business Men's Protective Ass'n, 117 Neb. 198, 220 N. W.
255 (1928); 5 JoNES, EvmENCE (2d ed. 1926) §2228.
In those states where the statute makes the surviving party incompetent in
suits "founded on contract with or demand against the ancestor," the statute
is held not applicable to an action in tort. Cincinnati, H. & I. R. Co. v. Cregor,
150 Ind. 625, 50 N. E. 760 (1898).
A few states, while applying the statute to actions ex delicto generally, hold
that it does not apply to actions for wrongful death on the ground that, in the
particular jurisdiction, the action does not involve the estate of the deceased.
Kuykendall v. Edmondson, 205 Ala. 265, 87 So. 882 (1921); Robb v. Woosley,
175 Ark. 43, 295 S. W. 13 (1927) ; State ex rel. Thomas v. Daues, 314 Mo. 13,
283 S. W. 51, (1926); Notes (1925) 36 A. L. R. 959; (1926) 41 A. L. R. 345.
'Kentucky, by Acts 1932, c. 59, sec. 1.
'Krause v. Emmons, 6 Boyce 104, 97 Atl. 238 (Del. 1916) Seligman v.
Orth, 205 Wis. 199, 236 N. W. 115 (1931).
'Odum v McArthur, 165 Ga. 103, 139 S. E. 870 (1927) ; Hlavaty v. Blair,
101 Neb. 414, 163 N. W. 330 (1917); Bankers' Trust Co. v. Bank of Rockville
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group lay down the catch-all that a transaction "includes every method
by which one person can derive impressions or information from the
conduct, condition, or language of another.' 7 Under this 'holding it
seems there may be a "personal transaction" despite the fact that one
of the parties was entirely unconscious at the time.8
As these varying definitions would indicate, the authorities differ as
to whether the circumstances surrounding an accident constitute a "personal transaction." In automobile collision cases most courts seem to
hold the concurring conduct of the two drivers a "personal transaction."0
In cases, as the present, where the guest is suing for the negligence of
the driver, if the *guest took no active part by giving directions, the
driver's separate acts in managing the car have been held not to constitute a personal transaction. 10 These cases proceed upon the theory
that the driver's acts would have been the same regardless of the presence of the guest. The instant case is in line with these authorities in
so far as it excludes testimony of what the wife said to the husband regarding the speed of the car. However, it seems a little extreme in holding the husband's separate acts, uninfluenced by the wife's presence, a
"personal transaction."
The purpose of the statute is said to be to effect fair play in the situation where death has closed the lips of one party by automatically
closing the lips of the other and so to protect the estates of the dead
from raids by the perjured living." It is submitted that the statute
accomplishes its protective purpose quite as often at the expense of an
honest claimant as of a lying one and that there is very little fair play
in the situation, as in the present case, where the surviving party has
Center Trust Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 391, 168 AtI. 733 (1933); White v. Evens, 188

N. C. 212, 124 S. E. 194 (1924).
' Bright v. Virginia and Gold Hill Water Co., 270 Fed. 410 (C. C. A. 9th,
1921); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. McCarty's Adm'r 169 Ky. 38, 183 S. W. 237
(1916) ; Stephens v. Short et al., 41 Wyo. 324, 285 P. 797 (1930).
'Barnett's Adm'r. v. Brand, 165 Ky. 616, 177 S. W. 461 (1915) (in action
for malpractice defendant doctor incompetent to testify as to what happened
during operation when patient was unconscious).
'Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Davidson, 225 Ala. 171, 142 So. 63 (1932);
Van Meter v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620, 148 N. E. 391 (1925) ; Miller v. Walsh's
Adm'x, 240 Ky. 822, 43 S. W. (2d) 42 (1931); Burns v. Polar Wave Ice and
Fuel Co., 187 S. W. 145 (Mo. App. 1916); Knickerbocker v. Athletic Tea Co.,
285 S. W. 797 (Mo. App. 1926) ; cf. Minor v. Scholton, 250 Mich. 645, 231 N. W.
120 (1930) (auto accident within statute excluding matter "equally within knowledge of" a decedent). Contra: Seligman v. Orth, 205 Wis. 199, 236 N. W. 115
(1931).
" McCarthy v. Woolston, 210 App. Div. 152, 205 N. Y. S. 507 (1924) ; Waters
v. Markham, 204 Wis. 332, 235 N. W. 797 (1931) ; Krantz v. Krantz, 211 Wis.
249, 248 N. W. 155 (1933); ef. Waggoner v. Gummerum, 180 Minn. 391, 231
N. Wr. 10 (1930) (under statute excluding evidence of conversation with or admission by a decedent, driver not allowed to testify that deceased guest made no
protest). Contra: Stephens v. Short, 41 Wyo. 324, 285 P. 797 (1930).
"In re Will of Brown, 203 N. C. 347, 166 S. E. 72 (1932).
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no other method of proving his claim. The weapon of cross-examination and the good sense of the jury should sufficiently protect the estate
of deceased persons from mendacious claimants. 12 As cases previously
cited indicate, the statute has proved difficult to interpret and a great
source of expense and delay. To date this statute has come before the
North Carolina Supreme Court for interpretation two hundred and
sixty-two times, and as the instant case shows, its meaning is not yet
entirely clear.
In view of this confusion and the doubtful validity of the statute
in the first place, it is submitted that it should be abolished or at least
modified. 13 The necessity of interpreting such a statute leads the courts
into such peculiar positions as that of the Michigan court in a recent
automobile negligence case. 14 The words of the Michigan statute render
the surviving party incompetent to testify as to any facts "equally
within the knowledge" of the witness and the deceased. 15 The defendant driver wished to testify that he blew his horn; this evidence was excluded under the statute. On appeal the upper court held that the
evidence should have been submitted to the jury but with instructions
that if they found the deceased heard the horn, so that it was equally
within the knowledge of the parties, they were not to consider it. In
other words, the effect of the court's holding is that if the defendant
blew his -horn loud enough to do any good-i.e., so that the deceased
could hear it-then the jury could not consider it, but if he blew his
horn, but only ineffectually, then the jury could consider it.
F. M. PARKER.
Injunctions-Mandatory Injunction to Compel Skyscraper
Setbacks Required by Zoning Law.
Defendant erected a twenty-story apartment building separated by
an alley from the four-story apartment buildings of the plaintiffs, in violation of a Chicago zoning ordinance requiring certain setbacks according to height. The building permit had been granted over the objections
of the plaintiffs, under a section of the state zoning act which gave the
zoning board of appeals the power to vary the requirements of the ordinance. The state Supreme Court, in litigation carried on by these
plaintiffs, subsequently had held that section of the act unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs had then sought a mandatory injunction in a Federal District
Court to force the defendants to reconstruct the building, which had
-been completed in the meantime, so as to make it conform to the zoning
' St.
John v.for
Lofland,
5 N..D.
140, 64 N. W. 930 (1895).
Proposals
Legislation
in North
Carolina (1932) 11 N. C. L. REv. 51, 61.
" tNoonan v. Volek, 246 Mich. 377, 224 N. W. 657 (1929).
ComP. LAws (1929) §14219.

'Micr.
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ordinance. The District Court relying on the impropriety of causing
great injury to the defendant, in order to award an inconsequential
benefit to the plaintiffs, refused relief. On appeal, held, reversed and
mandatory injunction granted.1
2
There seems to be only one other case, that of Bouchard v. Zetley,
in which a mandatory injunction was granted to an individual to compel
compliance with a zoning ordinance.8 There the defendant, having
obtained a building permit, in spite of prompt notification by the plaintiff, an adjoining property owner, that the proposed apartment buildings
would violate the setback provisions of the zoning ordinance, proceeded
with the construction of the buildings. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that the trial court properly granted a mandatory injunction to
require compliance with the ordinance by destroying part of the buildings, in view of public interest in the enforcement of the ordinance, notwithstanding the claim that plaintiff could have been compensated by a
money judgment.
In cases of encroachments 4 and violations of restrictive covenantsu
the courts will sometimes balance the conveniences, but as each case is
decided on its own peculiar circumstances any rule that could be formulated would be too general to be useful. However, the courts consider
the following factors particularly: (1) The character of the defendant's
attitude and conduct; ie., whether based on innocent or negligent mistake, good faith, wilfulness, etc.; (2) whether plaintiff was guilty of
laches, waiver, or acquiescence; and (3) the relation of the injury that
the defendant would suffer from the injunction to the benefit that it
'Welton v. 40 East Oak St. Building Corporation, 70 F. (2d) 377, (C. C.
A. 7th, 1934); cert. denied, 55 S. Ct. 105 (1934), sub. non. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., trustee v. Welton.
'Bouchard v. Zetley, 196 Wis. 635, 220 N. W. 209 (1928).
'Although it is firmly established that an adjoining property owner has the
right to an injunction to restrain the violation of a zoning ordinance, provided he
shows special damages. Shelton v. Lentz, 191 Mo. App. 699, 178 S. W. 243
(1915) ; Holzbauer v. Ritter, 184 Wis. 35, 198 N. W. 852 (1924). But cf. O'Brien
"v.Turner, 255 Mass. 84, 150 N. E. 886 (1926).
In Goldsboro v. Supply Co., 200 N. C. 405, 157 S. E. 58 (1931), the nearest
North Carolina case to the point, it was held that a complaint by property owners
to enjoin construction and operation of a filling station in violation of a zoning
ordinance, alleging threatened irreparable injury to property, was not demurrable
for failure to show authority to sue.
'Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Wire Co., 203 Mass. 448, 89 N. E. 534 (1909)
(refused to balance equities). Goldbacher v. Eggers, 38 Misc. Rep. 36, 76 N. Y.
S. 881 (1902), aff'd in 82 App. Div. 637, 84 N. Y. S. 1127 (1903), aff'd in 179
N. Y. 551, 71 N. E. 1131 (1904) (equities balanced). See annotation in (1921)
14 A. L. MZ831, continued in (1924) 31 A. L. R. 1302.
But cf. Shrago v. Gulley, 174 N. C. 135, 93 S. E. 458 (1917) (the nearest
North Carolina case to the point, indicates that injunctive relief in the case of an
encroachment might be applicable under some circumstances).
IBauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 139 AtI. 508 (1927) (balanced equities);
,Hartman v. Wells, 257 Ill. 167, 100 N. E. 500 (1912) (refused to balance equities).
See annotation in (1928) 57 A. L. R. 336.
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would give to the plaintiff. To these the Bouchlrd case would seem to
add another factor, that of public interest in the enforcement of zoning
ordinances. Judged by these criteria, the instant case seems to have
been properly decided. Defendant, relying upon the variation permitted
by the zoning board of appeals, erected the structure in defiance of the
ordinance and despite the protests and legal actions of plaintiffs. It
should not be fatal that they did not in addition seek a restraining order
pending the outcome of that litigation. Although it was estimated that
it would cost the defendants around $350,000, of which $130,000 would
go into rebuilding, to make the building conform, and that the resulting
benefit to the plaintiffs from the setbacks would be an average increase
in light of 2.14%, this balancing of conveniences perhaps ought not to
prevail against the other factors. Nor should the interests of bondholders, though their security is thus impaired.
There is, however, one objection to the result reached, and that is
the possibility of inducing extortion. What happens after the granting
of such a mandatory injunction? Is the building made to conform to the
ordinance, or is the plaintiff bought off by a larger payment of money
than would be granted by a court as damages? If the latter seems likely,
the plaintiff should be deprived of his argument of public interest, and
also of the inadequacy of the remedy at law. There are, however, two
possible precautions: either by provision in the decree that once arf
injunction issues no compromise would be allowed, or by restricting the
enforcement of ordinances by injunction to suits brought by the zoning
HERBERT H. TAYLOR, JR.
officials. 6
Injunctions-Restraining Residents of Forum from Suing in
Foreign Courts to Evade Local Laws.
A contract of employment was executed by residents of Illinois.
During the course of employment the employee was killed in Missouri.
His admiistratrix filed a claim with the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission. In a suit brought by the employer in a Federal District Court for Missouri to enjoin the Commission from entertaining
jurisdiction and to restrain the claimant from prosecuting her proceeding, held, decree for plaintiff, injunction allowed.'
I This was the view of the District Court. Compare note 3, supra. In North

Carolina, under statutory authority, a city may enjoin the violation of its zoning
ordinance. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §2776 (y) ; Elizabeth City v. Aydlett,
200 N. C. 58, 156 S. E. 163 (1930). But in the absence of statute, equity will not
at the suit of a municipality, enforce municipal ordinances by injunction unless
the act sought to be restrained is a nuisance. Ventnor City v. Fulmer, 92 N. J.

Eq. 478, 113 Atl. 488 (1921), aff'd in 93 N. J-. E. 660, 117 Ati. 925 (1922);
Elizabeth City v. Aydlett, 198 N. C. 585, 152 S. E. 681 (1930).
1
Joseph H. Weiderhoff, Inc. v. Neal, 6 F. Supp. 798 (W. D. Mo. 1934).
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In the early days it was thought that a writ of injunction could not
lie beyond the borders of the court's territorial jurisdiction. 2 However, since the injunction is directed, not to the foreign tribunal where
the suit is pending, but solely to the party before the court who is
bringing the foreign action,3 the doctrine has become firmly established,
both in England4 and in this country,5 that courts of chancery may restrain suits in foreign tribunals.8 This jurisdiction is derived from the
authority which is vested in courts of equity over persons within the
limits of their jurisdiction and amenable to their process, to restrain
7
them from doing acts which will work wrong and injury to others.
Perhaps the most frequent ground for the granting of injunctions
against foreign proceedings is to prevent a resident of a state from
prosecuting an action against another resident of the same state in a foreign jurisdiction for the purpose of avoiding the laws of his own state.3
2
Lord Clarendon, in Lowe v. Baker, 1 Ch. Cas. 67 (1665).
'Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen 545 (Mass. 1862); Portarlington v. Soulby, 3
(4th ed. 1846)
§899, n. 1.
'Harrison v. Gurney, 2 Jac. & W. 563 (Ch. 1821); Carron Iron Co. v.
Maclaren, 5 H. L. C. 415, (House of Lords, 1855); Ellerman Lines v. Read,
[1928] 2 K. B. 144.
' Cole v. 'Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. ed. 538 (1890);
Ex Parte Crandall, 53 F. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) ; Oates v. Morningside
College, 252 N. W. 783 (Iowa, 1934); Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen 545 (Mass.,
1862); Dinsmore v. Neresheimer, 32 Hun. 204 (N. Y. 1884). A few of the
earlier state courts hesitated to enjoin proceedings in the courts of sister states
for reasons of comity and a feeling that the other courts were equally capable
of rendering justice. Carroll v. Farmers & Mechanic's Bank, Harr, 197 (Mich.
1840) ; Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige 402 (N. Y. 1831); Burgess v. Smith, 2 Barb.
Ch. 276 (N. Y. 1847). But the prevailing principle has been that the courts of
sister states, in relation to this doctrine, stand upon the same ground as courts
strictly foreign. Bank v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 2 Wins. 470 (Vt. 1856).
'The theory and development of this principle are discussed at length in:
Myl. & K. 104, (Ch. 1834); 2 STORY, EQuInT JURISPRUDENCE

2 STORY, Equirr

JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1846) §§899, 900; KERR, INYuNcroNS

(2d Am. ed. 1880) c. XIX, p. 433; 1 SPELLING, ExTAoRn rNAY RELinO (1893)
§§49, 50; 5 PoEtroy, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) §2091.

Oates v. Morningside College, 252 N. W. 783 (Iowa, 1934); Dehon v.
Foster, 4 Allen 545 (Mass. 1862); Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 Myl. & K. 104,
(Ch. 1834).
'Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. ed. 538 (1890);
Weaver v. Alabama Great Southern; Ry. Co., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917);
Sandage v. Studabaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 142 Ind. 148, 41 N. E. 380 (1895);
Oates v. Morningside College, 252 N. W. 783 (Iowa, 1934). This question has
been discussed in: Annotation (1930) 69 A. L. R. 591; Notes (1922) 22 COL.
L. Rv. 360. (1920) 5 IowA L. Bu.. 271, (1929) 8 OR& L. REv. 298, (1930)
9 Tmc. L. Rkv. 91. For collection of cases see: 5 PoMERoY, EQUITY JuIusPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) §2091, n. 156.

Within the meaning of this rule corporations organized under the laws
of a state are its citizens and may sue to restrain proceedings brought against
them outside the state on cause of action arising within the state. Reed's Adm'x v.
Illinois Cent. R. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S. W. 794 (1918).
The Federal Employer's Liability Act does not take away the right of one
state to enjoin one of its citizens from prosecuting an action against a fellow citizen in courts of another state, to prevent hardship, oppression or fraud. Reed's
Adm'x v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S. W. 794 (1918) ; Chicago, M. &
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It makes no difference whether the law sought to be evaded is one of
legislative enactment or of judicial decision. 9
Thus, equity will restrain a creditor from suing abroad to evade
the exemption laws of his own state or from gaining a preference over
other creditors therein by suing in a jurisdiction where the exemption
laws are more liberal,' 0 especially where the creditor is attempting to
reach exempt wages, earned in the state of residence," or property only
temporarily removed to another state, 12 and where statute prohibits the
sending of claims against debtors out of the state for collection, in order to evade the exemption law. 13
When there has been a general assignment for creditors, one will
not be allowed to obtain a preference by suing in another state. 14 An
injunction may be granted to restrain domestic creditors of an insolvent
debtor, against whom proceedings have been, or are about to be instituted,
from maintaining actions or proceedings in other states for the purpose of securing preferences or advantages by attachment and of evading the local insolvency laws. 15 Injunction has been allowed where a
debtor not subject to arrest in his own state was arrested in another
jurisdiction. 16 An injunction is proper where a receiver has been appointed and a resident creditor sues elsewhere for the purpose of collecting moneys or other assets to which, in the domiciliary state, the re17
ceiver is entitled.
The courts of one state may enjoin residents thereof from suing in
another state for damages which they would deny.' 8 Similarly, an injunction has been granted where the amount of recovery was limited by
a contract which was binding only in the injured party's own state.' 9
St. P. Ry. Co. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N. W. 218 (1921) ; Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry. Co. v. Wolf, 199 Wis. 278, 226 N. W. 297 (1929).
'Weaver v. Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917);
O'Haire v. Burns, 45 Colo. 432, 101 Pac. 755 (1909) ; Dinsmore v. Neresheimer, 32
Hun. 204 (N. Y. 1884).
"Allen v. Buchanan,.97 Ala. 399, 11 So. 77 (1892); Wierse v. Thomas, 145
N. C. 261, 59 S.E. 58 (1907) ; Moton v. Hull, 77 Tex. 80, 13, S.W. 849 (1890).
'Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa 746, 30 N. W. 36 (1886); Snook v. Snetzer, 25
Ohio St. 516 (1874) ; Moton v. Hull, 77 Tex. 80, 13 S.W. 849 (1890).
" Mumper v. Wilson, 72 Iowa 163, 33 N. W. 449 (1887); Stewart v. Thompson, 97 Ky. 575, 31 S. W. 133 (1895).
v. Joseph, 107 Ind. 490, 8 N. E. 616 (1886).
"Wilson
14
Hawkins v. Ireland, 64 Minn. 339, 67 N. W. 73 (1896); Kendall v. McClure
Coke Co., 182 Pa. 1, 27 Atl. 823 (1897).
" Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S.107, 10 Sup. Ct 269, 33 L. ed. 538 (1890);
Cunningham v. Butler, 142 Mass. 47, 6 N. E. 72 (1886); Hazen v. Lyndonville
Nat. Bank, 70 Vt. 543, 41 Atl. 1046 (1898).
"1Miller v. Gittings, 85 Md. 601, 37 Atl. 372 (1897).
Davis v. Butters Lumber Co., 132 N. C. 233, 43, S.E. 650 (1903) ; Vermont
L R. v. Vermont Cent. M. R., 46 Vt. 792 (1873).
"Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper, 286 U. S.145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571,
76 L. ed. 1026 (1932).
"Dinsmore v. Neresheimer, 32 Hun. 204 (N. Y. 1884).
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Residents will be enjoined from fraudulently bringing divorce proceedings abroad where they result in the evasion of20the domiciliary divorce
laws or in the embarrassment of the state court.
Creditors of an estate will not be allowed to evade the distribution
of the property of the estate through a local administration by resorting
to a foreign administration.2 1 An injunction will also issue against a
legatee who proceeds in a foreign tribunal to enforce payment of money
by an executor to the prejudice of other legatees. 22 A state will prevent its residents from suing elsewhere to avoid a decision of the domestic court differing from the rule upon the same subject in the foreign
tribunal.2 3 Also an injunction will issue to restrain a foreign suit which
violates an earlier injunction. 24 An injured party will not be permitted to sue outside his own state where he is seeking to avoid its
contributory negligence statute,2 5 or its insurance laws.2 0
A mere difference in the adjective laws of the two states, however, is not sufficient to warrant injunctive relief. 27 Thus, differences
in the rules of evidence do not constitute a sufficient basis for such relief.28 Injunction is refused where the only grounds are differences
29
in such matters as the number of jurors required to return a verdict,
or the finality of the jury's verdict.3 0 But injunction has been allowed
where the intent is to avoid the bar of the domiciliary statute of limitations.3 1 It is not enough that the other state would arrive at a different
judgment or more favorable decision. 32 Thus, injunction was denied
where plaintiff in the foreign suit obtained an attachment upon facts
I Kempson v. Kempson, 63 N. J. Eq. 783, 52 Atl. 360 (1902) ; Knapp v. Knapp,
173 Atl. 343 (N. J. Eq. 1934); Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 App. Div. 104, 218
N. Y. S. 87 (1926) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 146 Misc. 93, 261 N. Y. S. 523 (1933).
2'In re Williams Estate, 130 Iowa 553, 107 N. W. 608 (1906) ; Oates v. Morn-

ingside College, 252 N. W. 783 (Iowa, 1934).
Hutton v. Hutton, 40 N. J. Eq. 461, 2 AtI. 280 (1885).
-Dinsmore v. Neresheimer, 32 Hun. 204 (N. Y. 1884).
"' New York C. & St. L. R. R. v. Perdive, 187 N. E. 349 (Ind. App. 1933)
(Local administratrix was enjoined from prosecuting a foreign suit. She brought
a second action in a foreign tribunal, and the local court enjoined the taking of
depositions for the second trial).
" Weaver v. Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917).
' Davis v. Natchez Hotel Co., 128 So. 871 (1930).
1Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 95 So. 385 (1922) ; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.
v. Ashelman, 300 Pa. 291, 150 AlI. 475 (1930), annotated in (1930) 69 A. L. R.
591; Anerican Express Co. v. Fox, 135 Tenn. 489, 187 S. W. 1117 (1916).
' Edgell v. Clark, 19 App. Div. 199, 45 N. Y. S. 979 (1897).
'Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss, 277 Ill. 383, 115 N. E. 554 (1917); Missouri, K. &T. R. Co. v. Ball, 126 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (1928) ; Chicago, M. & St.
Paul Ry. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N. W. 218 (1921).
"Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 95 So. 385 (1922).
' Culp v. Butler, 69 Ind. App. 608, 122 N. E. 684 (1919). Contro: Thorndike v.
Thompson, 142 Ill. 450, 32 N. E. 510 (1892).
" McDaniel v. Alford, 148 Ga. 609, 97 S. E. 673 (1918) ; Reed's Adm'x v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S. V. 794 (1918); Carson v. Dunham, 149
Mass. 52, 20 N. E. 312 (1889).
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that would not have warranted it in his domicile.3 3 The inconvenience
of witnesses, the increased difficulty and expense of defending suit in
a foreign jurisdiction are not considered as warranting injunctions. 84
Courts also disregard the inability of the foreign jury to view the
premises where the accident occurred.3 5 Nor is unprofessional and
unethical conduct of an attorney for the plaintiff in the foreign suit a
36
sufficient ground for granting an injunction.
The injunctive relief which the court in the principal case granted
against the plaintiff in the foreign proceeding is consistent with these
settled rules. In the Missouri action the claimant sought to avoid both
an Illinois statute and an Illinois contract by which claimant's remedy
was limited. The Federal District Court went too far, however, when
it ordered the Workmen's Compensation Commission not to entertain
the suit. The attempted distinction between an administrative tribunal
and a court may have served to circumvent the federal statute,3 7 but it
did not give the Federal Court direct supervisory power over the Com-

mission.3

JOHN

R. JENKINS.,

JR.

Insolvency-Rights of Assignee of Secured Depositor of Insolvent
Bank.
A county's deposit in a state bank was secured by state bonds, and
by indemnity bonds written by plaintiff insurer. The bank became insolvent; then on the insistence of the plaintiff the county sold the state
bonds and credited the proceeds on its deposit; the county, nevertheGrover v. Woodward, 92 N. J. Eq. 227, 112 AtI. 412 (1920).
McWhorter v. Williams, 155 So. 309 (Ala. 1934) ; Illinois Life Ins. Co. v.
Prentiss, 277 IIl. 383, 115 N. E. 554 (1917); Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Ball, 126
Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (1928) ; American Express Co. v. Fox, 135 Tenn. 489, 187
S. W. 1117 (1916). Contra: Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry Co. v. Shelly, 96 Ind.
App. 273, 70 N. E. 328 (1930) ; Kern v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 204
Ind. 595, 185 N. E. 446 (1933); Wabash Ry. Co. v. Peterson, 187 Iowa 1331, 175
N. W. 523 (1919); Bankers' Life Co. v. Loring, 250 N. W. 8 (Iowa, 1933);
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Richey & Gilbert Co., 132 Wash. 526, 232 Pac. 355 (1925).
The rule applies with equal strictness where witnesses are unable to attend the
distant trial and it is necessary to take depositions instead of oral testimony. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Ball, 126 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (1928) ; Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N. W. 218 (1921).
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Ball, 126 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (1928);
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N. W. 218 (1921).
" Reed's Adm'x v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S. W. 794 (1918) ;
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185, N. W. 218 (1921) ;
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Wolf, 199 Wis. 278, 226 N. W. 297 (1929).
136 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §379 (1928): "The writ of injunction
shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any
court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any
law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." See Durfee and Sloss, Federal Injunctions Against Proceedings in. State Courts: The Life History of a Statute
(1932) 30 Mic. L. REv. 1145, 1154; Note (1932) 10 N. C. L. RaV. 209.
Notes (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 371, 372.
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less, filed a claim in the bank liquidation proceedings for the full amount
of the deposit; plaintiff paid the county the balance due on its deposit,
and took an assignment of its claim in the liquidation. Held, plaintiff's
claim is allowed only for the sum it actually paid the county.1
Four different rules dealing with the rights of creditors holding collateral security worth less than the full amount of their claims have been
applied in the distribution of insolvent estates. 2 The first of these is
commonly known as the bankruptcy rule under which the creditor
is allowed either to surrender his security and prove .for dividends upon
the full amount owing at the time of the adjudication of insolvency, or
to exhaust his security and prove for the balance.3 This rule has been
embodied in the National Bankruptcy Act.4 The second rule allows the
creditor to hold his security and receive dividends upon the amount
owing at the time of the declaration of each dividend regardless of any
amount received from his security subsequent thereto; but the amounts
received from the security before the declaration of the dividend go to
reduce the claim on which the dividend is allowed.5 The third rule
allows the creditor to retain his security and receive dividends upon the
amount owing at the time of proving his claim regardless of any amount
received from his security subsequent thereto; but all sums received prior
to proving the claim reduce the amount on which dividends are allowed.0
Under the fourth rule, better known as the chancery rule, the creditor
may prove for and receive dividends upon the full amount owing at
the time of the declaration of insolvency, regardless of the amount of
his security or any sums received therefrom after the insolvency, until
the claim has been paid in full.7
North Carolina adopted the bankruptcy rule in the case of Creecy v.
Pearce,8 but changed five years later to the chancery rule9 which has
been applied consistently until the present.' 0 The instant case refused
I U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hood, 206 N. C. 639, 175 S. E. 135 (1934).
'Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131, 19 Sup. Ct. 360,
43 L. ed. 640 (1899) ; Chemical National Bank v. Armstrong, 59 Fed. 372 (C. C.
S. D. Ohio 1893); Note L. R. A, 1918B 1024.
'Citizens & Southern Bank v. Alexander, 147 Ga. 74, 92 S. E. 868, (1917);
Bristol County Savings Bank v. Woodward, 137 Mass. 412 (1884).
'30 STAT. 560 §57 (e), (h) (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §93 (e), (h) (1927).
'Philadelphia Warehouse Co. v. Anniston Pipe Co., 106 Ala. 357, 18 So. 43
(1895) ; State National Bank v. Esterly, 69 Ohio 24, 68 N. E. 582 (1903).
'ln re Hamilton's Estate, 1 Fed. 800 (D. Ky. 1880); Levy v. Chicago National Bank, 158 Ill. 88, 42 N. E. 129, (1895); Kellock's Case [1868] L. R 3
Ch. 769.
"Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131, 19 Sup. Ct. 360, 43
L. ed. 640 f(1899) ; In re Jamison's Estate, 163 Pa. 143, 29 Atl. 1001 (1894);
Mason v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & C. 443 (Ch. 1837).

869 N. C. 67 (1873).

'Brown v. Bank, 79 N. C. 244 (1878).
"Winston v. Biggs, 117 N. C. 206, 23 S. E. 316 (1895) (assignment for
benefit of creditors) ; Merchants National Bank v. Flippen, 158 N. C. 334, 74 S. E.
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to allow the plaintiff to prove for and receive dividends upon the full
amount due at the time of insolvency because "the bonds were sold and
the credit made at plaintiff's solicitation" before the claim was filed.
According to the previous decisions, the county itself would have been
entitled to recover pro rata on the original deposit."1 If the plaintiff had
paid the county the full amount of its deposit, it would have been entitled to all the rights and remedies of the county, including the state
bonds held as collateral. 12 The plaintiff, as creditor, under the chancery rule hitherto adhered to in North Carolina, could then have sold the
state bonds and still have dividends upon the entire claim in the liquidation proceedings until Tepaid in full. The plaintiff's rights should be
the same whether it paid the balance after the county had sold the collateral, or paid the county in full and took the collateral and sold it itself. In either case the plaintiff is paying out of its pocket the same
amount. The court failed to follow the well established law in this
state.' 3 By departing from the chancery rule in favor of the third rule
14
above, the court took a position which receives considerable support,
but it should have recognized it was changing North Carolina law. It
is interesting to note the parallel betwen this state and England which
changed first from the bankruptcy rule' 5 to the chancery rule,1 6 then to8
the third rule,' 7 and finally returned by statute to the bankruptcy rule.'
T

100 (1912)

MAS H. LEATii.

(receivership of insolvent bank); Boney & Harper Milling Co. v.

Stephenson, 161 N. C. 510, 77 S. E. 676 (1913) (receivership of insolvent corporation) ; Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jarrett, 195 N. C. 798, 143 S. E. 827 (1928)
(assignment for benefit of creditors) ; see Commissioner of Banks v. White, 202
N. C. 311, 314, 162 S. E. 736, 737 (1932) (receivership of insolvent bank).
' Merchants National Bank v. Flippen, 158 N. C. 334, 74 S. E. 100 (1912) ; see

Commissioner of Banks v. White, 202 N. C. 311, 314, 162 S. E. 736, 737 (1932).
"Smith v. McLeod, 38 N. C. 390 (1844) ; see Brinson v. Thomas, 55 N. C.
414 (1856); 5 PomEaoy, EQUITY JURisPRuDFxcE & EQuTABLE REM IsS (2d. ed.
1919) §2345.

'Svpra note 10. A possible ground for supporting the decision, not, however, advanced by the court, is that here the plaintiff was not surety for the entire
deposit, but for only a part. It therefore might be argued that the plaintiff
would not be entitled to the full claim of the county quite apart from the sale
of the state bonds at the plaintiff's request. The answer to this argument is that
the full claim was assigned to the plaintiff.
14 See dissenting opinion Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S.
131, 19 Sup. Ct. 360, 43 L. ed. 640 (1899); Note (1931) 19 CAL. L. REv. 638;
Note (1909) 23 HARv. L. REv. 219; Note (1920) 15 ILL. L. REv. 171; Note (1923)
8 hN-N. L. REv..232.
'Greenwood v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & M. 185 (Ch. 1830).
"'Mason v. Bogg, 2 Myl & C. 443 (Ch. 1837).
Kellock's Case, (1868) L. R. 3 Ch. 769.
a SuppraIrn COURT OF JUDICATURE Acr (1873) Amendment, 38 & 39 Vicr. c.
77, §10 (1875).
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Libel and Slander-Qualified Privilege-Public ProceedingsChurch Meeting.
The defendant newspaper published a report of charges brought
against the plaintiff, a negro minister, before his board of deacons, by
the two defendant members of his congregation, charging him with embezzlement of a charity fund. Judgment for all defendants. Held,
affirmed; the defendant church members were privileged on a showing of good faith and absence of malice, jand the defendant newspaper
was privileged to make a fair and accurate report if the proceedings
had been carried on in a public manner and were legitimately before
the board.1
The law of defamation presents a conflict of two social interests.
On the one hand there is the interest to have the individual secure in
his character and reputation from unwarranted defamatory attacks,
and on the other there is the interest of society that publicity be given
matters of general social concern. The compromise resulting from this
conflict has produced the doctrine of privilege. Privilege is divided
into two general classes: absolute privilege--extended to the utterances of those actually participating in the course of judicial, legislative
and some official procedings ;2 and qualified, or conditional, privilege s extended to the utterances of those actually participating in the course
of quasi-judicial or public proceedings and reports thereof, and cases
where there is an interest or duty between the parties to the pullication.
Two classes of qualified privilege are involved in the principal case.
'Pinn v. Lawson, 72 F (2d) 742, (App. D. C. 1934). Plaintiff denied the jurisdiction of the board of deacons but failed to prove their lack of jurisdiction at
the trial. Had he been able to do so the occasion would have lost its privilege,

and his subsequent trial and conviction on the charges by the whole church

sitting as a court would have been no defense to the defendant newspaper against

liability for the original publication. Over v. Hildebrand, 92 Ind. 19 (1883);

Fawcett
v. Charles, 13 Wend. 473 (N. Y. 1835).
2
Judicial: Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 50 Am. Rep. 318 (1884) ; Wells

v. Toogood, 165 Mich. 677, 131 N. W. 124 (1911); Hastings v. Lusk, 22 Wend.
410, 34 Am. Dec. 330 (N. Y. 1839) ; Shelfer v. Gooding, 47 N. C. 175 (1855) ;
Seaman v. Netherclift, L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 53 (1876).

Legislative: Coffin v. Coffin,

4 Mass. 1, 3 Am. Dec. 189 (1808); Wright v. Lathrop, 149 Mass. 385, 21 N. E.
963 (1889); Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73 (1868). Official: Miles v. McGrath, 4 Fed. Supp. 603 (D. C. Md. 1933) commented on (1934) 12 N. C. L.

Rxv. 170; Layne v. Kirby, (Cal. 1929) 278 Pac. 1046; rev'd 20& Cal. 694, 284
Pac. 441 (1930) first decision commented on (1930) 28 MIcH, L. Rnv. 347;
Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: udldicial Proceedings, Legislative
and Executive Proceedings (1909) 9 COL. L. Rzv. 463, (1910), 10 COL. L. Rzv. 131.
1Qualified or conditional on the publication being made in good faith and
without malice in fact. The usual rule is that a defamatory publication establishes
legal malice. An exception is the defense of qualified privilege in which there
is a presumption of good faith, and the burden of proving actual malice is on
the plaintiff. If malice in fact can be proved, the privilege is destroyed. Coleman
v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908) ; Ashcroft v. Hammond, 197 N.
Y. 488, 90 N. E. 1117 (1910) ; Rosenberg v. Mason, 157 Va. 215, 160 S. E. 190
(1931).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
First, the privilege of the defendant church members. Their problem would appear to be simple and correctly disposed of by the court.
The law is well settled that where there is a sufficient interest or duty
between the communicating. parties, the publication, in the absence of
malice, is a privileged one.4 It is equally well settled that mutual membership in a church constitutes sufficient interest to justify communication of matters of and pertaining to the affairs of the church. 5 The
publication here was dearly within this ambit. Churches in this respect are classified with societies and fraternal organizations, to which
the same rule of qualified privileges applies. 6
The second problem, that of the defendant newspaper, is not so simple. Its privilege, if it has any, must rest on other grounds. 7 A newspaper, as such and in the absence of statute, has no more privilege to
publish libels than anyone else, and like an individual, is restricted to
a fair and accurate report of judicial, legislative, and some official or
public proceedings. 8 The primary question, therefore, is whether a
church meeting, as in the instant case, is of such a nature as to come
within the definition of a public proceeding, and if so, whether the protection of conditional privilege to a fair and accurate newspaper account
is invoked. 9
At common law this qualified privilege of publishing reports was
'Smith v. Agee, 178 Ala. 627, 59 So. 647 (1912); Adcock v. Marsh, 30 N. C.
360 (1848) ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N. C. 106, 52 S. E. 249 (1905) ; see Alexander v.
Vann, 180 N. C. 187, 104 S. E. 36U (1920). Ashcroff v. Hammond, 197 N. Y.
488, 90 N. E. 1117 (1910); Jones, Interest anon Duty in Relation to Qualified
Privilege (1924) 22 MicH. L. Rav. 437.

'Redgate v. Roush, 61 Kan. 480, 59 Pac. 1050 (1900) ; Farnsworth v. Storrs,
5 Cush. 412 (Mass. 1850); Konkle v. Haven, 140 Mich. 472, 103 N. W. 850
(1905) ; Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501, 31 Am. Rep. 698 (1879) ; Note (1929)
'63 A. L. R. 649.
'Wise v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers, 252 Fed. 961

(C. C. A. 8th, 1918); Kirkpatrick v. Eagle Lodge & Grand Lodge I. 0. 0. F.,
26 Kan. 384 (1881). For comment on publication in labour organization newspaper see (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 663.
7
Kimble v. Post Pub. Co., 199 Mass. 248, 85 N. E. 103 (1908). The privilege
of reporting is distinct from the privilege which attaches to the utterances of
those participating in the proceedings. The latter may be absolute, as in judicial
proceedings, or it may be conditional, as between persons with an interest, but
the privilege of reporting in either case is always a qualified privilege. Cowley v.
Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 50 Am. Rep. 318 (1884); Sweet v. Post Pub. Co., 215
Mass. 450, 102 N. E. 660 (1913); Rex. v. Wright, 8 T. R. 293 (K. B. 1799).
'Scheckell v. Jackson, 10 Cush. 25 (Mass. 1852); Sweet v. Post Pub. Co.,
215 Mass. 450, 102 N. E. 660 (1913); MacAlister v. Detroit Free Press Co.,
76 Mich. 338, 43 N. W. 431 (1889) ; Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 113 Va.
156, 73 S. E. 472 (1912). For relation of this restriction on newspapers to the
constitutional provision for freedom of the press, see HALE, LAw OF THE PRESS
(2nd. ed. 1933) c. VI, pp. 349 to 369 and cases citedL
'To be privileged the report must be fair and accurate but does not have
to be verbatim so long as it is a fair abstract. Leininger v. New Orleans Item
Pub. Co., 156 La. 1044, 101 So. 411 (1924); Brown v. Globe Printing Co., 213
Mo. 611, 112 S. W. 462 (1908).
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restricted to judicial and legislative proceedings. The courts, perhaps
following the traditional common law policy of protecting individual
rights, have been reluctant to extend its scope to include reports of
public meetings.' 0 In England and other jurisdictions of the British
Empire the extension has been made by statute," but in the United
States, with a few exceptions, neither the courts nor the legislatures have
made this extension.' 2 California and Texas have followed the English example and enacted statutes,' 3 and a few states have shown a
tendency to expand the rule by judicial decision. A Massachusetts
court held a report of the activities of a medical society to be of such
public interest as to be deserving of qualified privilege.' 4 The same has
been held respecting a meeting of a city council, 1 5 and a school board.10
Louisiana and Missouri have probably gone furthest by holding the
17
newspaper accounts of the proceedings of a race track association,
and of an interview with the Attorney General relative to an official
investigation of a race track' 8 to be conditionally privileged. At least
one court, Vermont, squarely takes the position that church affairs are
of sufficient public interest to vindicate their publication by the press.'0

The importance of the church as a social institution would seem to warrant this position, and justify the principal case as a desirable extension
of the common law rule.
FRANKLIN S. CLARK.
Rex v. Wright, 8 T. R. 293 (K. B. 1799); Davidson v. Duncan, 7 El. &

B1. 229 (Q. B. 1857); Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73 (1868).
NEWsPAPER LiM AND RIsrRA'ioN Ac, 44 & 45 VicT. c. 60 (1881);
LAw OF LimBi A MNDMENT AcT, 51 & 52 Vier. c. 64 (1888) ; 035ms, LuIDL AND
SLANDRa (6th. ed. 1929) c. XI, p. 252, and Appendix B; NEWELL, SLANDER AND
LimL, (4th. ed. 1924), §§468, 471. Some states have enacted retraction statutes.
North Carolina has held such a statute constitutional. Osborn v. Leach, 135 N1. C.
6£8, 47 S. E. 811 (1904). Contra: Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 Pac. 1041
(1904) ; Park v. Detroit Free Press, 72 Mich. 560, 40 N. W. 731 (1888).
' Kimball v. Post Pub. Co., 199 Mass. 248, 85 N. E. 103 (1908) ; HALE, LAW
OF THt PRESs (2nd
" CAL. CIv. CODE

(3).

ed. 1933) 153.
(1931) §47 (5); TEx. Civ.

STAT.

(Vernon, 1925) art. 5432

"Barrows v. Bell, 73 Mass. 301, 66 Am. Dec. 479 (1856).
"Meteye v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 47 La. Ann. 824, 17 So. 314 (1895);
Leininger v. New Orleans Item Pub. Co., 156 La. 1044, 101 So. 411 (1924);
(1925) 23 MicH. L. RZEv. 420; (1925) 19 ILL. L. Rav. 465. Contra: Trebby v.
Transcript Pub. Co., 74 Minn. 84, 76 N. W. 961 (1898); Buckstaff v. Hicks, 94
Wis.0 34, 68 N. W. 403 (1896).
Cafferty v. Southern Tier Pub. Co., 186 App. Div. 136, 173 N. Y. S. 774

(1919).
'Rabb v. Trevelyn, 122 La. 174, 47 So. 455 (1908).

v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 609, 145 S. W. 1143 (1912).
Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501, 31 Am. Rep. 698 (1879), citing: Kelly v.
Shulock and Kelly v. Tinling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 686, 699 (1866).
ITilles
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Municipal Corporations-Duty to Keep Streets Safe by
Warnings and Guards-Proximate Cause.
In Haney v. Town of Lincolnton1 plaintiff's intestate was killed
when a car in which she was a passenger was driven along a city
street and over an embankment opposite the point at which the street
terminated by intersecting a highway at right angles. The night was
dark, wet, and foggy. Held, by the North Carolina Supreme Court
in reversing judgment for the plaintiff, that the defendant municipality's demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained, as the defendant was not negligent in failing to give warning or to place a guard
at the street end, and even if negligent its conduct was insulated by
the negligence of the driver of the car, which was the immediate cause
of the accident.
North Carolina, in accord with most states, recognizes a duty on a
municipality to exercise reasonable care to maintain its streets in a
reasonably 2 safe condition,3 which includes the provision of proper
railings, barriers, or other reasonably necessary signals to warn and
guard the traveller against dangerous embankments, excavations, etc.,
contiguous to the street. 4 Ordinarily the question of the municipality's negligence in failing to provide warnings or guards5 is for the jury
to determine from the circumstances. 6 In the present case, in view of
1207 N. C. 282, 176 S. E. 573 (1934).
'A municipality is not the insurer of the absolute safety of its streets. Reuther
v. State, 125 Misc. Rep. 773, 214 N. Y. S. 783 (1926) ; Fitzgerald v. Concord, 140

N. C. 110,, 52 S. E. 309 (1905); Willis v. New Bern, 191 N. C. 507, 132 S. E.

286 (1926).
'Russell v. Monroe, 116 N. C. 721, 21 S. E. 550 (1895) (ditch in sidewalk);
Fitzgerald v, Concord, 140 N. C. 110, 52 S. E. 309 (1905) (defective culvert in
street) ; Johnson v. Raleigh, 156 N. C. 269, 72 S. E. 368 (1911) (hole in street) ;
Bailey v. Winston, 157 N. C. 252, 72 S. E. 966 (1911) (ditch in sidewalk) ; Michaux v. Rocky Mount, 193 N. C. 550, 137 S. E. 663 (1927) (bridge washout).
'Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N. C. 431 (1884) (city liable where plaintiff fell into
excavation near sidewalk); Willis v. New Bern, 191 N. C. 507, 132 S. E. 286
(1926) (city liable where plaintiff drove off end of street abruptly terminating
without lights or barrier in a river).
'In some cases it is not clear whether the court is referring to the duty of
notification or to the duty of fortification. Briglia v. City of St. Paul, 134 Minn.
97, 158 N. W. 794 (1916). Other cases clearly refer to the duty of notification,
Prather v. City of Spokane, 29 Wash. 549, 70 Pac. 55 (1902), and others dearly
to the duty of fortification, City of Milledgeville v. Holloway, 32 Ga. App. 734,
124 S. E. 802 (1924). City of Phoenix v. Mayfield, 20 P. (2d) 296 (Ariz. 1933)
seems to refer to both duties, as does the principal case. Watkin's Adm'r v. City
of Catlettsburg, 243 Ky. 197, 47 S. W. (2d) 1032 (1932) cites a number of cases
in holding that where there is no concealment and the condition is obvious there
is no duty on a city to maintain a barrier strong enough to keep a car from going
over an embankment.
'Horton v. McDonald, 105 Conn. 356, 135 Atl. 442 (1926) (plaintiff's car
backed over an embankment twenty feet from middle of the street when she
stopped at an intersection to shift gears) ; Bond v. Inhabitants of Billerica, 235
Mass. 119, 126 N. E. 281 (1920) (evidence sufficient for jury to find city negligent where car went over embankment at curve); Nelson v. City of Duluth,
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the "semi-dead end" street, 7 a sloping embankment opposite a right
angle turn, a dirt shoulder between the embankment and the highway,
and no lights, signs, or barriers to warn of the necessity of turning or
the existence of the embankment, the lower court should have been
sustained in submitting the case to the jury.8
Furthermore, the court held that even assuming that the city was
inactively negligent, yet its conduct was insulated by the intervention
of the active negligence of the driver of the car. North Carolina9 has
previously adhered to the general rule that the municipality is liable
where two causes concur in producing injury, one of them being a
culpable defect in the street, and the other, the active negligence of a
third party.1 0 However, the court probably means, instead of there being concurrent causes, that here the driver's negligence was the sole
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Although approval is given to
the bare statement that the interposition of independent, responsible
172 Minn. 76, 214 N. W. 774 (1927) (city liable for not providing warning or
guard at a cliff near an S-curve in road) ; Corcoran v. City of New York, 188
N. Y. 131, 80 N. E. 660 (1907)' (higher court reversed judgment of nonsuit and
ordered new trial where car at nighttime crashed through fence at end of street
and over an embankment).
"Bean v. City of Portland, 109 Me. 467, 84 Atl. 981 (1912) (plaintiff at night
drove over an unguarded embankment at the end of a street) ; Corcoran v. City of
New York, 188 N. Y. 131, 80 N. E. 660 (1907) (car crashed through fence at
end of street and over an embankment) ; Willis v. New Bern, 191 N. C. 507, 132
S. E. 286 (1926) (city liable where plaintiff drove off the end of street abruptly
terminating without lights or arrier in a river).
SComparethe facts in Ivory v. Town of Deer Park, 116 N. Y. 476, 22 N. E.
1080 (1889) where there was no ditch or barrier between a curve and an excavation within eleven feet of the beaten track. Plaintiff's horses failed to make the
turn one night and fell into the excavation. The jury's finding of negligence on
the city's part was not disturbed by the higher court. But cf. Briglia v. City of
St. Paul, 134 Minn. 97, 158 N. W. 794 (1916), where, as in the principal case, a
street intersected but did not cross another street and there was a bluff opposite
this point of intersection. However, the distinction in the facts is that the car
was driven along the boulevard and then turned into the street for some few feet,
and then it began backing across the intersection, sidewalk, and over the bluff.
The higher court held that the verdict was properly directed for, the defendant.
9
Speas v. City of Grensboro, 204 N. C. 239, 167 S. E. 807 (1930) (city held
liable in an action by a passenger in a car which hit a "silent policeman" negligently maintained with lights off at an intersection, even though the driver also
was liable for his negligence). This rule also was applied where an innocent
cause or occurrence combined with the defect in the street. Dillon v. City of
Raleigh, 124 N. C. 184, 32 S. E. 548 (1899) (Plaintiff's horse became frightened
and hit railroad trestle stringers negligently left in the street. Held, the city is
liable even though the defect in street combined with running of horse).
" Whitlach v. City of Iowa Falls, 199 Iowa 73, 201 N. W. 83 (1924) ; Thomas
v. City of Lexington, 150 So. 816 (Miss. 1933) ; King v. Douglas County, 114
Neb. 477, 208 N. W. 120 (1928).
However, some states in actions arising under a statute making a city liable for
injury by or through a defect in a street allow recovery where the defect combines
with an innocent occurrence in causing injury, Jennes v. City of Norwich, 107
Conn. 79, 140 At1. 119 (1927) ; but deny it where the defect combines with the
negligence or fault of a third party, Bartrarm, v. Town of Sharon, 71 Conn. 686,
43 AtI. 143 (1899).
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human conduct between the injury and the original wrongdoer's negligence insulates the latter, it is doubtful if the court would deny the
oft-stated proposition that if the intervening act and resultant injury
could reasonably have been foreseen 'by the defendant he remains
liable."
This test of foreseeability, which is a proper test for negligence, is improperly used in many cases as a test for-proximate cause. 12
It is true that if the driver's negligence alone would have caused the
injury the city is not liable, 13 but if the defendant had performed its
duty of fortifying against danger it seems unreasonable to say that this
accident would have happened anyway, if the car was being operated
at a speed of only fifteen or twenty miles an hour.
Although the inquiry here is almost entirely a factual one the present decision is to be regretted as a deterrent rather than a spur to action
by the new expense-wary North Carolina municipality towards maintenance of its streets in a safe condition. If the increasing tide of fatal
accidents 14 is to be checked a higher degree of care must be exercised,
both in the operation of vehicles, and in the maintenance of the streets
and highways, which includes all proper warnings and guards at sharp
turns and intersections. It is to be hoped that the present financial
condition of most North Carolina municipalities will not lead the court
to lighten the obligation of the municipality, which in terms of the safeguarding of human life is still far from being too onerous.
J. A. KLEEMEIER, JR.
Harton v. Telephone Co., 141 N. C. 455, 54 S. E. 299 (1906) (higher court
reversed ruling for defendant and ordered new trial where defendant's defective
telephone p6le broke and fell in the road, and after being propped up by a traveler
fell again killing plaintiff's intestate) ; Hinnant v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 202
N. C. 489, 163 S. E. 555 (1932) (recovery against railroad denied where engineer
was negligent in failing to blow whistle, and driver of car in which plaintiff was
passenger was negligent in driving too fast toward a grade crossing on a wet clay
road).
I That foreseeability is a test for negligence but not proximate cause is recognized in England. In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd. [1921], 3 K. B.
560; Bumrcx, ToRTs (1926) 21. See Gax, RATIoNALE OF PROXImATa CAUSE
(1927) 81, 83.
North Carolina has applied the test of foreseeability to the problem of cause in
some cases. Doggett v. Richmond & Danville R. Co., 78 N. C. 305 (1878) (where
in an action against the railroad for destruction of plaintiff's fence by fire it
appeared that plaintiff's fence was three-fourths of a mile from the fence first
ignited by sparks from defendant's engine, but was connected with it by a continuous line of fences of other owners. Held, defendant's negligence is remote,
and this was not such a probable consequence as should have been reasonably
foreseen) ; Harton v. Telephone Co. 141 N. C. 455, 54 S. E. 299 (1906) ; Herman v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 197 N. C. 718, 150 S. E. 361 (1929) (recovery denied
passenger in car which struck defendant's train as driver's negligence was the
sole proximate cause, being unforeseeable) ; Hinnant v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
202 N. C. 489, 163 S. E. 555 (1932).
"City of Douglas v. Burden, 24 Ariz. 95, 206 Pac. 1085 (1922) ; City of Hamilton v. Dilley, 30 Ohio App. 558, 166 N. E. 147 (1928) ; Dillon v. Raleigh, 124
N. C. 184, 32 S. E. 548 (1899).
" See dissenting opinion by Clarkson, J. in the principal case.
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Municipal Corporations-Taxpayers' RemediesLiability of Officers.
Municipal officers, after advertisement as required by statute,1
awarded construction company a contract for repairs on the city incinerator for a price of $1,370.00, and three days later, without advertising and public letting, awarded said construction company additional
work in the further sum of $4,870.61. Taxpayers, alleging that the
price of the additional work was exorbitant and was illegally paid, bring
suit in their own names, the mayor and city council having refused to
sue, to recover for and on behalf of the city. Held, the municipal
officers, even though they did not act corruptly and maliciously, are
jointly and severally bound, with the construction company, to restore
to the public treasury the amount by which the contract price exceeded
2
the reasonable value of the work.
When municipal officers wilfully transcend their lawful powers or
breach their legal duty in any way which tends to waste the corporate
property, there are two questions of interest to taxpayers on whom
the loss will ultimately fall: what is the liability of such officers, and
how are remedies against them to be enforced?
The doctrine is now almost universally accepted that when the proper, public officials fail to take action to prevent or restrain the illegal
creation of a public debt, the taxpayers themselves may maintain suit
for injunctive relief. 3 North Carolina has evinced a liberal attitude
toward such actions. 4 So also when an officer wrongfully retains funds
due the county or municipality and the proper authorities fail to collect
such funds from him when duly requested to do so, any citizen or taxpayer is authorized by statute to sue in his own name to recover for the
benefit of the county or municipality, and he may receive one-third of
the amount recovered up to $500.00. 5
When public funds have been wrongfully disbursed through mere
'N. C. CODE ANN, (Michie, 1931)23,§2830.
175 S.E. 714 (1934).
'Moore v. Lambeth, 207 N. C.
'Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601, 25 L. ed. 1070 (1879) ; Blanshard v.
City of New York, 141 Misc. Rep. 609, 253 N. Y. S. 419 (1931), aff'd 262 N.
Y. 5, 186 N. E. 29 (1933) (New York common law contra was changed by
statute in 1872) ; Murphey v. Greensboro, 190 N. C. 268, 129 S. E. 614 (1925) ;
Pierce v. Hagans, 79 Ohio St. 9, 86 N. E. 519, (1912); 4 DILLON, M1VtrcnAXL
CowoaRAnows (5th ed. 1911) 2763, n. 4.

"Murphey v. Greensboro, 190 N. C. 268, 129 S.E. 614 (1925) (averment of
request upon officers unnecessary if officers themselves involved in the alleged
illegality); Edenton Ice Co. v. Plymouth, 192 N. C. 180, 134 S.E. 449 (1926)
(Action should be brought by a taxpayer though he need not be a resident of the
town or an individual as distinguished from a corporation).
I N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §3206; Waddill v. Masten, 172 N. C. 582,
90 S.E. 694 (1916).
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errors of judgment, municipal officers incur no personal liability therefor;6 but where the losses occur in consequence of acts done in wilful
violation of law, officers are personally responsible even though they
acted in perfect good faith. 7 Guilty officials may be proceeded against
criminally but that does not restore the loss. 8 To recover the property
the municipal corporation through its proper officers should institute
proceedings. 9 But since the officials who should bring action are frequently the very parties whose alleged illegal acts are complained of, the
taxpayer, to have effectual protection, should not be limited to suits for
injunctive relief but allowed to maintain action to recover, on behalf
of the municipal corporation, funds already unlawfully expended. This
extension of the doctrine is supported by a majority of well reasoned
decisions. 10 It is definitely and fully adopted in North Carolina by
the principal case.A minority of states, however, have refused to entertain taxpayers'
remedial actions on the grounds that the wrong alleged affects the whole
community and not specifically those bringing the action; 12 that the
cause of action, if any, is in the corporation and only indirectly in the
taxpayer;13 and that to allow such suits would subject the courts as
'Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 150 Pac. 367 (1915) ; Burns v. Essling, 163
Minn. 57, 203 N. W. 605 (1925). 1 DILLON, MUN. Coiu. §439.
'Burns v. Essling, 163 Minn. 57, 203 N. W. 605 (1925) ; Jones v. North Wilkesboro, 150 N. C. 646, 64 S. E. 866 (1909); Murphey v. Greensboro, 190 N. C.
268, 129 S. E. 614 (1925). But cf. Ellefson v. Smith, 182 Wis. 398, 196 N. W.
834 (1924) (an exception where emergency exists and municipality receives full
benefit at a fair price) ; Vandervoort v. City of Troy, 130 Misc. Rep. 151, 223
N. Y. S. 454 (1927) (Mere illegality is not enough to authorize injunction unless
some injury is resultant) ; Harrison v. New Bern, 193 N. C. 555, 137 S. E. 582
(1927) (Although ultra vires contract made, the executed deal must be allowed to
stand for and against both parties "where the plainest rules of good faith require
it.")6

N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §4384 (official misconduct made a misdemeanor for which the officer may be removed from office, fined and imprisoned);
State v. Anderson, 196 N. C. 771, 147 S. E. 305 (1929).
'Young v. Moor, 144 Ga. 401, 87 S. E. 401 (1929) ; Brownfield v. Houser,
30 Or. 534, 49 Pac. 843 (1897) (Oregon held the corporation the only proper
plaintiff until 1912 when taxpayers' suit was recognized in McKenna v. McHaley,
62 Or. 1, 123 Pac. 1069 (1912)). 1 DILLoN, MuN. CorP. 2782.
" Zuelly v. Casper, 160 Ind. 455, 67 N. E. 103 (1903) ; Burns v. Van Buskirk,
163 Minn. 48, 203 N. W. 608 (1925) ; Cathers v. Moores, 78 Neb. 13, 110 N. W.
689 (1908); Land Co. v. McIntyre, 100 Wis. 258, 75 N. W. 964 (1898). Contra:
Bayley v. Town of Wells, 174 AI. 459 (Me. 1934); Stephens v. Campbell,
26 Tex. Civ. App. 213, 63 S.W. 161 (1901).
"The court had previously indicated what its attitude would be. See Waddill
v. Masten, 172 N. C. 582, 905 S. E. 694 (1916) ; Brown v. Walker, 188 N. C.
52, 123 S. E. 633 (1924). MCINTOSH, N. C. PRACrICE[AND PaocEmDu,
(1929)
205.
"Miller v. Town of Palermo, 12 Kan. 14 (1873) ; Bayley v. Town of Wells,
174 Atl. 459 (Me. 1934).
"Young v. Moor, 144 Ga. 401, 87 S. E. 401 (1915); Stephens v. Campbell,

26 Tex. Civ. App. 213, 63 S. W. 161 (1901).
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well as the municipal officials to a multiplicity of suits by dissatisfied
taxpayers. 14
On the other hand it may be pointed out that taxpayers' suits, with
certain statutory exceptions, are maintained not for the immediate benefit of the individual taxpayer but in behalf of the municipality, 1' and
to deny that taxpayers are proper parties plaintiff is to leave them without remedy while the public funds are wantonly or corruptly dissipated
'by those in temporary charge of municipal affairs. 16 The purpose of
such suits is not to interfere with the exercise of discretionary powers
by municipal officers, but the very basis of the taxpayer's action is the
refusal of the proper authorities to act when there is some injurious
17
misuse of corporate power.
The majority view, which is supported by the analogy of stockholder's suits where corporate directors refuse to sue,18 seems to be
based on sounder policy, because of the necessity of prompt action to
prevent public injury and because the taxpayer's suit is the most direct
and often the orily means of setting in motion the machinery of the
court.19
R. MAYNE ALBRIGHT.
Practice and Procedure-Effect of Judgment Pending
Appeal as Res Adjudicata
Through his next friend, A, an incompetent Indian, brought suit
in the Federal District Court against his former guardian, B, requesting an accounting. B offered in evidence as a bar to A's action a
judgment of the Oklahoma District Court from which an appeal was
pending to the State Supreme Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals
sustained the District Court's refusal to admit the judgment as evidence
by conforming to the Oklahoma rule that while an appeal is pending a
judgment has no force as res adjudicata.1
The opposite result has been reached in many decisions which grant
to a judgment pending an appeal the effect of a bar.2 Of course, if
"Sears v. James, 47 Or. 50, 82 Pac. 14 (1905) (Overruled in McKenna v.
McHaley, 62 Or. 1, 123 Pac. 1069 (1912). See note 9, supra).
Neacy v. Drew, 176 Wis. 348, 187 N. W. 218 (1922).
'Zuelly
455, 67 N. E. 103 (1903) ; Willard v. Comstock,
58 Wis.
565,v.17Casper,
N. W. 160
401 Ind.
(1883).

'Zuelly v. Casper, 160 Ind. 455, 67 N. E. 103 (1903) ; Murphey v. Greensboro, 190 N. C. 268, 129 S. E. 614 (1925).
'Hawes

v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, 26 L. ed. 827 (1882).

4 DMLON, MUN.

Coin. 2766.
"3 PoEREoy, EQUITY JuisPRuDENcE (4th ed. 1919) §1095; Note, (1929) 58
A. L. R. 588.
'Coppedge v. Clinton, 72 (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934). (Reversed in order that the District Court might determine a question of jurisdiction).
'Eastern Building & Loan Ass'n v. Welling, 103 Fed. 352 (C. C. D. S. C., 1900)

(South Carolina judgment) ; Tampa Waterworks Co. v. City of Tampa, 124 Fed.
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a judgment for the defendant has been ruled a bar, there is always the
possibility of its subsequent reversal and the necessity for further litigation.8 On the other hand, the doctrine of the instant case4 is subject
to more serious objections.5 If a judgment for a defendant is not a bar,
then the plaintiff may sue at least once more, pending appeal, and if
his effort is fruitful may force the defendant to appeal to prevent execu932 (C. C. S. D. Fla., 1903)' (Florida judgment; Contra Costa Water Co. v.
City of Oakland, 165 Fed. 518 (C. C. N. D. Cal., 1904) (California judgment) ; Edwards v. Bodkin, 267 Fed. 1004 (S.D. Cal., 1919) (California judgment); Howard v. Howard, 67 Cal. App. 56, 226 Pac. 984 (1924); Byrne, Vance & Co. v.
Prather, 14 La. Ann. 653 (1859) ; B. & M. Mining Co. v Montana Ore Purchasing
Co., 26 Mont. 146, 66 Pac. 752 (1901) (Although the court refused to accept the
judgment pending appeal as a bar, it did use it as evidence to influence a decision
not to issue an injunction) ; Haynes v. Ordway, 52 N. H. 284 (1870) ; McCusker
v. Commonwealth Casualty Co., 106 N. J. 116, 148 Atl. 897 (1930) ; City of Tulsa v.
Wells, 79 Okla. 39, 191 Pac. 186 (1920) ; Smith v. Lathrop, 44 Pa. 326 (1863)
(New York judgment); Southern Ry. Co. v. Brigman, 95 Tenn. 624, 32 S.W.
762 (1895) ; Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Hanson, 44 S. W. (2d) 985 (Tex.,
1932) ; State Bank of Sevier v. American Cement & Plaster Co., 80 Utah 250, 10
Pac. (2d) 1065 (1932).
In North Carolina if there is another action involving substantially the same
cause pending in a court of competent jurisdiction, the defendant may set the fact
out in his pleadings and secure a dismissal of the second suit. Jones Construction
Co. v. Hamlet Ice Co., 190 N. C. 580, 130 S.E. 165 (1925); McINTosH, NORTH
CAROLINA PRACrIcE AND PRocEDUR (1929) §479. This doctrine would probably
not be applicable where a judgment is pending appeal to the Supreme Court, first,
because it has only been applied where the first action is pending in the trial court
[Emry v. Chappel, 148 N. C. 327, 62 S.E. 411 (1908) ; Cook v. Cook, 159 N. C.
46, 74 S. E. 639 (1912)], and second, because the first action must be pending
in a court of the same state in which the second action is brought [Sloan v. McDowell, 75 N. C. 29 (1876)].
The North Carolina courts have never been forced to say whether a judgment
pending appeal would or would not bar a subsequent action, but it is probable, on
the basis of certain statutes which declare the judgment of a court of record to be
final until reversed by the Supreme Court, that they would declare such a judgment to be res adjudicata. N. C. CODE AwN. (Michie, 1931) §§601, 657.
"The evil resulting from this rule is, that though the judgment is erroneous,
and for that reason is reversed, yet before the reversal it may be used as evidence,
and thereby lead to another judgment, from which it may :be impossible to obtain
relief notwithstanding such reversal." 2 FEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §722.

' "The chief objection to this line of decisions is, that it enables one against
whom a judgment is entered to avoid its force for a considerable period of time
merely by taking an appeal."

2 FRmMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §722.

"Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n., 201 Fed. 306 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1912) (New
York judgment); By Products Recovery Co. v. Mabee, 288 Fed. 401 (N. D. Ohio
1923) (Ohio judgment); Railway Steel Spring Co. v. Chicago & E. I. Ry. Co., 12
F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926) (Indiana judgment); Corinth Bank & Trust
Co. v. Lawler, 218 Ala. 83, 117 So. 620 (1928) ; Allen, Ball & Co. v. The Mayor of
Savannah, 9 Ga. 286 (1851); People v. Rickert, 159 Ill. 496, 42 N. E. 884 (1896) ;
Hoyle v. Stellwagen, 30 Ind. App. 674, 66 N. E. 910 (1903) ; Willard v. Ostrander,
51 Kan. 481, 32 Pac. 1092 (1893) ; Faber v. -Hovey,117 Mass. 108 (1875) (New
York judgment) ; Wilcox Trux. Inc. v. Rosenberger, 169 Minn. 39, 209 N. W. 308
(1926) (judgment of a Federal District Court) ; Ton Toy v. John Gong, 87 Ore.
454, 170 Pac. 936 (1918) ; Paine v. Schenectady Insurance Co., 11 R. I. 411 (1876)
(New York judgment); Kaufman v. Klain, 69 Wash. 113, 124 Pac. 391 (1912);
Smith v. Schreiner, 86 Wis. 19, 56 N. W. 160 (1893) (appeal from Circuit Court
of Appeals pending in the United States Supreme Court) ; See Walz v. Agricultural Insurance Co., 282 Fed. 646 (E. D. Mich. 1922) ; Parkhurst v. Berdell, 110

N. Y. 386, 18 N. E. 123 (1888).
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tion of the second judgment. Thus, even though the first judgment for
the defendant is affirmed, there still remains the anomaly of a second
judgment for the plaintiff, which, so far as the record is concerned,
might also call for affirmance.
There seems to be no adequate means of classifying this division of
authority except to say that the courts probably adopted one rule in
preference to the other as a choice which they considered to be the lesser
of the two evils. However, other factors seem to have influenced
some of the decisions. Several states have a statute to the effect that
"an action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement
until its final determination upon appeal." 6 It is a logical conclusion
that under such a statute a judgment pending appeal would be ineffective
as a bar or a defense, 7 but some courts refuse to apply the statute to
this situation on the ground that it was only intended to provide the
proper basis for the application of the doctrine of lis pendens.8 Another statute, common to practically every jurisdiction but employed in
this type of case in only a few, is that which requires the appellant to
post a supersedeas bond for the protection of the appellee during the
period of the appeal. 9 Some courts hold that the posting of such a
bond vacates the judgment and makes it unavailable as a bar to another
action,' 0 while others hold that the bond only stays the execution of the
judgment and does not alter its effect as "Tes adjudicata." 1 1 In other
instances the mode of appellate review becomes important in the formulation of the rule. If the trial on appeal is to be de nova the judgment
from which the appeal is pending will have no force as a defense, but
if the appellate court may only affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment
on appeal, it will be good as a bar to another action. 12
8

Such a statute is found in only a few states. For example, CAL. CODE CIv.
UTAH ComP. LAws (1917) §7220.
"Contra Costa Water Co. v. City of Oakland, 165 Fed. 518 (C. C. N. D. Cal.
1904) (construing the California statute) ; Jennings v. Ward, 114 Cal. App. 536,
3008 Pac. 129 (1931) ; Vance v. Heath, 42 Utah 148, 129 Pac. 365 (1912).
Ransom v. City of Pierre, 101 Fed. 665 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900) (construing the
South Dakota statute); Day v. Holland, 15 Ore. 464, 15 Pac. 855 (1887); see
Ebner v. Steffanson, 42 N. D. 229, 172 N. W. 857 (1919) (involving a construction
of the South Dakota statute).
' This statute is found in practically every state, although its provisions differ in
various states. For example, Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §1022; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §630; OHIo Gmr. CODE (Page, 1931) §12234.
"Watson v. Richardson, 110 Iowa 698, 80 N. W. 416 (1899) ; Small v. Reeves,
25 Ky. L. 729, 76 S. W. 395 (1903) ; Bobb v. Taylor, 193 S. W. 800 (Mo. Sup. Ct.,
1917) ; Fassler v. Streit, 92 Neb. 786, 129 N. W. 628 (1913).
" Ransom v. City of Pierre, 101 Fed. 665 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900) ; Boynton v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 84 Ark. 203, 105 S. W. 77 (1907) ; Jennings v. Ward,
114 Cal. App. 536, 300 Pac. 129 (1931) ; Reese v. Damato, 44 Fla. 692, 33 So. 462
(1902) ; State v. Spratt, 150 Minn. 5, 184 N. W. 31 (1921).
' The decisions supporting this doctrine should be placed in two classifications,
First, the rule is applied where the judgment was rendered by a court of inferior
jurisdiction and the appeal is pending in the trial court of general jurisdiction.

PRoc. (Deering, 1931) §1049;
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These factors are of only superficial value in the rationalization of
the rule; they do not eliminate any of the inherent objections. A more
satisfactory and stable result might be reached if the courts would
recognize the pendency of the appeal from the judgment offered as a
defense as a valid basis for a continuance. 13 It should be mentioned,
however, that in view of the crowded condition of the appellate calendar
in Oklahoma' 4 the continuance suggested might have to be of extraordinary duration.
N. A. TOWNSEND, JR.
Practice and Procedure--Judgment of Nonsuit as Bar
to Subsequent Action.
The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of nonsuit on the ground
that plaintiff by her own testimony had shown that she was guilty of
contributory negligence.' Within one year thereafter she brought another suit on the same cause of action. A motion to dismiss for the
reason that the first suit was res adjudicata was granted. On appeal
this judgment was reversed. It was error to dismiss the second suit
unless it appeared from an examination of the pleadings and hearing
Sutton v. Dunn, 176 N. C. 202 96 S. E. 947 (1918) (appeal from a magistrate's

court to the Superior Court) ; Moss v. Taylor, 73 Utah 277, 273 Pac. 515 (1928)
(appeal from a Municipal Court to the District Court). Contra: Spokane Ry. Co. v.
Spokane County, 75 Wash. 72, 134 Pac. 688 (1913) (appeal from a ruling of the
Public Service Commission to the District Court). Second, the rule is applicable
where the judgment was rendered by the trial court of general jurisdiction and the
appeal is to the general appellate court. Ransom v. City of Pierre, 101 Fed. 665
(C. C. A. 8th, 1900); E. I. Du Pont Co. v. Richmond Guano Co., 297 Fed. 580
(C. C. A. 4th, 1924) (judgment rendered by a Federal District Court sitting in
North Carolina) ; Boynton v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 84 Ark. 203, 105 S. W.
77 (1907) ; Bank of North America v. Wheeler, 28 Conn. 433 (1859); Reese v.
Damato, 44 Fla. 692, 33 So. 462 (1902) ; Cain v. Williams, 16 Nev. 426 (1882) ;
see Sharon v. Hill, 26 Fed. 337 (C. C. D. Cal. 1885) ; see also the dissent of Lord,
C. J., Day v. Holland, 15 Ore. 464, 15 Pac. 855 (1887). Contra: Watson v. Richardson, 110 Iowa 698, 80 N. W. 416 (1899) (where a supersedeas bond is posted
the judgment will be res adjudicataregardless of the fact that the appeal will result in a hearing de novo).
=Robinson v. El Centro Grain Co., 133 Cal. App. 567, 24 P. (2d) 554 (1933) ;
McCusker v. Commonwealth Casualty Co., 106 N. J. L. 116, 148 AtI. 897 (1930) ;
Paine v. Schenectady Insurance Co., 11 R. I. 411 (1876) ("We will add, however, as a matter of practice, that we think the pendency of the appeal in New
York may be good ground for delaying the judgment here until the appeal is disposed of; for otherwise we may give the judgment here a permanently conclusive
effect, whereas in New York, if the appeal is successful, it will be conclusive
'only for a short time").
(1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 148.
'Batson v. City Laundry Co., 205 N. C. 93, 170 S. E. 136 (1933). On a previous appeal in the same case it was held that the trial court was without authority
to set aside a verdict for insufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law and then
grant a motion for nonsuit made at the close of all the evidence and renewed
after the verdict had been set aside. Batson v. City Laundry Co., 202 N. C. 560,
163 S. E. 600 (1932).
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the evidence on the trial that it was substantially the same as the first
2

suit.

The courts have generally held that a judgment of nonsuit, voluntary or involuntary, does not operate as a bar to another action.3 North
Carolina adhered to the general rule until the case of Hampton v. Rex
Spinniing Co., 4 where it was held that a former judgment of nonsuit
will operate as a bar to a second action if in the second action th
plaintiff introduces substantially the same pleadings and substantially
the same evidence as that offered in the first suit.
This departure from the general rule is commendable in that it
carries out the policy against a multiplicity of suits. As applied in the
instant case, however, the rule is subject to this criticism: the plaintiff
can omit the evidence of her contributory negligence in a subsequent
suit. Thus her evidence will be substantially altered, and the former
judgment will not be res adjudicata. In doing so she has avoided the
effect of having shown in the first suit that she was not entitled to
recover as a matter of law. This would not be prejudicial to the defendant but for the fact that there was no practical way for the
defendant to get a final judgment in the first action. Since the plaintiff's evidence did not entitle her to go to the jury, the defendant had
only a choice between a motion for nonsuit or motion for a directed
verdict. A motion for a directed verdict would usually be unavailing,
since plaintiff can always take a nonsuit to avoid the effect of a directed
verdict.5 The result might be that the plaintiff will eventually win a
suit which at one time she has shown as a matter of law that she was
not entitled to win. 6
It is submitted, therefore, that in addition to holding a judgment
of nonsuit res adjudicata when in a second suit the plaintiff fails to introduce a substantially different case from the one previously presented,
our court should also hold a nonsuit res adjudicata when it has been
granted because of plaintiff's showing as a matter of law that he was
2

Batson v. City Laundry Co., 206 N. C.371, 174 S. E. 90 (1934).
'Gardner v. Michigan Central R. Co., 150 U. S. 349, 14 Sup. Ct. 140, 37 L. ed.

1107 (1893) ; Mohn v. Tingley, 194 Cal. 470, 217 Pac. 733 (1923) ; Spring Valley

Coal Co. v. Patting, 210 Ill. 342, 71 N. E. 371 (1904) ; Sander v. New Orleans &
N. E. R. Co., 139 La. 85, 71 So. 238 (1916); Qualls v. Fowler, 186 S. W. 256
(Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
'198 N. C. 235, 151 S. E. 266 (1930).
'McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929)
6 Of course, testimony of her contributory negligence given by

§574.
plaintiff as a

witness in the first trial would be competent evidence in the second trial, since it

was clearly an admission. 2 and 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§1048,
1387(3). And there is some authority that testimony given by any other of
plaintiff's witnesses might also be admissible under this theory. Keyser Canning
Co. v. Klots Throwing Co., 98 W. Va., 487, 128 S. E. 280 (1925); 2 WIGMORE,
EvmENcE (2d ed. 1923) §1075. Also the pleadings on the former trial are admis-

sible; 2

WIGmoRE,

EviDENcE (2d ed. 1923) §1066.
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not entitled to recover. This view is supported by authority in other
7
jurisdictions.
FRANKLIN T. DuppEE, JR.
Practice and Procedure-judgment by Default and InquiryEvidence Relevant to Damages.
The plaintiff's car was demolished by defendant's truck in an accident due to the alleged negligence of the truck driver. Judgment was
by default and inquiry; evidence offered to prove that the accident resulted from plaintiff's negligence was ruled inadmissible. Held A
judgment by default admits the cause of action, but on the inquiry defendant fs entitled to establish facts in mitigation of damages. Evidence showing how the accident occurred is competent, therefore, not
as a bar to liability, but to show the amount of damages properly assessable on the inquiry.'
In North Carolina, the rule is well settled that a judgment by default and inquiry establishes a cause of action of the kind properly
pleaded in the complaint ;2 plaintiff's right at least to nominal damages ;3
and precludes defendant from offering any evidence in bar of the action. 4 Other state courts are in accord with the North Carolina view, 5
but this court is not clear in declaring what 'constitutes evidence in bar.
For instance, in an action for goods sold and delivered the defendant
was allowed to prove non-delivery ;6 but in another similar action, the
defendants' evidence that the goods were not delivered to themselves as
7
individuals but as officers of a buying corporation was inadmissible.
In the instant case, while saying that the judgment admits the cause
'Ordway v. Boston R. Co., 69 N. H. 429, 45 Atf. 243 (1899); Morrow v.
Atlanta & C. A. L. R. Co., 84 S. C. 224, 66 S. E. 186 (1909) ; Bartert v. Seehorn,
25 Wash. 261, 65 Pac. 185 (1901).
'DeHoff v. Black, 206 N. C. 687, 175 S. E. 179 (1934).
2 Graves v. Cameron, 161 N. C. 549, 77 S. E. 841 (1913) ; Plumbing Co. v. Hotel
Co., 168 N. C. 579, 84 S. E. 1008 (1915).
'Parker & Gatling v. Smith, 64 N. C. 291 (1869) ; Osborn v. Leach, 133 N. C.
428, 45 S. E. 783 (1903) ; Stockton v. Mining Co., 144 N. C. 595, 57 S. E. 335
(1907) ; Mfg. Co. v. McQueen, 189 N. C. 311, 127 S. E. 246 (1925).
'Gerrard v. Dollar, 49 N. C. 175 (1856) ; Lee v. Knapp, 90 N. C. 171 (1882);
Mitchell v. Express Co., 178 N. C. 235, 100 S. E. 307 (1919). Cf. Osborn v.
Leach, 133 N. C. 428, 45 S. E. 783 (1903) ; Parker & Gatling v. Smith, 64 N. C.
291 (1869).
1 Electrolitic Chlorine Co. v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 328 Mo. 782, 41 S. W.
(2d) 1049 (1931) ; Smithers v. Brunkhorst, 178 Wis. 530, 190 N. W. 349 (1922) ;
Loellke v. Grant, 120 Ill. App. 74 (1905). Iowa denies the defendant any right
beyond the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses; IowA CODE (1931),
§11591; Elwell, Lyman & Co., v. Betchell & Ross, 68 Iowa 755, 12 N. W. 273
(1882).
"Parker & Gatling v. Smith, 64 N. C. 291 (1869). See also Graves v. Cameron, 161 N. C. 549, 77 S. E. 841 (1913).
'Lee v. Knapp, 90 N. C. 171 (1882).
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of action, the court allows proof of the plaintiff's negligence. s Chief
Justice Stacy carefully avoids use of the term "contributory negligence"
which would be an affirmative defense in bar,0 but in a previous decision by the same jurist, the definition given would so characterize the
present defense.' 0 The effect of this decision is that the negligence of
plaintiff and defendant are compared to arrive at the proper damages.'"
The rule applied where judgment is on a verdict of the jury, that contributory negligence must be pleaded and that it bars the plaintiff's action,' 2 is abandoned. Will the decision therefore foster a new body of
law which dispenses with the necessity of giving plaintiff notice of
defenses by pleading them, and to be applied or ignored in the discretion of the court? That implication necessarily follows, for in the absence of a consistent line of authority the trial judge must use his own
notion of justice in deciding whether a particular defense, affirmative
or not, relates to the question of damages.
The limitation on the defendant's time for pleading, obviously necessary to insure trial of the case, occasions no hardship which calls for
the instant ruling; for even after judgment has been rendered, he may
have the case reopened for excusable neglect. Grounds therefor are
specified by statute.' 8 Thus it is difficult to see why the North Carolina court must depart from logic and precedent to give the defendant
additional advantages on the inquiry.
MAURICE V. BARNEILL,

JR.

Real Propety-Status of Proceeds of Sale of Real Estate
Held by the Entirety.
Husband and wife sold real estate of which they were seised by
the entirety. The husband took the money thus received and placed it
8
DeHoff v. Black, 206 N. C. 687, 690, 175 S. E. 179, 181 (1934). In illustrating, Judge Stacy says, "Upon execution of the inquiry, B offers to show how the
accident occurs, not to escape his liability of a penny and costs established by the
judgment, but to show that A's damages, over and above the amount fixed by
the default judgment, was the result of a self-inflicted injury (not contributory
negligence). ..

"

"West Construction Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 184 N. C. 179, 113 S. E.

672 (1922).
"West Construction Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 184 N. C. 179, 113
S. E. 672 (1922).
1 The doctrine of comparative negligence has not heretofore been recognized
in this state except in cases coming within the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
and our own statute, N. C. CoDE ANNr. (Michie, 1931) §3467, which relates to actions by employees against common carriers; Moore v. Chicago Bridge & Iron
Works, 183 N. C. 438, 111 S. E. 776 (1922).
1N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §523.
13N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §600; the statute declares that the judge
shall relieve the defaulting party where there has been "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect."
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in a bank to his credit. On his death the widow claimed all by virtue
of survivorship and secured a judgment against the estate for the full
amount. Pending an appeal from this judgment the bank became
insolvent. The appeal having been abandoned and the personalty proving inadequate, the widow now petitions for sale of the decedent's real
estate to make assets to pay her judgment. Held, thq estate holds the
entire amount of the money as trustee for her and she as a creditor is
entitled to the sale.'
Upon conversion, by sale or otherwise, of realty held by the
entirety2 into other forms of property, what status do these new assets
assume-? This question is important for it ultimately determines: (1)
The right of survivorship, since there must be an estate by the entirety
for such right to exist.3 (2) Rights of the creditors of the individual
spouse, since as long as the estate by the entirety exists these creditors
have no valid claim on the assets. 4 (3) Right of each individual spouse
to do with his part as he pleases, for this is possible, only where no estate
by the entirety exists. 5
At common law this problem in its present-day form did not exist,
for once the realty was turned into personalty the husband was the
absolute owner thereof. 6 Many states today recognize estates by the
entireties in personalty of any character ;7 others recognize such estates
in personalty consisting of proceeds received from the sale.of realty
thus held.8 In the latter jurisdictions the courts say that an estate
by the entireties existed in the realty, and that the proceeds received
therefrom should stand in the place of the realty and should also be
held by the entireties 9 until a division by the parties is had.' 0 Accordingly, estates by the entireties have been held to exist in assets such as
Place v. Place, 206 N. C.676, 174 S. E. 747 (1934).
This problem would arise only in those states that recognize estates by the
entireties in realty: Ark., Ind., Mich., Mo., N. Y., N. C., Ore., Pa., S. C., Tenn.,
and Vt. PowEL, CASES ON POSSESsoRY ESTATES (1st ed. 1933) 290, n. 4.
' Survivorship is generally abolished in joint tenancies by statutes. N. C. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1735.
' Patton v. Rankin, 68 Ind. 245, 34 Am. St. Rep. 254 (1879). For the rights
of creditors generally in estates by the entireties see Martin v. Lewis, 187 N. C.
473, 122 S. E. 180 (1924); Davis v. Bass, 188 N. C. 200, 124 S. E. 566 (1924).
But see Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 312, 39 N. E. 337 (1895).
1 Bruce v. Nicholson, 109 N. C. 202, 13 S. E. 790 (1891); Jones v. Smith,
149 N. C. 318, 62 S. E. 1092 (1908).
02 KXNT CoMM. 143; Gooch v. Weldon Bank & Trust Co., 176 N. C. 213; 97
S. E. 53 (1918).
"Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925).; Brewer v. Bowersox, 92
Md.567, 48 Atl. 1060 (1901) ; Note (1920) 8 A. L. R. 1017. Contra: WinchesterSimmons
Co. v. Cutler, 194 N. C. 698, 140 S. E. 622 (1927).
8
Koehring v. Bowman, 194 Ind. 433, 142 N. E. 117 (1924).
it re Blumenthal's estate, 119 Misc. Rep. 588, 196 N. Y. S. 764 (1922);
Citizen's Say. Bank and Trust Co. v. Jenkins, 91 Vt. 13, 99 Atl. 250 (1916).
" Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 Atl. 635 (1923).
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bonds and purchase-money mortgages,"1 undivided money from the
sale of the land, 12 money from the sale of lumber cut from the realty,'8
money received from insurance of the premises, 14 money from the sale
of realty which was later invested in business, 15 money from the sale of
real estate which was later used to purchase more realty in the husband's name, 16 money borrowed on realty held by the entireties, 17 and
surplus money accruing from the sale under a mortgage foreclosure of
land held by the entirety,' 8 A minority take the position that the estate
by the entirety is undesirable because it is contrary to the policy
expressed by the Married Women's Acts,'0 defeats a general policy
against survivorship, 20 and exempts property from the debts of the
individual spouse;21 therefore these courts refuse to recognize estates
by the entireties in personalty even where such is derived from the
conversion of realty held by the entireties. Following this reasoning,
estates by the entireties have been held not to exist in bonds and purchase-money mortgages, 2 2 undivided money from the sale of realty,2 8
and a note given to the husband and wife secured by a mortgage on
24
realty owned by a third party.
The North Carolina Court in the instant case holds that an estate
by the entirety exists in money received from the sale of realty. In
the earlier case of Moore v. Trust Co. 2 5 money received from the sale
o, realty held by the entirety was divided and placed in two different
banks to the credit of the wife. The Court held that no estate by the entirety existed in money thus divided, but refused to commit itself as to
the status of the money had it not been divided. However, Justice Clark
in a concurring opinion held that when the land was turned into money
the estate by the entirety ceased. In a case four years later the Court
probably answered the question left open in the above case when in
Turlington v.Lucas,26 where the 'husband and wife conveyed to a third
party realty held by the entirety and in return received bonds secured
n Boland v. McKowen, 189 Mass. 563, 76 N. E. 206 (1905) ; Fielder v. Hovard,
99 Wis. 388, 75 N. W. 163 (1898).
" Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 Atl. 635 (1923).
2 Morris v. Morris, 210 Mich. 36, 177 N. W. 266 (1920).
14 Masterman v. Masterman, 129 Md. 167, 98 Atl. 537 (1916).
George v. Dutton, 94 Vt. 76, 108 Atl. 515 (1920).
"Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S. W. 527 (1906).
'Union and Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hudson, 147 Ark. 7, 227 S. W 1 (1921).
"Hill Top Savings and Trust Co. v. Worley, 16 Pa. Dist. 250 (1906).
In re Albrecht's Estate, 136 N. Y. 91, 32 N. E. 632 (1892).
'Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923).
Gooch v. Weldon Bank & Trust Co., 176 N. C. 213, 97 S. E. 53 (1918).
'Central Trust Co. v. Street, 95 N. J.Eq. 278, 127 Atl. 82 (1923).
Bremer v. Luff, 7 F. Supp. 148 (N. D. N. Y. 1934).
" Stout v. Van Zante, 109 Ore. 430, 219 Pac. 804 (1923).
"Moore v. Trust Co., 178 N. C. 118, 100 S. E. 269 (1919).
" Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923).
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by a deed of trust, it held that an estate by the entirety did not exist in
those bonds since they were personalty and no estates by the entirety
existed in personalty in North Carolina. It seems that this Court is
willing to say that money received from the sale of the realty is held
by the entireties while bonds thus received are not so held. It is doubtful if any satisfactory distinction can be made, since both are personalty and a bond "smacks" more of the realty than does money especially
where the bond is secured by a deed of trust.
The Court in the principal case, clinging to the view that estates
by the entireties exist in money received from the sale of realty so held,
and intent on preserving the integrity of such estates, goes further and
holds that a trust is set up in favor of the widow for the whole amount.
Trusts, other than those expressly created by the parties, are usually
declared by the courts (1) where an intent that one should arise is presumably inferable from the conduct of the parties, or (2) to prevent
a wrongful enrichment. 27 It is suggested that in the present case a
trust cannot be predicated on either of these two grounds. By holding
that a trust exists the Court is giving the widow a preferred claim
against the estate where the fund was dissipated through no fault of the
husband or his administratrix. This result would work a hardship on
the husband's bona fide creditors if the husband's estate should be found
to be insolvent, since the widow's preferred claim would have to be
settled in full before the creditors could receive anything.
A better result would have been reached by holding that the widow
was a mere creditor of the estate to one half the amount. This would
have carried out the probable intention of the parties as to a division
of the fund. At the same time it would have obviated, as to the money,
any further consideration of the undesirable legal consequences flowing
from an estate by the entirety.
ROBERT BOOTH.
Sales-Passing Title to Part of Fungible Goods-What
Constitutes Fungible Property.
The defendant company had stored in different warehouses 513,517
bags of beet sugar, each of the same standard and weight. During the
year 1917 the defendant entered contracts for the sale of 190,374 bags,
on which no payment was made before 1918, and which were not set
apart from the other bags nor delivered until 1918. The Federal income
tax upon the proceeds of these sales was computed as upon funds accruing in the fiscal year 1917. In 1925 on the contention that title did
not pass to the vendees until delivery in 1918, and hence that the tax
I Bo(mET, TRusTs (lst. ed. 1921) 92; MArLAND, EpuiTy (1st. ed. 1920) 73.
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should be levied upon the proceeds as accruing in that year, the commissioner of internal revenue levied against the defendant a deficiency
tax of $210,000 for the year 1918. On appeal the decision of the commissioner was repudiated, the court holding that the tax was correctly
levied for the year 1917, on the grounds that (a) the beet sugar in bags
was fungible property, and (b) that title to the bags sold passed immediately without segregation, since that was the intention of the parties.'
The court takes the position that the fact that the sugar "was stored
in different warehouses used in the operation of the (vendor's) business did not render inapplicable the ordinary rules respecting the sale
and passage of title to a part of fungible property without separation,"
since the parcels "were all a part of a common stock."
It is familiar law that unascertained chattels cannot be the subject
of sales, because otherwise the parties would not know what had been
bought and sold ;2 hence the attempted sale of a part of a mass presents
the problem of what constitutes a sufficient identification. Generally
the contract for the sale of goods from bulk is executory, and no title
passes until the subject matter has been identified by segregation of the
items to be sold.3 This is universally true where the units of the mass
differ in value, quality, or state, unless the parties agree to regard the
items as being alike.4 But in connection with the doctrine of fungible
goods, applicable to merchandise the units of which are the same in
value, quality, and state, even when the parties intend the immediate
passage of title, there is a clear split of authority along three lines: (1)
No title passes before separation. 5 (2) Title passes upon execution of
the contract for sale, regardless of separation. 6 (3) Title passes at
once, creating a tenancy in common, which the parties may sever at will
7
by demanding their respective shares.
'United States v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 72 Fed. (2d) 755 (C. C. A., 10th,
1934).
'United States v. Woodruff, 89 U. S. 180, 22 L. ed. 863 (1874); Kellog v.
Frohlich, 139 Mich. 180, 102 N. W. 1057 (1905); Blakely v. Patrick, 67 N. C.
40, 12 Am. Rep. 600 (1872).
'McFadden v. Henderson, 128 Ala. 221, 29 So. 640 (1901) ; Keeler v. Goodwin,
111 Mass. 490 (1873).
"Stamford Extract Mfg. Co. v. Oakes Mfg. Co., 9 F. (2nd) 301 (C. C. A.
2nd, 1925) ; Yoder v. Parcell, 189 N. E. 517 (Ind., 1934).
"Cook & Laurie Contracting Co. v. Bell, 177 Ala. 618, 59 So. 273 (1912);
American Factors v. Goss, 72 Cal. App. 742, 238 Pac. 121 (1925) ; S. Breakstom
Co. v. Gen. Parts Corp., 87 Ind. App. 55, 160 N. E. 47 (1928) ; Scudder v. Worster,
11 Cush. 573 (Mass., 1853) (the leading case on this view).
' Conboy v. Petty, 60 Ill. App. 117, (1894) ; Ark. River Gas Co. v. Molk, 130
Kan. 30, 285 Pac. 561 (1930) ; Kimberly v. Patchin, 19 N. Y. 330, 75 Am. Dec.
334 (1859) (the leading case on this view); Juno v. Northern Elevator Co.,
56 N. D. 223,216 N. W. 562 (1924); Geoghegen v. Arbuckle Bros, 139 Va. 92,
123 S. E. 387 (1924).
"Chapman v. Shepherd, 39 Conn. 413 (1872); National Exchange Bank
v. Wilder, 34 Minn. 149, 24 N. W. 699 (1889); Merchants Bank v. Hibbard,
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Rule (1) is based on the contention that regardless of whether the
units of a mass be exactly alike or distinguishable, in either case, the
precise thing to be sold cannot be identified as the subject of the sale if
not taken out of the bulk.8 Rule (2) rests upon the ground that the
impossibility of distinguishing between the units of fungible merchandise renders it impracticable to set aside the vendee's goods before he
calls for them; and that the subject of the sale is sufficiently ascertained
by the designation of the quantity and the mass from which it is to be
taken.9 Rule (3) is founded upon a compromise which admits that
before segregation title to precise goods cannot pass, but which holds
that title to an undivided interest in the whole passes at once, thus carrying out the intention of the parties through the device of a cotenancy. 10
This is really a sound method of reaching the desirable result of the second rule.
Formerly the tendency of authority in England was toward the second rule, while in the United States it was toward the first."1 Today
the situations are reversed, the English courts following the first rule,
and the trend in this country being toward the second and third rules.' 2
This fact is due largely to differences between provisions in the English Sale of Goods Act and in the United States Uniform Sales Act, the
adoption of which by over half the states explains why most courts in
this country repudiate the first rule.13
48 Mich. 118, 11 N. W. 834 (1882) ; (It has been held that the tenant in common

may bring replevin for his share: Halsey v. Simmons, 85 Ore. 324, 166 Pac. 944
(1908); Manti City Savings Banks v. Peterson, 33 Utah 209, 93 Pac. 566);
MARI.ASH, SALEs, (1930) §78 ("It would seem that as the goods are not specified,
title would not pass,. . . but the parties intend to transfer title to something.
Therefore it is held that the buyer becomes owner in common with the seller.") ;

1 WiLLis

oN, SALEs,

(2nd ed. 1924) §150, §156, §157 ("In regard to a tenancy

in common of goods which are fungibles, there is a right of severance by either
party").
s See cases upra cited under note (5).
'Kingman v. Holmquist 36 Kan. 735, 14 Pac. 168 (1887) ; Barber v. Andrews,
29 R. I. 51, 69 Atl. 1. (1908) ; See cases cited supra in note (6).
" Hurff v. Hires, 40 N. J. L. 581, 29 Am.Rep. 282; O'Keefe v. Leistikow, 14
N. D. 355, 104 N. W. 515 (1905); Cases and treatises cited supra note (7);
WAITE, SALEs, (1921) 64.
1 Scudder v. Worster, 11 cush 573 (Mass., 1853) (Holding separation necessary to Pass Title) ; Whitehouse v. Frost, 12 East 614 (K. B. 1810) (Separation
held not necessary to passing of title.
"Stems v. Vickers [1923] 1 K. B. 78 (Separation held essential) ; 1 WILLIsTON, SALES (2nd ed. 1924) §148 (To the effect that in England before separation
the sale of a part of fungibles passes no title in severalty nor creates a tenancy
in common) ; material cited supra notes (6), (7), and (10) for the prevailing
view in this country.
English SALE OF GOODs Acr §16 ("Where there is a contract for the sale
of unascertained goods no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer
unless and until the goods are ascertained"). United States UNIFoRm SALEs Acr
§17 ("Where there is a contract to sell unascertained goods, no property in the
goods is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained,
but property in an undivided share of ascertained goods may be transferred as
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Determination of what goods are included in the term "fungible
merchandise" involves consideration of requirements both as to (a) the
units and (b) the mass they compose. The units must be not only practically identical, but also in mercantile usage each one must be regarded
as the equivalent of the other ;14 or, if the items are not the same, the
parties can treat them as being alike by agreement. 15 Once the requirements as to the iinits are satisfied, there must be a common mass or bulk
composed of those units; there is such a common mass either when the
units are commingled, or when the parties agree to regard the different
constituents, even though widely separated, as parts of a common
supply.16 Hence in the instant case, the reasoning of the court to the
effect that all the goods, though in different warehouses, were brought
into a common mass by the terms of the contracts for sale seems sound.
As illustrative of the above rules: (a) Clearly liquids, cotton, hay,
grains, and fruits, of like standard and condition, commingled in huge
depositories, are fungible goods.. 7 (b) The same is usually true when
such merchandise is put up in boxes, barrels, sacks, or bales, though
not always.' 8 But automobiles, even though of the same make, model,
style, and price, are not fungible goods, because in mercantile practice
one of such cars is not treated as the equivalent of any other of them ;19
in the light of the fact that such units are of the same value, quality, and
state, it is believed that this distinction is arbitrary, and that automobiles
should be treated as fungibles without special agreement. Of course
by agreement even units of varying kind and quality, as sheep or cattle,
20
may be deemed fungible property.
JOE. L. CARLTON.

provided in section six") id. §6 ("If the parties intend to effect a present sale,
the buyer, by force of the agreement, becomes an owner in common with the
owners of the remaining shares." The remainder of the section makes this
specifically applicable to fungible goods). MARIAsHr, SALES (1930) 753 (Listing states that have adopted the UNIFORM SALES Acr). North Carolina has not
adopted the act, and there seem to be no cases directly in point with the principal
case from this state.
" UNIFORM SALES AcT §76 (1)
("Fungible goods means goods of which
any unit is from its nature or by mercantile usage treated as the equivalent of any
other unit) ; Cases cited supra notes (6) and (7).

1Watts v. Hendry, 13 Fla. 523, (1870); Woodward v. Edmunds, 20 Utah

118, 57 Pac. 848 (1899) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALSS (2nd ed. 1924) §159.
"See: Jennings-Haywood-Oil Synod v. IHaussiere-Latreille Oil Co., 127,

La. 971, 54 So. 318; Henderson Grain Co., v. Russ, 122 Tex. 620, 64 S. W. (2d)

347 (1933) ; Trejbal v. Packhard Farmers Warehouse Co., 124 Wash. 638, 215

Pac. 26 (1923).

"'Cases cited supra under notes (5), (6), and (7); Any suggestion of the
characteristic of selection in the place of that or mere weight or measure precludes the possibility of fungible goods: Lamprey v. Sargent, 58 N. H. 241 (1878),
where hard brick were to be selected from a quantity of brick.
's See 1 WILLISTOIT, SALEs (2nd ed. 1924) §159.
"oSee MARIAsr, SALES (1930) §77.
'Cases and treatise cited supra note (15).
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Statute of Frauds-The Main Purpose!Doctrine in North Carolina.
In determining whether or not an oral promise to answer for the
debt of another is within the statute of frauds' many courts have applied the "main purpose rule," the essence of which doctrine is that if
the promisor has a personal, immediate, and pecuniary interest in the
transaction in which a third party is the obligor, the promise is original
and not within the statute. This doctrine seems to have had its origin
in Massachusetts, 2 but the cases most frequently cited in support of it
are two decisions of the United States Supreme Court.3 This doctrine
has been accepted and applied in North Carolina. 4 Thus it has
been held in this state that the promisor's interest was sufficient to take
his oral promise out of the statute where he agreed to pay his grantor's
purchase money mortgage ;5 where he promised to pay a subcontractor
for hauling logs to his mill ;6 where he agreed to pay the creditor who
furnished a boiler to his contractor to be used in making slabs for use
in the promisor's business ;7 and where a bank president made an oral
guaranty of deposits, it appearing that the bank was on the verge of insolvency and that the promisor stood to lose heavily in that event. 8
In a case where a group of citizens agreed to waive the provisions of a
tax assessment statute in order that a street might be improved, it was
held that the interest the leader of the group had in having the street
past his property improved was sufficient to take out of the statute of
frauds his promise to obtain waivers from the remainder of the adjoining owners, and he was held responsible for the payment by them. 9
With the exception of this last case the principal debtor remained liable
in all of these cases.' 0
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §987 provides in substance that "no action
shall be brought . . . to charge any defendant on any special promise to answer
the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person unless the agreement on
which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in
writing, and signed by the party charged therewith or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized."
2 Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Metc. 396, 37 Am. Dec. 148 (Mass. 1841) Chief Justice
Shaw, in discussing cases not within the statute, said, "where although the effect
of the promise is to pay the debt of another, yet the leading object of the undertaker is to subserve some interest or purpose of his own, the promise is not within
the statute."
I Emerson v. Slater, 63 U. S. 28, 16 L. ed. 360 (1859) ; Davis v. Patrick, 141
U. S. 479, 12 Sup. Ct. 58, 35 L. ed. 826 (1891).
'Dale v. Gaither Lumber Co., 152 N. C. 651, 68 S. E. 134 (1910).
Coxe v. Dillard, 197 N. C. 344, 148 S. E. 545 (1929).
'Dale v. Gaither Lumber Co., 152 N. C. 651, 68 S. E. 134 (1910).
7 Kelly Handle Co. v. Crawford Mill Supply Co., 171 N. C. 495, 88 S. E.
514 (1916).
'Dillard v. Walker, 204 N. C. 16, 167 S. E. 636 (1933).
'City of Charlotte v. Alexander, 173 N. C. 515, 92 S. E. 384 (1917).
"The statute of frauds is no defense if there has been a release of a third
person in consideration of the promise. Shepherd v. Newton, 139 N. C. 533,
'52 S. E. 143 (1905) ; Jenkins v. 'Holley, 140 N. C. 379, 53 S. E. 237 (1906).
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The court, however, has not been altogether consistent in its application of the rule. In a recent case it was indicated in a very strong dictum that a person who is president, director, and stockholder of a corporation does not have such an interest in the successful and profitable
operation of that corporation as to take his oral promise to answer for
its debt out of the statute of frauds." In an opinion filed on the same
day it was held that the interest of one who is vice-president, director,
stockholder, and depositor of a bank is such as will take out of the
statute his oral promise to indemnify a depositor against loss by reason
of the bank's insolvency.' 2 Neither of these cases refers to the other.
The court in the first case argues that there the promisor's interest is
no more personal and immediate than the interest of the landlord in
8
the success of his tenant's farming operations and cites Peele v. Powell."
In that case the landlord promised to stand for supplies furnished his
tenant. In the action against the landlord on this promise a judgment
of nonsuit was affirmed on the ground that the oral promise was within
the statute of frauds. Wherever this case has been cited the fact generally 'has been overlooked that the court on a rehearing of the case
reversed its former ruling and held the facts sufficient to be submitted
to the jury.14 The case is therefore no authority for the proposition
that a landlord does not have sufficient interest in the successful operation of his farm by a tenant to take a promise to pay the tenant's debt
out of the statute of frauds. As a matter of fact the court has expressly held otherwise. 1
The main purpose rule has its justification in the fact that when it
can be shown that the promisor has a personal and pecuniary interest
in the transaction, it is likely that the promise was in fact made. It is
obvious that the strict construction of the statute advocated by some
authorities'16 will make the statute an instrument for the perpetration of
" Gennett v. Lyerly, 207 N. C. 201, 176 S. E. 275 (1934).
' Garren v. Youngblood, 207 N. C. 86, 176 S. E. 252 (1934).

156 N. C. 553, 73 S. E. 234 (1911).
" Peele v. Powell, 161 N. C. 50, 76 S. E. 698 (1912).
1Whitehurst v. Padgett, 157 N. C. 424, 73 S. E. 240 (1911) ; Taylor v. Lee,
187 N. C. 393, 121 S. E. 659 (1924) ; Tarkinton v. Criffield, 188 N. C. 140, 124
S. E.
129 (1924).
0
" In McCord v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 124 Wis. 509, 102 N. W. 334
(1905) the court said: "There are many dicta and some decisions indicating
that this result may be escaped if there is a new consideration for the guaranty,
or if such consideration consist of benefit to the guarantor. The statute, how-

ever, recognizes no such exception." Cf. Ames v. Foster, 106 Mass. 400 (1871) ;
Lang v. Henry, 54 N. H. 57 (1873) ; Muller v. Riviere, 59 Tex. 640 (1883). The
'main purpose rule does not apply in England: Harburg Comb Co. v. Martin,
(1902) 1 K. B. 778. The contention of this group seems to be that if the
promisor's promise is to pay the debt of another, it is within the statute regardless of the promisor's beneficial interest in the transaction; that if the promise
is in effect to pay the promisor's own debt, then it is immaterial that payment has
the incidental effect of extinguishing the liability of another. 1 BRAniff, SuRET-
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fraud rather than the prevention of it. The main purpose rule has an
important place in the North Carolina law of contract. It would indeed
be a surprise to the hundreds of merchants who extend credit to tenant
farmers on the landlord's promise to stand for the debt to learn that the
landlord was not responsible unless there was a writing evidencing his
promise. But if we are to retain the doctrine, it is submitted that there
should be an attempt to harmonize the decisions so as to prevent such
incompatible rulings as those presented by the two recent cases noted.
FRANKLIN

T. DuPpEE, JR.

United States-Suits against the GovernmentCancellation of Air Mail Contracts.
In February, 1934, Postmaster General Farley cancelled government
mail contracts of three air transportation companies; and, under authority from President Roosevelt, turned over the task of carrying the
air mail which the companies had been performing, to army planes
and pilots. One of these companies brought suit against Farley to
force the restoration by him of its cancelled contract. Held, bill dismissed for want of jurisdiction in a suit substantially one against the
United States.'
There are, in this and similar cases, three possible lines of procedure: (1)
The injured party may sue the official in a strictly personal action for
damages. This redress is open only in cases where the officer has committed a tort.2 Such as act must have been done without authority;
but apparent authority will not protect a defendant. 3 (2) If Congress
has given its consent, the plaintiff may sue the United States. 4 This has
generally been allowed only in cases on contract brought in the Court
of Claims. 5 (3) Finally, as in the principal case, the aggrieved may
sue the officer in a quasi-private capacity and ask that the particular act
be restrained, or, in case of non-action, compelled.
In cases of this last type, granted that the official acted either (1)
without auliority, or (2) illegally, or (3) in an attempt to enforce an
sunp (3rd ed. 1905) §81; 1 Wn.LIsToN, CONTRACTS (1920 ed.) §470; Arnold, The
Main Purpose Rule and The Statute of Frauds (1924) 10 CoRN L. Q. 28; Falconbridge, Guarantees and the Statute of Frauds (1919) 68 U. PA. L. R~v. 1.
I Transcontinental and Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Farley, 71 F. (2d) 288
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; certioraridenied U. S. Supreme Court, Oct. 14, 1934.
Elliot v. Swartwout, 35 U. S.137, 9 L. ed. 373 (1835).
Little v. Barreme, 6 U. S.170, 2 L. ed. 243 (1804).
'U. S. ex rel. Levey v. Stockslager, 129 U. S.470, 9 Sup. Ct. 382, 32 L. ed. 785
(1888) ; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 3734 22 Sup. Ct. 650, 46 L. ed. 945
(1902) (Consent had been given).
'The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is defined in 28 U. S. C. A. §250
(1928). It is said that the next move of the airlines will be to sue in this court.
U. S. News Weekly, Oct. 22, 1934, p. 14.
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unconstitutional statute, and that the injury is one properly cognizable
by the courts; still, if the suit is regarded as against the United States,
the court wil have no jurisdiction and a resort to it will bring no
redress. 6
The rule that no state 7 can be sued without its consent is considered
axiomatic in the law,8 and is no longer limited to cases wherein the state
appears on the record as a party.9 The doctrine is based on two quite
separate considerations: (1) That the state is sovereign. It can do no
wrong, and the court is powerless to enforce decrees against it.10 (2)
That the courts will not interfere with the processes of government by
controlling discretionary acts of officials, or, as it is sometimes phrased,
that the courts will not decide a political question. 11 It is necessary,
therefore, when the objection is raised that a suit is one against the
state, to determine whether it is either directed against the sovereign as
such, or is one which involves interference with executive discretion.
Is the sovereign state sued? If it is the nominal party defendant,
obviously so.12 If not, then the question becomes whether or not it has
such an interest in the outcome that the suit is in reality one against it.
A direct property right in the subject of the controversy is such an
'Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60, 26 Sup. Ct. 568, 50 L. ed. 955 (1906).
"A distinction is sometimes taken between suits against a state as an ideal
person and those against the government which is its agent. The differentiation,
though valid as a recognition of the two reasons for the rule, is a confusing one
and is not adhered to in the present note. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270,
5 Sup.
Ct. 903, 29 L. ed. 185 (1884).
8
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U. S. 264, 380, 5 L. ed. 257 (1821) (The doctrine was,
without comment, recognized for the first time in the United States Supreme
Court). Amend. XI to the U. S. CoNsT. makes the situation identical in suits
brought against officers of the states of the Union with those against officers of
the United States.
"Ex pare Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 8 Sup. Ct 164, 31 L. ed. 216 (1887) ; United
States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 27 L. ed. 171 (1882). The rule laid
down by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 22
U. S. 738, 6 L. ed. 204 (1824) that jurisdiction in these cases is to be determined
by inspection of the record has been "modified" by subsequent decisions, supra,
until it now means only that lack of jurisdiction may be determined by inspection.
1 BL. Comm. *242 Blackstone cites as authority for this proposition BRAcTON, DE LcrBus Er CoNsunr mD Bus Aw
mLn,
f. 5b (1285) in which Bracton
says, "The king himself ought not to be subject to man, but subject to God and
to the law, for the law makes the king. Let the king attribute (attribuat rex) to
the law ... dominion and power." However, the same author says, op. cit. supra
f. 34, "The king has a superior, to-wit God. Likewise the law by which the king
is made. Likewise his court, to-wit counts and barons, because they are called
counts as if equals of the king, and he who has an equal has a master." This
latter passage is marked as being of doubtful authority in the edition of Bracton
published by the Yale Press (1922).
nMississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 18 L. ed. 437 (1866) (The case raises
an additional question of the power of the court in any event to control the
Executive Department which is the President of the United States, but was
decided on both grounds. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U. S. 50, 18 L. ed. 721 (1867).
" See United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 27 L. ed. 171 (1882).
The writer has been unable to find any considered case, not in the Court of Claims,
in which the United States was expressly made a party defendant.
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interest ;13 but the fact that the government owns all of the stock in a
defendant corporation has been held not to defeat an action.1 4 Also, if
the effect of a decree in the case will be to enforce specific performance
against the state, the suit cannot be maintained.1 5 The principal case
was decided on this basis.
Is the case such that the court, if it took jurisdiction, would be
forced to control executive discretion? If the officer acted without his
authority, he had no discretion whatever and an injunction will issue ;16
and since an unconstitutional statute gives no authority, an attempt to
enforce such a law will be restrained. 17 But, if the official acted within
his authority, the court will ordinarily not move to restrain him and
will not consider the juestion of the illegality of the act.1 8 Furthermore, because of the policy against supervision of executive administration, the court will not enforce affirmative action on his part, even though
non-action amounts to a violation of the Constitution.1 9 If, however,
there is a refusal to do an act which is purely ministerial, that is, one
concerning which the officer has no discretion, the court will issue a
mandamus compelling performance 2 0
'Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 16 Sup. Ct. 443, 40 L. ed. 599 (1895) (Suit
to enjoin the use of United States property in the hands of defendant on the
grounds that plaintiff's patent rights had been violated. Dismissed.) ; Oregon v.
Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60, 26 Sup. Ct. 568, 50 L. ed. 955 (1906) (The United States
had title to land claimed by plaintiff.) ; Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331,
27 Sup. Ct. 388, 51 L. ed. 510 (1906) (Case against the Secretary of the Interior
dismissed because the effect of a decree favorable to plaintiff would be to oust subsequent grantees of the United States and give them claims against the state.) ;
United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 27 L. ed. 171 (1882) (The
court first held that title to the land in question was not in the United States and
then enjoined officers, who claimed to hold for the government, from occupying
the premises). In these cases the ostrich-like procedure of determining jurisdiction by first deciding whether title actually is in the state is followed. However,
a desirable result is attained at only a small sacrifice of logic.
"Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation, 258 U. S. 594, 42 Sup. Ct. 386, 66 L. ed. 762 (1922).
'1 Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335, 38 Sup. Ct. 317, 62 L. ed. 755 (1917) ; United
States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U. S. 218, 34 Sup. Ct. 84, 58 L. ed. 191

(1913).

" Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota ex rel. Langer, 250 U. S. 135, 39
Sup. Ct. 502 63 L. ed. 897 (1918).
(Though holding that the defendant acted
within his authority, the court considered the merits saying that the claim of a
lack of authority was not so frivolous as to form no basis for jurisdiction);
American School v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 23 Sup. Ct. 33, 47 L. ed. 90 (1902).
" Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. ed. 819 (1897) ; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 11 Sup. Ct. 699, 35 L. ed. 363 (1890).
"Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627, 34 Sup. Ct 938, 58 L. ed. 1506 (1913)
(Interpretation of the tariff act in question was within the discretion of the defendant, Secretary of the Treasury) ; Ex parte Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 8 Sup. Ct. 164,
31 L. ed. 216 (1887) ; Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U. S. 409, 51 Sup. Ct. 186, 75 L. ed.
388 (1930) (An allegation that taxes collected were illegal made suit against tax
collector personal).
"Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 6 Sup. Ct. 608, 29 L. ed. 805 (1885) ; see
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, at 16, cited note 17, mtpra.
'*Houston v. Ormes, 252 U. S. 469, 40, Sup. Ct. 369, 64 L. ed. 667 (1919) ; Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U. S. 249, 29 Sup. Ct. 62, 53 L. ed. 168 (1908).
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These rules are laid down as being separate and distinct, but it must
be observed that in practice both principles are frequently involved in
the same case and often, as in the leading case of United States v. Lee, 21
the determination of whether or not the state has an interest in the outcome of the suit will incidentally also determine the question of the officer's authority. Thus, in the principal case, not only -has the United
States an interest in the suit, but also a decree forcing Farley to reinstate
the contract would involve the difficulties attendant upon the supervision of an official's performance of his duties.
Were the rules governing these cases otherwise, there would be
opened an opportunity for an interference with governmental functions which would put the good of a private individual above the general welfare. Just when this is not true is a question of policy best
determined, as it has been, by Congress which has, in general, provided
adequate relief in case where the injury is the result of a breach of

contract.

PETER

W. HAiRSTONS.

Wills-Posthumous Continuation of Undue Influence.
In a will contest, caveators offered evidence of undue influence alleged to have been exerted by testator's wife, and proponents objected
on the ground that the contested codicils were executed eight days and
ninety-eight days respectively after her death. Held, in contemplation
of law, undue influence does not necessarily cease with the death of the
person alleged to have exercised it. Judgment for caveators sustained.'
It is well established that influence alleged to be undue need not be
physical force but may be, and, in fact, more often is some more subtle
power which operates only on the mind of the testator.2 No overt acts
of any kind need be exercised at the exact time of the execution of the
will,8 nor is there any fixed time limit as to the admissibility of acts
committed previously. 4 Questions of remoteness are largely within
1 106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 27 L. ed. 171 (1882).
1

Trusf Co. v. Ivey, 178 Ga. 629, 173 S. E. 648 (1934).

Only one American and one English case have been found in point, and both
are in accord with the principal case. Penniston v. Kerrigan, 159 Ga. 345, 125
S. E. 795 (1924) (death preceded testamentary act by approximately eight
months); Radford v. Risdon, 28 T. L. R. 342, 55 Sol. Jo. 416 (Pros. Div., and
Adm. Divq 1912) (death preceded testamentary act by eleven days).
211 re Hinton's Will, 180 N. C. 206, 104 S. E. 341 (1920); Marx v. McGlynn,
88 N. Y. 357 (1882) ; In re Brunor's Will, 43 N. Y. S. 1141, 19 Misc. Rep. 203
(1896); RooD, WnLs (2d ed. 1926) §§175, 176; 1 ScHOULER, WILLS, ExECUTORS

AND ADMrNISTRATORS (5th ed. 1915) §§228, 229.

1Shepardson v. Potter, 53 Mich. 106, 18 N. W. 575 (1884) ; Mowry v. Norman, 204 Mo. 173, 103 S. W. 15 (1907); Gott v. Dennis, 296 Mo. 66, 246 S. W.
218 (1922) ; Kaechelen v. Barringer, 19 S. W. (2d) 1033 (Mo. App. 1929) ; 1 PAGE,

Wx.ms (2d ed. 1926) §194.

'Huffman v. Groves, 245 IIl. 440, 92 N. E. 289 (1910).
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the discretion of the trial court, 5 and if contestant can show a continuation of the effect on the mind of the testator, it seems immaterial when
the acts themselves were committed. 6 The person alleged to have exerted undue influence need not have been present at the execution of
the will,7 nor need he have had a beneficial interest thereunder ;s and
since neither the time element nor the manner of exerting influence
would bar a contestant from alleging the undue influence of one living
at the time but removed from the scene of the making of the will, the
only problem left in distinguishing between the influence of a deceased
person and one merely absent, seems to be in the matter of proof of
its continued operation on the mind of the testator. This is a question
of fact which should be submitted to the jury,9 unless, of course, the
court finds that the evidence calls for a directed verdict.
In cases of this kind, even more than in ordinary will contests, special consideration should be given to evidence of the relationship of the
parties and the relative power of resistance of the testator. A careful
distinction should also be made between that influence which threatens
the testator's physical comfort and safety and that which prejudices his
mind. For example, the alleged influence in the principal case, which
consisted mainly of threats by the testator's wife to commit suicide, or
to do him bodily harm, or to harass and annoy him, seems to be such
5 i re Everett's Will, 105 Vt. 291, 166 AtI. 827
(1933). Evidence of acts
alleged in the following cases was excluded as "too remoie": In re Chisholm's
Will, 93 Vt. 453, 108 Atl. 393 (1919) (twenty years); Vannest v. Murphey, 135
Iowa 123, 112 N. W. 236 (1907) (eighteen years) ; In re Shell's Estate, 28 Colo.
167, 63 Pac. 413 (1900) (sixteen years) ; Ketchum v. Steams, 76 Mo. 396 (1882)
(eleven years) ; Batchelders v. Batchelders, 139 Mass. 12, 29 N. E. 61 (1885)
(eight or nine years, "entirely too remote') ; Davidson's Ex'r v. Melton, 223 Ky.
145, 3 S.W. (2d) 19& (1928) (eight years); Floto v. Floto, 233 Ill. 605, 84 N. E.
712 (1908) (seven years); Bunyard v. McElroy Ex'r., 21 Ala. 311 (1852) (six
years); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Di Cola, 233 Mass. 119, 123 N. E. 454 (1919)
(six years); Sullivan v. Brabazon, 264 Mass. 276, 162 N. E. 312 (1928) (two
years) ; Eckert v. Flowry, 43 Pa. St. 46 (1862) (one year).
But acts alleged in the following cases were admitted in evidence: Smith's
Ex'r v. Smith, 67 Vt. 443, 32 At. 255 (1895) (six weeks); Loree v. Vedder,
158 Mich, 372, 122 N. W. 623 (1909) (six years); Powers Ex'r v. Powers, 25
Ky. L. 1468, 78 S.W. 152 (1904) (undue influence vitiating a previous will held
available to defeat a similar will executed approximately fifteen years later).
"Dunnaway v. Smoot, 23 Ky. L. 2289, 67 S.W. 62 (1902) ("immaterial"
when exerted) ; Shepardson v. Potter, 53 Mich. 106, 18 N. W. 575 (1884) (may
be exerted "previously"); In re Everett's Will, 105 Vt. 291, 166 Atl. 827 (1933)
(available "whenever exerted, whether months or years before").
'In re Richardson's Will, 199 Iowa 1320, 202 N. W. 114 (1925); Worth v.
Pierson, 208 Iowa 353, 223 N. W. 752 (1929) ; Mowry v. Norman, 204 Mo. 173,
103 S.W. 15 (1907); I PAGE, WiLLs §193.
'I re Cahill, 74 Cal. 52, 15 Pac. 364 (1887) ; Vanvalkenberg v. Vanvalkenberg, 90 Ind. 433 (1883) ; Gott v. Dennis, 296 Mo. 66, 246 S.W. 218 (1922) ; 1
PAGE, WILLs §193; 1 J'aRMAN, Wu.s (6th ed. 1893) p. 68. But cf. Stutivilles
Ex'rs. v. Wheeler, 187 Ky. 361, 291 S.W. 411 (1927).
'Zeigler v. Coffin, 219 Ala. 586, 123 So. 22 (1929); Madden v. Keyser, 331

Ill. 643, 163 N. E. 424 (1928) ; Blume v. Hartman, 115 Pa. 32, 8 Atl. 219 (1887).
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influence as would naturally cease with the death of the wife. But, on
the other hand, in a case in which the first of testator's daughters represented to him that the second daughter had wronged her, did not love
him, and did not deserve to participate in his estate, a prejudice thus
formed in the testator's mind might well remain after the death of the
first daughter. 10 In fact it is easily conceivable that such prejudice might
be actually increased by the death of the daughter who pictured herself as having suffered at the hands of the other. In such situations,
however, it is difficult to determine just when such influence no longer
overwhelms the will but
instead convinces the judgment and therefore
11
ceases to be "undue."
Whatever criticism may be made of the jury's handling of the facts
in the principal case, the court's refusal to exclude evidence of the continuation of undue influence simply because of the intervening death
of the person alleged to have exerted it, seems to present a sound policy
not inimical to what is conceived to be the nature and effect of undue
influence, nor inconsistent with the present rules concerning the proof
thereof.
R. MAYNE ALBRIGHT.
"Penniston v. Kerrigan, 159 Ga. 345, 125 S. E. 795 (1924) cited note 1,
supra.
'Cf. Henderson v. Jackson, 138 Ohio 326, 111 N. W. 821 (1907) (Testatrix
unwillingly disinherited her heirs because she felt bound by a promise made her
husband at his death four years previous to the making of the will. Held, not
undue influence). But cf. Nelson v. Oldfield, 2 Vern. 76 (Ch. 1688) (Testatrix
unwillingly disinherited her mother and sisters in favor of a stranger because of
a previous oath she had been prevailed upon to make and which she "durst not
[break] for fear of damnation." Held, undue influence).

